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What do American people talk about, with whom, and when? What people talk about influ-
ences and is influenced by who they talk with, and when they talk structures the interdepen-
dency between discussion topics and relationships. This context-alter-topic interdependency
provides an opportunity to identify contextual mechanisms by which social and political net-
works are activated and deactivated in response to salient social events and polarized contexts.
Do people talk about important matters with fewer people than ever before? Do people or-
ganize their political belief systems in ideological ways using the single liberal-conservative
dimension? Do people discuss politics with more people who are more politically diverse in
contested elections? This dissertation answers these and related questions by revisiting the
same survey data that others have found useful in the past, but with a new and fresh lens.
Do people talk about important matters with fewer people than ever before? The 2004 General
Social Survey (GSS) reported significant increases in social isolation and significant decreases
in ego-network size relative to previous periods. These results have been repeatedly chal-
lenged, though none precisely identify the cause of decreased ego-network size. The second
chapter shows that it matters that the 2004 GSS – unlike other GSS surveys – was fielded
during a highly polarized election period. I show that political priming induced by presiden-
tial election events makes people frame “important matters” as political matters, and political
polarization further suppresses network size especially for non-partisans.
Do people organize their political belief system in ideological ways using the single liberal-
conservative dimension? By considering a set of interrelated political beliefs as a network of
belief systems, the third chapter seeks to resolve theoretical puzzles concerning the organiza-
tion of political belief systems, and address competing accounts of the role of political ideology
and core values. I compare results from the American National Election Studies and General
Social Surveys, and show the strong contextual influence on belief systems. I find that belief
systems, often thought to be relatively stable, need to be “activated” by certain social cues.
Do people discuss politics with more people who are more politically diverse during contested
elections? The fourth chapter focuses on battleground states to investigate the mutual interre-
lationship between political discussion partners and topics: who people discuss politics with
depends on which issues they discuss and vice versa. I propose that increases in the salience of
politics and exposure to opposing views contribute to the activation of interpersonal political
echo chambers. I present evidence to support this claim based on statistical analysis of the
1992, 2000, and 2008 National Election Studies.
My dissertation shows, throughout three empirical chapters, why we need to seriously
consider socio-temporal context in studies of social and political networks. I use survey timing,
exogenous events, and battleground states to show how political situations induced by political
events activate ideological thinking, which in turn deactivates our core discussion networks,
and ultimately activates interpersonal political echo chambers. In sum, I discover situational
activation of network processes.
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Social networks are main drivers through which diffusion of ideas and social contagion of
behaviors take place (Centola 2015; Rogers 2003; Valente 2012). They are also patterns,
which reveal an important part of social reality – the structure of interpersonal interactions
in small groups and large societies (Blau 1977; DiPrete et al. 2011; Granovetter 1973). It is
crucial to study how interpersonal network forms not only because it is a means of communica-
tion through which messages are delivered and social influence proceeds (Katz and Lazarsfeld
1966; Watts and Dodds 2007), but also because it is a barometer to represent the level of social
integration and social distance (Bearman 1997; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2006;
Smith, McPherson, and Smith-Lovin 2014).
The formation and evolution of social networks across time have increasingly gained schol-
arly attention across diverse fields such as computer science, statistics, economics, political
science, psychology as well as sociology (Rivera, Soderstrom, and Uzzi 2010). Therein, time
is conceptualized either as calendar time or as analytic time. In the cross-sectional repeated-
time design, scholars often compare average network characteristics among independent (and
representative) samples in two or more periods (McPherson et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2014).
In the longitudinal panel design, scholars trace the change of social ties within the same set of
individuals across multiple waves; some approaches consider continuous time (Snijders, van
de Bunt, and Steglich 2010; Snijders and Steglich 2015), other approaches consider discrete
time (Almquist and Butts 2014; Krivitsky and Handcock 2014; Robins et al. 2007). In the
longitudinal progressive-time design, scholars are interested in temporal patterns of change
in global network properties across “moving windows” – sometimes it is about sharp change
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points (Peel and Clauset 2014), or sometimes about gradual changes (Kossinets and Watts
2009).
Surprisingly, the situational role of time has rarely been considered – for example, to ask,
when the important matters network name generator is asked? Against this backdrop, I ar-
gue that we need to direct our attention to situational characteristics of time that structure
and govern the way actors interpret the situation they belong to, by which they are guided
to interact with others in particular ways. Historical network analysts follow this situational
perspective (Bearman, Faris, and Moody 1999; Diehl and McFarland 2010; Erikson and Bear-
man 2006), though this approach remains underemphasized by recent scholarship on network
dynamics. My dissertation seeks to remerge the importance of the “situational role of time”
through analyzing real-world events and their influence on network formation.
A huge volume of literature over the decades has utilized the “important matters” name
generator (and some of its variants) as core instruments to map the core discussion network
and measure the flow of information and support through social ties (Cornwell and Laumann
2011; Fischer 1982; Marsden 2002; Perkins, Subramanian, and Christakis 2015). Among net-
work outcomes from various network name generators, network size and network homophily
have been shown to be important determinants of health and economic successes (DiMaggio
and Garip 2012; Mouw 2006; Smith and Christakis 2008); for example, popular kids at schools
enjoy higher wage premiums later in life (Conti et al. 2013); older adults with stronger social
support networks live longer (Berkman and Syme 1979). Likewise, how much and with whom
people talk about political matters also play key roles in political domains; political disagree-
ment in interpersonal environments increases personal tolerance for different ideas, thereby
making political deliberation possible (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004; Mutz 2002b,
2002a; Pattie and Johnston 2008); those who have large network size are more likely to have
correct knowledge on political issues and engage in politics (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). In my
dissertation, I study what determines the size and homophily of ego-centric networks in the
general population.
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Theoretical explanations for the origin of social networks in prior literature broadly fall
into two categories – individual (e.g., preference) and structural (e.g., opportunity) factors
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Rivera et al. 2010). Namely, individuals have
larger (political discussion) network size because of higher human capital (Lake and Huckfeldt
1998) or due to genetics (Fowler, Dawes, and Christakis 2009) or because they occupy majority
positions in their neighborhood (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988). Regarding network homophily,
individuals are more likely to talk with the like-minded people because of their preference to
avoid conflicts and cognitive dissonance or because of lack of opportunity to interact with
people with opposing views (McPherson et al. 2001; Wimmer and Lewis 2010; Zeng and Xie
2008). However, one overlooked aspect is a cultural mechanism associated with the situational
role of time – how people interpret the survey question differently depending on the situation,
and as a result think differently about topics in their mind, which in turn activates whom people
talk to (Jerolmack and Khan 2014). Without an understanding of what time actually means to
agents, it is hard to infer the meaning of discussion networks at that time, or even sometimes
we shall make a wrong inference on the characteristics of the networks, thereby leading to
drawing an inaccurate portrait of the society.
Unlike prior literature that ignores the role of space/time in shaping the interpretation of
“important matters” and/or “political matters,” I specifically consider political polarization as
the most directly relevant situational characteristic to the current study context. Scholars agree
that there is increased political polarization in the United States (Abramowitz and Saunders
2008; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Prior 2013)1. What are the
implications of the rising political polarization on how we interpret survey questions, and
organize our political belief system, which further shapes our social networks? This is the
key question that I address throughout my dissertation.
1Although the literature on political polarization is split into those who see mass polarization (i.e. the opinion
distribution of the electorate has become more extreme and bimodal) (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008) and
those who see party sorting (i.e., the opinion distribution remains unimodal, but the alignment of partisanship
and ideology has become tighter) (Fiorina and Abrams 2008), the consequences of either mass polarization or
party sorting have an important implication to the way in which people discuss important political matters.
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Prior literature in this field investigates either historical changes of issue/partisan polariza-
tion or the relationship between partisan polarization and network polarization, especially for
opinion leaders. From this literature we know that (1) elites such as party leaders and con-
gressmen takes more distant positions and their communication networks are increasingly seg-
regated (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Moody and Mucha 2013; Robison and Mullinix
2015; Waugh et al. 2009), and (2) users in social media (e.g., twitter, blog) are becoming
more polarized in their ideological distance and patterns of interaction (Ackland and Shorish
2009; Adamic and Glance 2005; BarberÃa˛ 2015; Boutyline and Willer 2016), and (3) there
are increasing partisan sorting in the general population but the distribution of political atti-
tude stays the same (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Fiorina
and Abrams 2008; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Park 2018; Robison and Mullinix 2015).
However, how such historical change of increasing political polarization shapes network seg-
regation and political disagreement in the general population has not been fully examined yet.
What do people talk about, with whom and when? How do real-world events situate in-
dividuals in a particular temporal context that shapes their political belief system, which in
turn determines the topic of discussion? In which way do discussion topics affect whom to talk
with? What is the implication of context-dependent nature of network segregation and isola-
tion to the society, especially during politically contested periods? More specifically, how does
political polarization influence the formation of political discussion network? How does local
spatial/temporal context interact with varying degree of individual perceptions and event-
driven issue-salience to induce the rise of political disagreement and political isolation? These
are the questions that I will investigate in my dissertation.
1.1 Outline of Chapters
My dissertation consists of three empirical chapters. Each chapter asks interrelated questions
on different aspects of the impact of political polarization on the size of core discussion net-
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works, core values in political belief system, and political diversity in political discussion net-
works. The second chapter of my dissertation, which I coauthored with Peter Bearman, tackles
the provocative claim, advanced in McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears (2004)’ analysis of
the 2004 GSS data, that people are more isolated today than ever before, by showing that the
average size of American’s immediate core discussion network shrunk by a third between 1985
to 2004. In contrast, I show that survey respondents in the 2004 GSS reported discussing “im-
portant matters” with a fewer number of people than those in the 1985 GSS, precisely because
the GSS 2004 survey was fielded during the highly polarized presidential election period in the
fall. As background, it has long been known that “political matters” discussion networks are
smaller than “important matters” discussion networks. I discover that core-discussion network
size decreased precipitously in the period immediately around the first presidential debate.
This suggests that the debate primes individuals to frame “important matters” as political mat-
ters. I find that this political priming effect is stronger where geographic polarization is weaker,
and among those who are more politically engaged.
In the third chapter, I study the role of political events in the organization of political belief
systems, considering a set of public opinions as a network of correlations. Theories of social
constraint insist that people use political identity as a cognitive heuristic to resolve the cog-
nitive complexity of ideological reasoning across ill-defined policy positions (Boutyline and
Vaisey 2017; Converse 1964). In contrast, according to a theory of “moral politics” (Lakoff
2002), family and parenting values occupy the center of complex belief systems. Alternatively,
Feldman (1988) denies the unidimensional liberal-conservative dimension, suggesting politi-
cal belief system is organized by a set of core values that are pertinent to the Lockean liberal
basis. Identifying which item is at the center of political belief systems is not only useful for
testing competing theories of organizing liberal and conservative political worldviews, but also
for enumerating the core values held by people in certain situations.
With this understanding, I apply the belief network analysis recently proposed by Boutyline
and Vaisey (2017) to the General Social Surveys and American National Election Studies in five
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presidential election years since 2000. I reproduce Boutyline and Vaisey’s finding that political
ideology occupies the center of belief networks in the ANES. In contrast, I discover that gay
rights issues have been the most central in the GSS since 2008. To reconcile these findings,
I investigate the potential role of survey timing in shaping which values emerge in the core.
Using a 30-day moving window, I calculate the centrality for each belief across time and find
that the centrality of gay right issues peaked right after the tragic mass shooting event at the
Pulse gay nightclub in Orlando, whereas the centrality of liberal-conservative ideology peaked
around the first presidential debate. These results imply that people react to a particularly
salient political event by updating their core values.
Recent debates on political polarization are centered on the rise of affective polarization.
Animosity between Republicans and Democrats has significantly increased, while their ideo-
logical distance on a set of key public opinion issues has stayed the same (Iyengar et al. 2012;
Mason 2016). Yet, it is one thing that opposing partisans hate each other, but it is another that
they do not have meaningful interaction and activate only politically homophilous ties. Thus,
the second chapter of my dissertation focuses on electoral competitiveness as a driver of expo-
sure to opposing views and concomitant segregation. I combine three nationally representative
survey data sets (i.e., the 1992, 2000, 2008 National Election Study), all of which collect in-
formation about political discussion networks from 1992 to 2008. I also collect election results
and merge them at the state level over the same period. From this, I exploit exogenous varia-
tions produced by state-level election-specific winning margins of the US Presidential elections
in order to identify how political fragmentation arises in the battleground states where an elec-
tion is expected and turns out to be close. In doing so, my fourth chapter identifies the causal
processes of how neighborhood contexts constrain structural opportunity and guide behavioral
rules -- activating individuals’ own political echo-chambers.
In the concluding chapter of my dissertation, I summarize findings and suggest the the-
oretical implications for studying social theory of action. I present initial evidence from the
nationally representative survey experiment data that I conducted with Peter Bearman with a
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focus on political context during the 2016 US presidential election – one of the nastiest and
most polarized elections. The findings from my dissertation shed light on how to repair bridges
that enable meaningful public discourse about politics in politically divided nations.
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Chapter 2
Important Matters in Political Context
There is general consensus in the public and social science community that people are more
isolated today than ever before. Part of this idea arises from the broadly historical recogni-
tion that the transition to modernity is characterized by the breaking of traditional relations
that bound individuals to their local communities and kinship groups. Part of this consensus
is more immediate, supported by survey data that indicates that social isolation has increased
and that the size of strong-tie ego-networks has decreased. The key set of findings in this
regard are identified by McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears whose 2006 article reports
significant increases in social isolation and significant decreases in the size of Americans’ dis-
cussion networks from the 2004 General Social Survey (GSS), which shows that the average
size of American’s immediate conversational network shrunk by a third in the two decades
from 1985 to 2004.
This finding has not gone unchallenged. Critics have argued that the decrease in network
size, for example, arises not because Americans are more isolated, but instead as a conse-
quence of respondent fatigue (arising endogenously during the survey) or problems occurring
exogenously at the level of the survey organization. The latter -- interviewer malfeasance and
coding errors -- are easy to dispense with as the main drivers of change. The former, whether
the mechanism is seen as fatigue or respondent learning arising from order effects (where ques-
tions are located within the survey) are more difficult to reject and in fact were anticipated
by McPherson et al (2006), who raised and evaluated the impact of question order, training
and fatigue on self-reported discussion network size and argued that these factors had little
influence. Our analysis largely supports their claims; although each critique has some merit,
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none precisely identify why the size of individuals’ ego-networks decreased. This is the task
undertaken in this article.
To anticipate our argument, we start with the observation that while people report a lot
of heterogeneous topics – health, finances, local events, new shows on TV, celebrity salaries,
wildlife – when they describe their last important conversation (Bearman and Parigi 2004;
Brashears 2014), as a rule they try to avoid potentially tense conversations. This is why we try
not to get into political conversations with the parents of our children’s friends at the school
barbecue. Politics as a topic of conversation is fraught with potential risk and as a consequence,
while our “political matters” discussion networks are a subset of our ‘important matters” net-
works, they are systematically smaller.
But at some times, when it seems as if everyone is talking about politics, people do talk
about politics. In the United States politics becomes especially salient in election years, and
even more so around key moments. Some of those key moments are local – for example pri-
maries. But others are national, for example the first debate of the presidential candidates
following their party conventions. When these events take place, people are primed to think
about politics and this priming shifts the ways in which they interpret the “important matters”
name generator used by the GSS to capture core strong-tie networks. When political matters
are primed, reported network size decreases for the simple reason that people talk with fewer
people about politics than they do about “important matters” more generally. One of the sur-
prises of the 2004 GSS (where smaller interpersonal networks were first observed) is that the
survey – in contrast to previous administrations – took place in the fall of a presidential election
year. This turns out to be critical.
Roadmap
Immediately below we briefly review the extended debate precipitated by the 2004 GSS with
respect to increased social isolation in America. This debate centers on methodological issues
because increased isolation was not associated with any theoretically relevant social changes in
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the initial publication. We suggest that political priming allows us to see how political polariza-
tion expresses itself on network size. We then consider the relationship between partisanship
and network size over time to show how temporally polarized contexts matter. Priming can be
political or apolitical, and one way to think about priming effects in surveys is to consider at-
tention cycles. We show how incredibly short such cycles are using Google Trends data for the
fall of 2004. We then use a Bayesian change point model to identify the moment of sharpest
change in reported network size over the course of the 2004 GSS survey period. This coin-
cides with peak attention to the first presidential debate. We show that the priming effect of
the debate – the closer to the debate, the smaller the network size reported – does not suffer
from reachability or prominence bias. Against that background, we consider how priming and
context interact by focusing on polarization within the GSS primary sampling units. Finally,
we discuss the implication of our findings.
2.1 Increasing social isolation as methodological artifacts?
The idea that there were potential exogenous drivers of decreased network size was first pro-
posed by Fischer (2009) who suggested that a random technical error – individuals who should
have been reported as missing were reported as having zero discussion partners – artifactually
induced the core findings. There was some truth to the first part of this claim: after Fisher’s
critique, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) announced that 41 cases that had been
coded as reporting zero confidants should have been treated as missing data (Fischer 2009:
658). While there was a coding error (Fisher was right), the error had no effect on the results
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2009). The observation, first proposed by Paik and
Sanchagrin (2013) that some interviewers may have over-represented isolated individuals –
presumably so as to get through their interview more quickly -- appears to be similar. Some in-
terviewers are associated with over-reporting isolates, but it is highly unlikely that this actually
matters (see Appendix A).
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The idea that isolation is an artifact of order effects is more challenging. Here the mech-
anisms are varied. One idea is that – similar to the so-called over-reporting interviewers –
respondents wanted to end the survey more quickly and so didn’t report talking with others
about important matters. This may be because they learned (from within the survey) that if
they identified an organization that they were a member of, a host of questions about that
organization followed. So here, fatigue and learning as mechanisms overlap. Of course, re-
spondents in 2004 may have experienced many more surveys of all sorts in which they were
trained to expect “follow-up questions” to any answers they gave. Fatigue on its own may
have played a role. In some of the 2004 GSS administrations, the social network questions
were placed at the end of the already excessively long 90-minutes face-to-face interview.
Throughout this debate, two separate outcomes – proportion isolated and decreasing net-
work size – were often conflated. The various mechanisms proposed as (artifactually) inducing
the observation of network change matter differently for each outcome. For example, McPher-
son et al (2009) show that while the coding errors may necessarily impact network size, the
extent of that impact is minor. Similarly, they acknowledge that coding errors do influence
(slightly) the extent of social isolation, writing, for example “[W]e are pretty sure that there
are inflated zeros in both 1985 and 2004, and we are pretty sure that there are more in 2004
than in 1985” (2009:674). For McPherson et al, the picture is messy, but the conclusions they
draw are the same – they observe a meaningful decrease in network size.
Using the positional variation in the social network modules in the 2010 GSS, Fischer
(2012) suggests that the 2004 GSS network size decreases may be explained by training ef-
fects arising from question order. We tend to think about training effects as negative effects,
but they need not be. If surveys can get respondents to think of specific contexts – family,
neighborhood, school – they can be “trained” to recover more names in response to a “name
generator”. In this sense, as Brashears (2011) shows, “training” conceptualized as “priming”
can lead to more, rather than fewer nominations. Against this background, it is not surpris-
ing that Brashears (2011) shows that the question-order effect – where an extensively long
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battery of voluntary organizational membership questions, each with follow-ups, preceded
the network name generator is observable on network size but not on social isolation. That
said, correcting for order effects indicates that much of the observed decrease in network size
remains poorly understood – although likely a consequence of priming rather than fatigue.
Brashears’ work has shifted the focus of debate to decreases in network size where change is
marked and not well understood.
In sum, with respect to the various methodological challenges to the increased isolation
hypothesis, we can simply say that after a number of years of such challenges, the core result –
decreased network size – remains a bit elusive. Why should we care? Obviously, if the effect is
real – that is, if there is no methodological smoking gun – then McPherson et al (2006, 2009)
have empirically identified a really important social fact about America, one anticipated in the
literature, perhaps most forcefully by Putnam (2000), but articulated in reference to a wide
variety of contexts (Parigi and Henson 2014). And if that is what happened, then it means that
we have to pay more attention to understanding the substantive changes that must also have
happened in America from 1985 to 2004 – and beyond – that restructured the nature of our
closest interpersonal networks.
2.2 Did we miss big historical changes?
It is not as if McPherson et al (2006) didn’t think about the kinds of big historical changes
that might have been operating. Others have followed suit. We can partition the candidate
historical factors into three broad groups: demographic, technological, and social. It makes
sense, as McPherson et al (2006) first argued, that demographic shifts in American society
could lead to the increasing social isolation: for example, “as the population gets older and
more racially diverse, we would expect networks to get smaller, since older people and racial
minorities have smaller networks, on average” (367). These candidate changes and others –
increased inequality, work hours, racial diversity, and proportion of the population of living
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alone – are not driving changes in network size (McPherson et al. 2009). In fact, demographic
stability and the absence of any relationship between the modest change that was observed
led Fischer (2009) to think that there had to be a coding error of some sort in the first place,
since for something real to change, some real change has to cause it.
With respect to interpersonal networks, it seems almost obvious that the internet and social
media have changed the way people communicate, thereby reshaping the ways in which people
relate to each other (Hampton and Ling 2013; Hampton, Sessions, and Her 2011; McPherson et
al. 2006, 2009; Parigi and Henson 2014; Sigman 2009). One argument is that the proliferation
of new communication channels arising from technological change makes it easier to maintain
weak ties with otherwise disconnected alters and that this could reduce the number of alters
reported when people are asked to name their close, that is, strong-tie, confidants as in the GSS.
All the evidence suggests the opposite (Hampton et al. 2011; Wang and Wellman 2010; Zhao
2006) – the use of new technology is positively associated with network size. In any case, the
argument is basically anachronistic. Facebook, for example, was launched in February 2004.
When the GSS was in the field, it had fewer than 1 million members and was not open to the
public. The online social network/Internet revolution hadn’t happened.
The body of scholarship focused on increasing social fragmentation broadly captures the
obvious social changes salient for interpersonal networks. Independent of segregation dynam-
ics, one strand of the social fragmentation hypothesis focuses on the way in which people
organize their relationships. Here the idea is that the changing patterns of associational life
may have an implication for network size. Less civic engagement and participation in com-
munity activity reduces opportunities to interact with others, thereby leading to decreases in
network size (McPherson et al. 2006, 2009; Putnam 2000; Wellman 1979). This is a good
idea, but empirically, neither the level of informal social participation nor the extent of asso-
ciational membership changed significantly between 1985 and 2004 (Marsden and Srivastava
2012; Paxton 1999; Schwadel and Stout 2012). One can imagine that the relationship between
voluntary associational memberships and network size changed over this period, but this is not
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the case. The correlation between the number of voluntary association memberships and the
number of confidants is almost identical over the same time period (McPherson et al. 2009).
Thus, reduced opportunities for social interaction arising from the loss of community does not
explain the smaller networks reported in 2004.
The loss of community thesis also invokes increasing segregation across diverse demo-
graphic traits, most notably race, ethnicity and class (Fischer and Mattson 2009). At the limit,
increasing segregation in contexts where the number of potential interlocutors is fixed (as it
is in the GSS), inevitably leads to a decrease in network size (Rytina and Morgan 1982). But
this limit is not even approximated empirically and while spatial and residential segregation
has increased across all of these traits, McPherson et al (2006) and later Smith et al (2014)
show that within the GSS strong-tie network, the extent of heterogeneity across different de-
mographic dimensions is remarkably similar from 1985 to 2004, after accounting for changes
in population composition.
Critically, for us, increased attitudinal segregation, often thought about as political polar-
ization, has been largely ignored. As we show subsequently, increased polarization – a form
of social fragmentation – drives network size declines, but only at specific moments, and most
acutely for specific individuals. The key to the puzzle of “for whom and at what times” hinges
on how name generators work.
2.3 The “important matters” name generator
The “important matter” name generator has a distinguished provenance. It has been repeat-
edly instrumented in network surveys and is believed to capture the core of one’s interpersonal
strong tie network (Burt 1984; Marsden 1987; McPherson et al. 2006), despite a long history
of criticism since its introduction in the 1985 GSS (Bailey and Marsden 1999; Bearman and
Parigi 2004; Fischer 1982; Marin 2004; Paik and Sanchagrin 2013; Small 2013). Defenders
have long noted that the network characteristics obtained through the “important matters”
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name generator do not significantly differ from those obtained from differently worded name
generators such as “strong tie”, “emotionally close tie” or “significant people” (Mollenhorst,
VÃu˝lker, and Flap 2008; Straits 2000). But even if similar network characteristics (e.g., ho-
mophily or network density) are observed across diverse name generators one cannot infer that
these name generators capture ties that are actually important to respondents. In his study of
an online survey of over 2000 Americans, Small (2013), for example, found that half of the
people talk about important matters with non-important alters, and almost half of the impor-
tant alters are not included in ego’s core discussion networks. Small concluded: “The core
discussion network is not a representation of our strong ties; it is a combination of the people
we are close to, people we are not close to but who are knowledgeable about the matters we
regularly find important, and people we are not close to but who are available because of our
routine activities” (2013: 481).
It has also been long known that the topics people report talking about when they respond
to the “important matters” (or similar) name generator consist of variety of important and triv-
ial topics including “cloning headless frogs” (Bearman and Parigi 2004), “my husband’s affair
with my sister” (Small 2013), “KFC changing the color of their bucket” (Brashears 2014). It is
not necessarily that respondents are vacuous: As Brashears argues, people discuss seemingly
trivial topics because they “are important simply because they are issues that concern those
who are important to us” (2014: 506). What matters to most people (and their interlocutors)
are topics that are right in front of them, temporally – topics that enter into our issue-attention
cycle (Downs 1972). For brief periods of time people care about natural disasters, mass shoot-
ings, dishonest politicians. These topics are, under normal conditions, what flows through
networks generated by “emotionally close”, “significant” or ‘important matters” name genera-
tors1. The social and political contexts in which the important matters name generator is given
1For example, Bearman and Parigi (2004) said “at the time of our data collection, stories concerned the “nanny”
in Boston who murdered her charge, a state trooper who was shot on interstate 95, road-construction projects,
moral issues in the Clinton White House, and trouble in the livestock (specifically pig) industry . . . were fre-
quently discussed” (537).
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matter not only by shaping what is talked about, but who one talks with. If the “important mat-
ters” name generator induces different ideas about what is important, because of the timing
of the survey – and what is immediately within the respondents’ attention cycle –, those topics
influence who comes to mind. The really unusual thing about the 2004 GSS, in contrast to
earlier and later GSS administrations, is that it took place in the Fall of a Presidential election
year.
2.4 Issue-attention cycles during the 2004 presidential
election period
If the salient issue is not particularly contentious and/or positions on that issue are not highly
polarized (for example, very few people do not genuinely feel sad when natural disasters occur,
and even hardened gun advocates are upset – or indicate such – when children are gunned
down by a mass shooter) people feel free to talk about the issue with many others. But highly
contentious and polarized issues are different. People only talk about contentious issues with
people they feel safe sharing their opinion with (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982). By the
Fall of 2004, the political polarization we now take for granted in the United States, had largely
solidified (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008) 2, with network effects
that encouraged homophilious group formation to avoid partisan dissonance (Baldassarri and
Bearman 2007; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1988). To a great extent, Americans are now
sorted along partisan line, and discuss politics with like-minded people. An interesting and
important consequence is that people who are not yet sorted in political discussion networks
are increasingly segregated.
We know that people’s interpretation of the important matters name generator is strongly
2The literature on political polarization is split into those who see mass polarization (i.e. the opinion distribution
of the electorate has become more extreme and bimodal) (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008) and those who see
party sorting (i.e., the opinion distribution remains unimodal, but the alignment of partisanship and ideology
has become tighter) (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). For our purposes, this does not matter since the interpersonal
network effects downstream are the same for both models.
16
subject to survey context (Brashears 2011; Eagle and Proeschold-Bell 2015; Small, Deeds Pam-
phile, and McMahan 2015). From Downs (1972) we know that attention cycles are short.
Salient events attract public attention and shape the interpretative context, but only for short
periods of time. It follows, then, that events that channel public attention to politics channel
the topics that come to mind in response to the important matters name generator, to political
matters. If the issue-orienting event is political, then the important matters people discuss will
be more likely to be about political matters, than, say, disasters. It turns out that this is easily
testable.
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Note: The Google search index, obtained by Google Trends Analysis, shows the share of
queries for the search keyword with respect to the total volume of queries for each par-
ticular keyword within four months (09/01 − 12/31) in the United States. In Panel A,
the maximum query share in the specified time period is normalized to be 100 for each
search term during the period. Therefore, the meaningful comparison is between different
moments in time within a particular search, and not between different searches within a
particular moment in time.
Panel A in Figure 2.1 shows the issue-attention cycle from September to December 2004
based on Google Trends data. In the fall of 2004, while people searched for specific things at
different times, their attention to any given issue was short lived. Here we can see bursts of
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interest in hurricanes, CSI, the presidential debate, the flu, the (Boston) Red Sox, the presi-
dential election, and finally turkey, presumably for Thanksgiving dinner3. Panel B shows how
frequently people searched for one of the two main presidential candidates (Bush and Kerry)
over the same period. It is reasonable to assume that the frequency of Google searches for the
presidential candidates tracks the publics’ attention to and interest in political matters (broadly
construed) during the election period. The search volume for both Bush and Kerry peaked the
day after the election (November 3rd). Not surprisingly, the second largest search volume
occurred the day after the first presidential debate (October 1st). The sharp peaks in public
attention reported in panel B show that these two events are obviously salient with respect to
political matters. We focus on the first presidential debate in our study4.
2.5 The sharp moment of intense priming: the first
Presidential debate in 2004
Earlier we noted that under normal conditions people talk about the issues that are important
to them – issues that are front and center in their attention cycle. When the important matters
name generator is asked is itself important. The fact that the 2004 GSS was in the field during
the Presidential election provides us with a unique opportunity to see how timing matters.
We tend to think that years are homogeneous temporal units, but obviously, with respect
to the ways in which temporal context shape respondents, they are heterogeneous. Consider
2004. The 2004 GSS was administered from August 18th to January 3rd. When the survey
was first fielded, almost a month had passed since the democratic convention that formalized
the nomination of John Kerry whose competition (Dean and Clark) was especially hapless, at
3Note that our goal in this exercise is not to investigate the entire space for all different (issue) domains, but
to illustrate the short-lived nature of the issue attention cycle using some selected examples. Of course there
are many issues that don’t take off while other issues compete with one another at the same time. We address
these points in Panel B which tracks the relative level of public attention to “political matters” within the political
domain over time.
4We focus on the priming effects of the first presidential debate rather than the presidential election in this study
because only a few individuals were surveyed for the 2004 GSS survey around November 1st.
18
least electorally. The Republican Convention that formally nominated George Bush was yet to
occur. For most Americans, political issues were less salient in the dog days of summer than
spending some time working on their tan on the beach or getting their kids ready for school.
But this quiescence changed, most markedly in the days surrounding the build up towards,
and fall-out from, the first Presidential Debate on September 30th.
On September 30th, six weeks into the fieldwork with twelve weeks to follow, over 62
million people – more than at any time since 1980 and more than would watch at any time
until 2012 -- watched the first presidential debate (Kenski and Stroud 2005). The election –
and political matters specifically – were front and center in the issue-attention cycle for the brief
period before and after the debate. If priming matters, which it does, then the first presidential
debate defined the context for important matters as, well, “political matters” (Benoit, Hansen,
and Verser 2003).
Political scientists have been asking Americans about their discussion networks for years
using a GSS name generator strategy that differs in only one respect from the 2004 survey: in-
stead of asking about “important matters” they ask about “political matters” (Huckfeldt, John-
son, and Sprague 2004; Zuckerman 2005). The networks that they induce in response to this
name generator are always smaller than those that arise from the important matters name
generator5. So, if the debate primed respondents to think about important matters as political
matters, then we ought to anticipate that their networks – for the short period of time in which
the political context occupied their attention cycle – were smaller. This turns out to be the
case.
Given temporal heterogeneity with respect to both polarization and political priming, we
would not expect the reported declines in network size to be the same across the whole survey
5While Klofstad et al (2009) argue that the network characteristics reported from these two name generators
are not statistically different, the political matters name generator consistently yields fewer names than the
important matters name generator. It is worth observing however that the data (the 1996-1997 Indianapolis-St
Louis Study) they used contains numerous political survey items that could have primed respondents so as to
frame important matters as political matters. Sokhey and Djupe (2014) also reported smaller network size from
the political matters name generator.
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period. Just as we observe temporal variation in polarization, we can observe marked spatial
variation at the county-level, GSS primary sampling units. Net of time, some counties are more
polarized than others, and we would anticipate that spatial polarization shapes respondent
reports. Thus the local temporal and spatial context with respect to polarization is critical to
understanding how respondents responded to the important matters name generator. Tying
all these pieces together requires thinking about how local context, priming, name generators,
and individual social networks intersect.
2.6 Who talks to whom about what, when and where?
Who talks to whom about what (important matters, or political matters), when and where is the
key issue we need to solve. Temporal priming events, like the Presidential debate, will manifest
themselves more for more political individuals. Individuals who are largely non-political will
be less sensitive to a prime like the Presidential debate since that prime will not lead them to
change the topics they consider important. At the same time, these kinds of temporal priming
events filter through local contexts and their effects are thus shaped by the structure of that
context, that is, the opportunities that people embedded within them have for finding and
reporting on discussion partners (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). A central feature of those
contexts, for us, is the extent to which they are segregated, or polarized ideologically. In
some ways the answer about local context is simple: where everyone agrees with one another,
priming events (like watching a debate) will not lead to risky conversations. Where there
is a lot of disagreement, people will avoid talking about matters that would allow for that
disagreement to arise (Gerber et al. 2012). They could talk about the weather. And they could
think that the weather was “important”. But the prime shifts their framework. They know that
the weather is not important and that politics is important, and the reality is, they talk to fewer
people, and report that fact.
In highly polarized environments, where individual networks are segregated, network ho-
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mophily is high, and so people discuss whatever topics they discuss – including political matters
– with like-minded people (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). In such contexts, people are aware
that they agree with one another. Thus, priming has little influence. However, in less polarized
environments, where individual networks are intermingled with respect to the partisan iden-
tity, people know they may disagree with one another and so to avoid political confrontations,
they selectively talk about other topics (Cowan and Baldassarri 2018). In such settings, the
priming effect has a large influence. As the summer of 2004 ended and thinking about tans
gave way to thinking about politics, discussion networks around politically important matters
in an increasingly polarized America became increasingly shut down. This happened more
in communities with low levels of polarization than in communities that were already highly
polarized. Political priming has a more intense suppression effect on conversations where
ideological segregation is less pronounced because it is in those settings that people eschew
potentially contentious conversations. In highly segregated communities, this effect is weaker.
2.7 Data and Methods
We use the General Social Survey (GSS) egocentric network data arising from the “important
matters” name generator collected in 1985, 1987, 2004, and 2010 and the American National
Election Studies (ANES) “political discussion” network data collected in 2000 and 2006. The
1985, 1987, and 2010 GSS surveys were fielded in the spring and summer of non-presidential
election years. The 2004 GSS and 2000 ANES data were collected during presidential election
years, though the 2000 ANES was collected after the election. ANES collected both “impor-
tant matters” and “political matters” data in 2006, in telephone interviews, as part of survey
experiments during the fall of mid-term election year. The GSS data and the 2000 ANES data
arise from an in-person interview.
The dependent variable is discussion network size, measured by the number of alters in-
voked by the network name generators. The questions about name generators used in each
survey are similar, but not precisely the same. Network size ranges from zero to six in the
“important matters” name generator in the GSS data, but the maximum number of alters in
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the “political matters” name generators is four in the 2000 ANES and ten in the 2006 ANES
data. For comparability, we top-code network size of ANES data at six, although our results
become stronger without top-coding.
The 2000 ANES asked:
From time to time, people discuss government, elections and politics with other peo-
ple. I’d like to ask you about the people with whom you discuss these matters.
These people might or might not be relatives. Can you think of anyone? IF LESS
THAN 4 NAMES MENTIONED, PROBE: “Is there anyone else you talk with about
these matters?”
The 1985 GSS and 2004 GSS asked:
From time to time, most people discuss important matters with other people. Look-
ing back over the last six months – who are the people with whom you discussed
matters important to you? Just tell me their first names or initials. IF LESS THAN
5 NAMES MENTIONED, PROBE: “Anyone else?”
The 2006 ANES pilot study asked:
During the last six months, did you talk with anyone face-to-face, on the phone,
by email, or in any other way about [things that were important to you / govern-
ment and elections], or did you not do this with anyone during the last six months?
What are the initials of the people who you talked with face-to-face, on the phone,
by email, or in any other way during the past six months, about [things that were
important to you / government and elections]? RECORD UP TO 10 NAMES. AF-
TER EACH NAME, “Who else?” UNTIL UNPRODUCTIVE OR THREE NAMES ARE
ENTERED.
Analytic Strategy
We employ diverse strategies to show how priming mechanisms suppress core discussion net-
work size in the 2004 GSS data. First, we show how much of the daily variance of network size
is attributable to interview timing. To account for the fact that our dependent variable is gen-
erated by a count process, we employ random-intercept poisson regression models treating the
date of survey as level-2 unit across the ANES and GSS data. We assess the significant presence
of daily variance using likelihood ratio tests (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Identifying
significant daily variation is an essential step towards establishing that survey timing matters,
especially in the 2004 GSS data.
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Table 2.1: Variable Description.
Variable Name Variable Wording and Coding
Pretreatment covariates controlled for zero-inflated poisson regression models
Age Age of respondent
Female Gender of respondent [1=Female, 0=Male]
Race Race of respondent [1=White, 2=Black, 3=Other race]
Education Years of education of respondent
Marital status Marital status of respondent [1=married, 0=all others]
Number of children
“How many children have you ever had? Please count all that were born alive at
any time (including any you had from a previous marriage).”
*ANES : “How many children do you have under 18?”
Working status Current working status of respondent [1=Employed/Looking, 2=Retired,
3=Housekeeping]
Variables used in interaction analysis
Party identification “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat,
Independent, or what?” [1=Strong Democrat, 2 = Weak Democrat, 3=Leaning
Toward Democrat, 4= Independent, 5 = Leaning Toward Republican, 6 = Weak
Republican, 7 = Strong Republican]
Political ideology “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I’m going to
show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold
are arranged from extremely liberal–point 1–to extremely conservative–point 7.
Where would you place yourself on this scale? ”
% moderate Proportion of moderate in political ideology scale in each sampcode
Kurtosis of ideology kurtosis of political ideology scale in each sampcode
Party sorting correlation between party identification and political ideology in each sampcode
Political interests “How interested would you say you personally are in politics?” [High=Very inter-
ested, Low=Fairly interested, Not very interested, Not at al interested]
Political talk fre-
quency
“When you get together with your friends, relatives or fellow workers, how often
do you discuss politics?” [High=Often, Low=Sometimes, Rarely, Never]
Additional variables for balancing tests
Partisan strength Recode party identification scale [0 = Independent, 1 = Leaning toward
Democrat/Republican, 2 = Weak Democrat/Republican, 3 = Strong Demo-
crat/Republican]
Interviewer age Age of interviewer
Interviewer female Gender of interviewer [1=Female,0=Male]
Interviewer race Race of interviewer [1=White, 2=Black, 3=Other race]
Interviewer tenure Years of service as an interviewer at NORC
Interview length How long was interview [/min]
SAQ skip “Respondent did Gene module?” [1=R did not do gene, 0=R did gene saq / ad-
ministered by interviewer]
uncooperativeness “In general, what was the respondent’s attitude toward the interview?”
[1=Friendly and interested, 2=Cooperative but not particularly interested, 3=Im-
patient and relentless, 4= Hostile]
poor comprehension “Was respondent’s understanding of the questions?” [1=Good, 2=Fair, 3=Poor]
Next, we situate the 2004 GSS data in broader political context to show how political
polarization and partisanship interacts across two decades. We pay special attention to the
2000 ANES data that collected political discussion networks right after the election period as
a useful point of comparison to the 2004 GSS data. Following McPherson et al (2006; 2009)’s
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strategy, we estimate zero-inflated poisson regression models to handle the over-dispersion of
core discussion network size. Our independent variable in this analysis is party identification.
By comparing the difference in differences of network size between partisans (Republicans or
Democrats) and non-partisans (Independents) across periods characterized by different levels
of political polarization, we can identify how non-partisans are less likely than partisans to talk
about important or political matters depending on political context. In the statistical models,
we include standard demographic characteristics known to be related to network size such
as age, years of education, gender, race, marital status, working status and the number of
children as for pre-treatment control variables, which would not affect party identification. All
variables’ wording and coding are presented in Table 2.1.
We then we shift our attention to priming within the 2004 GSS data. The entire survey
period in 2004 was highly political due to the polarized Presidential election, but the level
of political priming peaked sharply (as shown in Figure 2.1) in the period around the first
presidential debate. That debate is the treatment of our analysis. The date of the interview
is our instrument to explore the effects of political events (i.e., the first presidential debate)
on reported network size. We largely follow the lead of other recent studies that employ a
regression discontinuity design to compare the mean before and after a particular date, treating
events as exogenous random shocks leading to differential responses (Hoffman and Bearman
2015; e.g. Legewie 2013).
T =

0 if respondent i was interviewered before the event
1 if respondent i was interviewed after the event
(2.1)
T = t0 if the respondent i was interviewed at t0 days before or after the event (t0 > 0)
(2.2)
As in equation [1], the treatment indicator in prior studies is whether each respondent is
interviewed after the event occurs. However, we are interested in the pattern of change before
and after an event, given that the event focused on in this article – the first debate -- is one of
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a class of events that are anticipated by our respondents. Our expectation is that as the GSS
interviews approach the date of the first presidential debate people will report fewer discussion
partners. Likewise, as the debate recedes out of the issue-attention cycle, respondents will
report larger discussion networks. We model this V-pattern around the first presidential debate
by estimating the effect of the elapsed time from the day of event within moving calipers.
Rather than assume pre-fixed duration effects, we employ continuous treatment indicators as
a linear indicator in the equation [2]. This enables us to report the full range of all treatment
effects for all (theoretically plausible) moving calipers6.
Of interest is the width of the caliper both before and after an event, since we do not know
a priori how long the debate exerts its influence. To address this issue, we need to ascertain the
probability of change in network size at each point in time during whole period. We employ a
Bayesian Change Point model to estimate the probability of observing a sharp change in daily
network size using the bcp package in R (Erdman and Emerson 2007). To account for the
different number of daily participants across time, we first do a partial pooling using a random
intercept regression model and predict the random intercept (i.e. mean) for each day. From
this we estimate the posterior probability of change points and their posterior means using the
default tuning parameters recommended by Barry and Hartigan (1993) with a burn-in period
of 5000 draws and mcmc size of 200,000. The maximum width of caliper is defined by the
two contiguous change points with the second greatest posterior probabilities arising from the
Bayesian change point model.
We first show a smoothing line by fitting the local regression (i.e. local polynomial re-
gression fitting) to identify trends of network size as a nonparametric method using the loess
function in R package. For statistical tests, we run a simulation to identify how likely it is
that we can observe significant effects by chance alone, which is preferable to conventional
6The fact that the first presidential debate in 2004 took place around the acute change point supported by the
predictive model does tell how long its effects will persist within the maximum caliper compared to the counter-
factual situation of its absence. For example, if we assume that the debate will suppress the core discussion
network linearly for a week, then the linear treatment indicator will have an effect among respondents who
participate in the survey within a week before and after the debate, but not within two weeks.
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statistical null-hypothesis testing given the bias-efficiency trade-off with regard to the width of
moving calipers. Specifically, using poisson regression models for network size, we estimate
the debate effect on the simulated data sets randomly permuting the survey date of each par-
ticipant 1000 times, while all other individual characteristics including network size are fixed.
Our simulation strategy induces a situation in which the number of respondents watching the
first debate is the same, but those who watch the debate are different. Differently put, those
who watch the debate in a given period are compared to those who watch it in a randomly
assigned period.
Potential threats for the identification of debate effects
We assume that interview timing is exogenous to survey participation. However, a potential
threat to our identification strategy might originate from reachability bias. For example, if for
some reason those who participate in the survey around the debate are more likely to be less-
educated or unmarried, average network size around the debate will be smaller not because of
the debate per se, but because those less educated and/or unmarried have smaller networks.
To test for possible bias, we first compare characteristics of the sample during the treatment
period (t0) to the rest of period. In doing so, we calculate student t-statistics of mean difference
between the two periods with survey weights adjusted for pre-treatment variables associated
with survey participation for both interviewers and respondents.
Specifically, we include variables that were utilized as controls in prior studies (Fischer
2009; McPherson et al. 2006, 2009; Paik and Sanchagrin 2013). For respondents, these
include age, gender, education, race, marital status, working status, number of children, party
identification and partisan strength. For interview context, these include interview length, SAQ
skip, uncooperativeness and poor comprehension. For interviewers, these include interviewers’
gender, age, race, and tenure.
The model we use rests on the assumption that the first presidential debate is exogenous to
other political events (i.e. the temporal stability assumption, Legewie 2013: 1208) and that it
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was the most salient event driving network size during the sample period. To test the assump-
tion, we examine the potential presence of other salient event effects by presenting all plausible
effects of different moving calipers (t0) across the whole survey period. A final concern is the
linearity assumption underlying the usage of linear treatment indicators. We know that social
realities are complex; for example, one can imagine that debate effects are latent until three
days and suddenly take place at the fourth day. But the power of linear modeling lies in its
simplicity. We test the linearity assumption by comparing one random intercept poisson model
with linear indicators against another with a series of dummy indicators within each moving
caliper using likelihood ratio tests. As we will show, the model is robust to these three threats.
Interactions with political engagement and geographic polarization
As discussed earlier, the priming mechanism through which the presidential debate drives how
people interpret the “important matters” name generator should be more salient for those who
are more politically engaged or living in more polarized neighborhoods. We would expect that
their responses are quicker than the other, and thus show a steeper V-pattern. We assess the
sensitivity of different subgroups with respect to the debate by fitting a loess curve across each
subgroup.
With respect to individual characteristics, we utilize two variables to measure the level of
political engagement – political discussion frequency and political interest. We dichotomize
them into high engagement (discuss politics often or are very interested in politics) and low
engagement. As for the neighborhood context, we measure the degree of political polarization
in each Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) in three different ways. First we consider the proportion
of people who identify as moderates on the 7-point political ideology scale in the GSS. Where
this proportion is above the mean, the PSU is considered non-polarized. Second, we measure
the kurtosis of the same political ideology scale7. When kurtosis is below the mean, polarization
7Following Baldassarri and Bearman (2007)’s strategy, we compute the kurtosis – which captures the bimodality




− 3, where pi is an individual i’s political ideology score, and µ j , σ j
27
is coded as present. Finally, we measure party sorting by the correlation between political
ideology and party identification. When that correlation is above the mean, the community is
treated as polarized.
2.8 Results
The important matters name generator is sensitive to time because what people consider im-
portant – and therefore with whom they report discussing important matters – is driven by
issue-attention cycles. Table 2.2 reports network size based on GSS data (in 1985, 1987, 2004,
2010) and ANES data (in 2000 and 2006) with survey weights adjusted. The central puzzle is
the huge decrease in ego-network size from 2.92 in 1985 to 2.14 in 2004.
Comparison with results from ANES – which employs the “political matters” name genera-
tor – provides support for the idea that people discuss political matters when they talk about
“important matters” in politically contested periods. From Table 2.2 it is evident that the pro-
portion of social isolates reported in political discussion networks is always larger than that
reported in “important matters” discussion networks, except for in the 2004 GSS. A survey
experiment conducted within the 2006 ANES data confirms the significantly smaller size of
political discussion networks compared to important matters discussion networks (2.14 versus
2.74); p=0.052). It may be a coincidence that the size of the 2006 political matters discussion
network produced precisely the same estimate for network size as the 2004 GSS, but it sug-
gests that the shrunken size of the important matters networks reported in 2004 arises from
political priming, which re-frames “important matters” to “political matters”.
We examine the degree to which network size varies across survey dates based on like-
lihood ratio tests using a random-intercept poisson model without covariates. This model
reveals that across all GSS surveys, daily network size variation is largest and significant in
2004 (χ2=19.438, p-value < 0.001). Importantly, we observe a negative correlation between
are the mean and the standard deviation of political ideology in the neighborhood j, and N is the number of
individuals in neighborhood j.
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daily variance and average network size (r= -0.46). The absence of significant daily variation
observed in the other GSS surveys supports the idea that what people construe of as important
matters is relatively stable in contexts that are not explicitly political. The significant daily
variation in 2004 suggests that something unusual happened at the end of September.
Table 2.2: Network size and its daily variations during survey period across different datasets.
GSS ANES5) GSS ANES 2006 pilot6) GSS
1985 1987 2000 2004 moduleA moduleB 2010
Name Generator1) imp imp pol imp pol imp imp
% of Social Isolation 0.10 0.06 0.28 0.22 0.38 0.28 0.13
Network Size
Mean2) 2.94 2.50 2.29 2.14 2.14 2.74 2.42
SD 1.77 1.28 2.34 1.82 2.18 2.27 1.77
N 1531 1800 1551 1426 346 316 1272
Survey Period spring spring winter fall winter winter summer
% Variations across days
Daily variance3) (
p
ψ11) 0.002 0.000 0.074 0.169 0.445 0.244 0.059
χ2 0.001 0.000 2.497 19.438 45.422 31.377 0.538
p-value 4) 0.489 0.500 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.232
Notes: 1) Name generators are denoted “imp” for “important matters” and “pol” for “po-
litical matters”. 2) Throughout, mean network size is calculated by top coding network
size at 6.5 with sampling design adjusted as is conventional. 3) It is estimated by random-
intercept poisson regression models without any covariates using xtpoisson in Stata. 4)
Log-likelihood tests are performed to examine whether daily variances are statistically sig-
nificant. 5) ANES (American National Election Study) 2000 probed up to four discussion
partners, but here we present the mean of top-coded network size. Without top-coding, it
is 1.79. 6) In an ANES 2006 pilot study based on a telephone survey, one half of survey
respondents were randomly assigned to a “political/election” name generators (module A),
and the other half were assigned to an “important matters” name generators (module B).
The effect of increasing political polarization across decades
It is always the case that non-partisan respondents report talking to fewer people than parti-
san respondents about important or political matters. Some set of the topics of conversation
induced by the important matters name generator are political (Bearman and Parigi 2004;
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Brashears 2014) and as one would expect, people without political attitudes talk less about
political matters than those who do have attitudes (Huckfeldt, Johnson, et al. 2004). Prim-
ing, which shifts the framework of the name generator from “important matters” to “political
matters” suppresses partisans and non-partisans equally, and so -- absent any other factor --
we would expect to observe consistent differences in network size. We can see these processes
unfold in Figure 2.2, which reports the average network size of non-partisan and partisan
respondents.
Figure 2.2: Differences of mean network size by party identification across sample surveys.

























Note: Each X represents the average network size among those who identify themselves as
independent on the party identification scale, and each circle represents estimates among
other members excluding the independent category. Statistically significant differences
between the two are plotted as a solid line, otherwise as a dotted line.
Figure 2.2 reports mean network size for respondents who identify as independents with
respect to party identification in comparison to all others who are leaning towards or identify
themselves as partisan, either democratic or republican across a series of studies in which
network data were collected from 1985 to 20108. Across the board, non-partisan respondents
8Normally one would measure polarization using the political ideology battery in the GSS, but the 2004 GSS did
not collect political ideology information for those who responded to network name generator.
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have fewer discussants. The largest difference is observed in 2004, when political polarization
is highest (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008) – precisely because the
2004 GSS was uniquely administered in the Fall of a Presidential election year.
Recall that our expectation was for no difference, absent any other factor. But there is an
additional factor – polarization. Political priming in the context of political polarization drives
network size further down. Table 2.3 reports results from zero-inflated poisson regression
models controlling for standard social-demographic variables that are associated with network
size -- age, gender, years of education, race, marital status, number of children, and working
status. Note that zero-inflated poisson regression models simultaneously take account for the
poisson process of counting the number of alters as well as the zero-inflation process in which
an inflated zero is modeled given the expected number of zeros from the poisson process.
Table 2.3: The difference in differences of network size between partisan and non-partisan
across time with reference to the 2004 GSS data.
Panel A. Zero-inflated poisson regression models among non-partisan sample.
Reference Year= 1985 1987 2000 2010
Count Model Coefficients (Poisson with log link)
Year = 2004 -0.554† -0.462† -0.324* -0.356†
(0.086) (0.083) (0.129) (0.084)
Observations 393 440 412 429
Panel B. Zero-inflated poisson regression models among all sample.
Reference Year= 1985 1987 2000 2010
Count Model Coefficients (Poisson with log link)
Party ID = Independent -0.029 -0.034 -0.049 -0.108
(0.062) (0.047) (0.078) (0.075)
Year = 2004 -0.252† -0.067+ -0.025 0.004
(0.037) (0.034) (0.050) (0.035)
Year (2004) × Party ID (Independent) -0.300† -0.313† -0.251* -0.216*
(0.099) (0.090) (0.108) (0.094)
Observations 2900 3167 2913 2612
Note: We estimate zero-inflated poisson regression models on network size after controlling for respondent’s
age, gender, education, race, marital status, the number of children and working status (see Table B2 in the
online supplement for full regression tables). The 2000 ANES data investigate the network size up to four,
and so we also top-coded network size of the 2004 GSS data as four in this comparison, but the results are
the same without top-coding. Standard errors are in parenthesis (+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.01).
First, we can observe significant declines in non-partisans’ network size from 1985 and
1987 (also 2000 and 2010) to 2004 across both model frameworks after accounting for the
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zero-inflation process. The key period is 2004. In 2004, non-partisans talk about important
or political matters less than any other period. At the same time, the difference in network
size between partisan and non-partisan voters in 2004 is statistically much larger than at any
other time. These descriptive results suggest that network size (the number of people indi-
viduals discuss things with) depends on an interaction between characteristics of people and
the broader temporal context as illustrated in Figure 2. In this case, a priming that transforms
“important matters” into “political natters” suppresses network size for everyone. So does po-
larization, on its own. But when political polarization is high, non-partisan individuals report
talking to others even less. They eschew potentially contentious conversations.
The priming effect of the first presidential debate
Figure 2.3, Panel A reports the number of survey respondents in each day. Before the election
roughly fifteen people took the survey each day; after the election roughly five people took
the survey each day. Given the small number of observations around and after the election,
we explore the temporal patterns of network size variation a month before and after the first
presidential debate. Panel B reports – using a three-day moving average t-1, t, t+1) – network
size for each survey date plotted as gray dots across time from September to October. The loess
curves (i.e. local regression estimators) predicted with two different smoothing parameters in
Panel B clearly show that network size is smaller when respondents participated in the survey
closer to the first presidential debate in 2004 (marked by a red vertical line). Note the V-
pattern indicating a precipitous decline and increase in network size for the first debate, which
is present (though more muted) for the second and third debates.
Panel C shows the posterior probability of change points and Panel D shows the posterior
mean of network sizes from the Bayesian change point model. The maximum posterior prob-
ability for a change point is September 28th (colored by the red vertical line). This is right
before the first presidential debate (09/30) colored by the blue vertical line, which is when
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Note: In Panel A, the number of participants who responded to the network name generator
on each survey date is plotted across time. In Panel B, each gray dot represents the mean
network size per day, and the blue line shows the loess curve (i.e. local regression estimates)
estimated by the loess function in R with the smoothing parameter (α) set to 0.4 (solid line)
and 0.15 (dotted line). Estimating the Bayesian change point model (using bcp package in
R) yields the posterior probability of change points on average network size on each day in
Panel C, and its posterior mean in Panel D. Blue solid line indicates the date (09/28) that
reaches the maximum posterior probability of change point, and red solid line indicates
the date of the presidential debate (09/30), when we observe the smallest posterior mean
network size. Two blue dotted lines show the next largest change points on 09/08 and
10/23.
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we observe the smallest posterior mean network size in Panel D. The second largest posterior
probabilities before and after the debate, indicated by dotted red lines, are 09/08 and 10/23,
22 days and 24 days away from the debate respectively. Given the next largest change points,
we define the maximum width of the caliper as 21 days.
Table 2.4: Tests on linearity assumptions.
Moving Caliper(day)
Linear Model Dummy Model Difference
Log-likelihood DF Log-likelihood DF DF p-value
1 -46.88 3 -46.88 3 0 0 1
2 -99.06 3 -98.34 4 1.45 1 0.23
3 -146.98 3 -145.08 5 3.8 2 0.15
4 -198.75 3 -196.22 6 5.07 3 0.17
5 -264.07 3 -260.8 7 6.52 4 0.16
6 -323.81 3 -319.38 8 8.85 5 0.12
7 -403.11 3 -398.16 9 9.91 6 0.13
8 -453.51 3 -447.45 10 12.13 7 0.1
9 -510.15 3 -503.56 11 13.19 8 0.11
10 -558.15 3 -551.27 12 13.77 9 0.13
11 -600.69 3 -593.23 13 14.93 10 0.13
12 -652.19 3 -643.84 14 16.7 11 0.12
13 -710.85 3 -701.92 15 17.86 12 0.12
14 -777.33 3 -768.14 16 18.38 13 0.14
15 -841.53 3 -831.39 17 20.29 14 0.12
16 -914.54 3 -902.75 18 23.58 15 0.07
17 -974.94 3 -962.98 19 23.92 16 0.09
18 -1036.54 3 -1023.65 20 25.78 17 0.08
19 -1108.62 3 -1095.62 21 26.01 18 0.1
20 -1160.98 3 -1147.46 22 27.04 19 0.1
21 -1240.01 3 -1224.93 23 30.15 20 0.07
Note: We estimate a random intercept poission regression model using glmer package in R
by treating survey date as a level-2 unit. In the linear model, the linear treatment indicator
(|2004/09/30− moving caliper|) is included, whereas in the dummy model a series of
dummy variables instead of the simple linear indicator were included. The likelihood ratio
tests are performed within each moving caliper, which shows that the two models are not
significantly different at p-value of 0.05.
Before testing the significance of the V-pattern, we examine the linearity assumption. Ta-
ble 2.4 shows the degree to which linear models lose explanatory power compared to a non-
parametric dummy model free of any parametric assumptions since it estimates all effects of
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each treatment day. We conduct likelihood ratio tests after estimating random intercept pois-
son regression models across a range of moving calipers from 1 to 21, and they confirm the
validity of linearity assumption; the linear models do not significantly differ from the dummy
models at the p=0.05. We also evaluate the significance of the linear trend before and after
the debate against null distributions from 1000 simulations that assign respondents to random
survey dates, matching the number of observations each day in Figure 2.4.
In this simulation, respondents retain all of their attributes and characteristics. The only
thing that we allow to vary is the timing in which they complete the survey. Each histogram
reports for each day the null distributions arising from random arrivals. The gray-solid line
represents the observed coefficient for the debate effect, and the black-dotted line shows the
adjusted coefficient after controlling for the key covariates. For statistical comparison, we
identify the 95 percentile of the simulated distribution (red lines). The vast majority of both
the adjusted and unadjusted coefficients are significant. This confirms that the observed V-
pattern is meaningful, and not simply statistical noise.
The small gaps between adjusted and unadjusted coefficients shown in Figure 2.4 across
the moving windows imply that survey participation is exogenous to the Presidential debate. In
English, this means that whatever reason people may have had for participating in the survey
on a given day, that the day they decided to complete the survey had nothing to do with the
debate. Still, we examine the extent of reachability bias by conducting balancing tests on a
range of respondents’ characteristics, reported in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 shows the t-statistics for mean differences on a set of pre-treatment confounders
included in the regression model as well as party identification and partisan strength across all
moving windows. None of covariates significantly differ across a full range of moving windows
from 6 to 21 days, with reference to overall period (Panel A and B). In other words, we find
that those who were reached within each caliper (= |t0 – moving window|) have similar char-
acteristics to those who participated in the survey out of the caliper. The absence of imbalance
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Figure 2.4: Testing debate effects against the simulated distribution arising from 1000 random
permutation of survey dates.
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Note: Each histogram reports the simulated distribution of the debate effect arising from
1000 random permutations of survey dates given all other respondents’ characteristics be-
ing fixed within each moving caliper. The gray-solid line represents the unadjusted pois-
son regression coefficient of the effects of elapsed time from the first presidential debate
(=|moving window− 09/30/2004|) on network size per day, and black-dotted line repre-
sents the adjusted regression coefficient after controlling for the pretreatment covariates.
The red-solid line shows the 95% percentile of the simulated distribution.
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Figure 2.5: Balancing tests: Mean differences of covariates around the first presidential debate
in 2004.
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Note: Each dot represents the t-statistic for mean differences between the period around
the first presidential debate (=|moving window− 09/30/2004|) and the rest of period on
the following covariates; in Panel A for respondents’ characteristics, and in Panel B for
interviewers’ characteristics. We compare the mean of the treatment period within each
caliper against the rest of all time. Statistically significant differences (p-value < 0.05) are
shown in red.
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in balancing tests confirms that the reachability bias is not a concern.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































09/08 09/22 10/06 10/20 11/05 11/19 12/03
Note: Each circle represents the observed regression coefficient for the effect of time de-
viation from each survey date (=|moving window-survey date(t)|) on network size across
different moving windows after controlling for the pretreatment covariates. Filled dots
identify estimates that are higher than the effects of the first presidential debate (red dots
with red line).
The remaining concern is the presence of other prominent events during the analytic pe-
riod that could lead to the violation of event exogeneity of the first presidential debate. This
is a testable empirical question. Figure 2.6 shows a full range of regression coefficients from
estimating poisson models that change the event date in our treatment indicator (=t0) for all
dates in the Fall across a full range of temporal calipers. We find that nearly none of regres-
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sion coefficients in other dates during the period around the first debate are larger than the
coefficients for the first presidential debate (red horizontal lines) unless the moving window is
larger than 16 days. The absence of other events that politically prime people so as to drive de-
clines in reported network size indicates the first presidential debate played a more significant
role in the issue-attention cycle than the others during the period9. We next turn to identify-
ing the mechanisms that motor the ways in which priming effects lead people to report fewer
discussion partners.
Disengagement and the priming effect
Logically it follows that the priming effect should be absent for people not exposed to the
priming event in the first place. The first presidential debate couldn’t prime individuals who
didn’t care about or see it and, as a result, the important matters they discuss should not
suddenly become political even if such political events are seemingly widely reported in the
mass media. Since people see what they want to see and don’t see what they don’t want to see,
we can assess if this is the case. We know something about the characteristics of individuals
that lead them to be more or less politically engaged, and it is this engagement that has to be
associated with caring (even a little) about the presidential debate. In Figure 2.7, we report
how individual characteristics salient for political engagement, political interest and political
discussion frequency, interact with the priming effect. Panels A and B show that those who are
very interested in politics or discuss politics frequently are more sensitive to the priming effect
than others. They were probably some of the 62 million people who watched the debate.
9Logically, and probably empirically as well, the election would have primed in the same manner but the small
N of respondents in the days immediately before and after the election mean that inferences about around the
election are unreliable.
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Note: Each circle represents the mean network size for the three days around each sur-
vey date (t-1,t,t+1), and each line shows the loess curve estimated by loess function in R
package with smoothing parameter (α) set to 0.4 depending on each category; Political
Interest is dichotomized into High (very interested) and Low (rest); Political Discussion is
dichotomized into High (discuss politics often) and Low (rest).
Community polarization and the priming effect
While there is no restriction in the GSS to select discussion partners from ones’ neighborhood,
it is often the case that recent conversations with people about important matters are with peo-
ple from ones’ community, and to the extent to which this is true, the local context defined by
the characteristics of people residing in ego’s community plays a role in shaping what people
feel comfortable discussing (Mollenhorst, Volker, and Flap 2014). Since most people strive to
avoid dissonant, or uncomfortable conversations, the presence or absence of ideological seg-
regation in the local environment provide an efficient description of the context in which such
conversations can occur. It also provides us with an opportunity to construct a risky test of
our theory in a different context: if we are right that people will try to avoid dissonant con-
versations when they are primed to think about important matters as political matters, then it
should be the case that reported discussion networks are smaller in less polarized communities.
This follows because in non-polarized communities the chances are greater than in polarized
40
communities that one might talk to someone whose views differ.
Figure 2.8: Priming and spatial political polarization in 2004.
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Note: We measure political polarization in each Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) (sampcode)
in three different ways and plot their distribution. Panel A reports the proportion of mod-
erate respondents, Panel B reports the kurtosis of political ideology, and the correlation
coefficient between party identification and political ideology is reported in Panel C. We
dichotomize each measure based on its mean value, and plot the mean network size per
day as differently colored circles, by level of polarization: low (blue) and high (red). As
in Figure 4, the smoothed means for network size are plotted as skyblue or pink circles
depending on the level of political polarization with the loess curves overlaid.
Figure 2.8, Panels A-C report distributions of these variables. Consistent with our expecta-
tion, Figure 2.8, Panels D-E show that those who live in low polarized PSUs – across all three
measures -- report smaller networks around the first presidential debate. However, those who
live in high polarized PSUs consistently report similarly sized network across time. Initially, this
would appear counter-intuitive. But reflection indicates it is not. Our discussion networks are
composed of people who are like us. In polarized communities, Democrats talk to Democrats
and Republicans talk to Republicans about important matters. Priming that turns important
matters into political matters has little effect, because they already know that they agree. Their
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neighborhoods and their networks are polarized, politically already. In non-polarized neigh-
borhoods, this is not the case. Democrats may well talk about important matters with Repub-
licans. Because polarization is absent, political beliefs are not salient in choosing discussion
partners. But a priming event that re-frames “important matters” to “political matters”, makes
a difference for people in non-polarized communities. Suddenly, the important matter is a po-
litical matter and the conversation that can occur is fraught with potential danger. In response,
people talk to fewer people, which reduces the size of their discussion network.
So far, our theory has survived two reasonable risky tests. We show that there really were
smaller networks in 2004 and those smaller networks arose for a very specific reason: re-
spondents were primed to think about political, rather than important, matters and answered
interviewer questions with that framework in mind.
2.9 Discussion
Do Americans have fewer close confidents with whom they talk about important matters than
they did in the 1980s? The most robust evidence that they do is found in the 2004 GSS,
which reported seemingly inexplicable declines in the size of our closest interpersonal net-
works (McPherson et al. 2006). Because the causes of this change were largely unexplained
in the original article, and because none of the factors thought to shape network size changed
sufficiently to account for the observed decrease, scholars have eagerly searched for the sup-
posed methodological smoking gun that invalidates the survey. This article suggests that they
have been largely unsuccessful10; that there is “nothing wrong” with the 2004 GSS network
10It is worth observing that while the prior attempts to identify why Americans reported having smaller networks
in 2004 than at any other time were largely unsuccessful, many of the articles had the intuition that political
events during the survey period may have played a role. For example, McPherson et al (2006) stated: “What
American considered important might well have shifted over the past two decades, perhaps as a result of ma-
jor events . . . If people think of “important” more in terms of national and world-level events, more people
might now think that they have nothing important to say” (372). Likewise, Fischer (2009) wrote: “One might
speculate, for example, that being questioned during a spring (sic) full of heated discussion about war and
presidential primaries may have led many respondents to interpret “important matters” as political matters”
(668).
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instrument or the findings arising from it. At the same time, this article shows that we cannot
make inferences about social change from those results because they are not comparable to
earlier or later GSS social network surveys. In this regard there is a smoking gun. The “gun”
is time, the “bullet” is priming.
For a couple of weeks in the middle of the field period, Americans really talked to fewer
people about “important matters” because the first presidential debate and the entire presi-
dential election period primed respondents to think that “important matters” were “political
matters” and eschewed potentially conflictual conversations. Nothing like that happened be-
fore or after, because no previous General Social Survey with a battery of network questions
was conducted in the fall of a presidential election year.
Scholars agree that there is increased political polarization in the United States (Abramowitz
and Saunders 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Fiorina
and Abrams 2008; Prior 2013). Talking about politics is potentially uncomfortable when po-
larization is marked, especially in highly polarized contexts, where the attitudes of others may
not be known(Cowan and Baldassarri 2018). If this is the case, it follows that non-partisans
should have fewer discussion partners when they think that the important matters of the day
are political matters. This is not the case for partisans. While their networks may become
somewhat smaller, they can still easily have conversations with partisan friends whose opin-
ions on politics they are sure of and which concord with their own. Against this background,
many Americans are at risk of “political isolation”. In such a situation, our capacity to have a
meaningful public discourse about politics may be significantly lessened.
There is some additional evidence to support this idea. During the fall of the 2016 US
presidential election, widely thought to be the nastiest and most partisan to date, we collected
network size data using the “important matters” and “political matters” network name gen-
erators from 1,055 American adults using the Time Sharing Experiment for Social Sciences
(TESS) platform11. Our results show that the average reported discussion network size is very
11This result comes from analysis of data arising from a survey experiment entitled, “Networks in Time: Testing
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small (1.4). As we have tried to argue, this does not mean that Americans are more isolated
than ever before. But it does mean that Americans are politically isolated – they really do have
fewer people that they talk to about political matters. While the link between this fact and the
hollowing out of substantive content in politics is speculative, it is, we believe, a speculation
worth considering.
For a long time we have known that the “important matters” name generator is sensitive
to survey context. If the network battery followed questions about education, for example,
people would report that their last important conversation was about education (Bailey and
Marsden 1999)! But what we never considered was how temporal context shapes how the
important matters name generator works12. This article shows that temporal context, identified
over 40 years ago by Anthony Downs as driven by issue-attention cycles, is absolutely critical
for that understanding. In the fall of 2004, around the first presidential debate, respondents
were primed to think about politics when they thought about important matters, and when
they did, they reported talking to fewer people than ever before. This was especially true
for people living in communities characterized by greater structural opportunity to talk with
diverse others with respect to political beliefs.
More than sixty million Americans watched the first presidential debate in 2004. The peo-
ple who watched the debate cared more about politics than those who did not (Kenski and
Stroud 2005). The run-up to the debate and the discussion that followed it dominated other
issues competing for attention at the end of September 2004. And so it follows that if the
priming mechanism we identify as shifting focus from important to political matters operates,
that it should impact those more interested in politics than those less interested. We show that
this is the case. The strikingly steep decline in network size for just a few weeks around the
Contextual Effects in the 2004 General Social Survey Network Items”.
12Of course, there is a body of scholarship that studies the sensitivity of the recall period (i.e., “the last six months”)
in network name generators (Sokhey and Djupe 2014), and that study change in core discussion networks across
individual life trajectories (Mollenhorst, Volker, and Flap 2014; Small, Deeds Pamphile, and McMahan 2015).
However, neither approach treats temporal context as a situational structure constituted by real-time events
that shape individual’s action frameworks.
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first presidential debate is real, but it is momentary. The short-lived nature of priming effects
reflects the limited attention space in people’s mind as well as the public arena (Hilgartner and
Bosk 1988). What can we learn from that fact?
One thing we can learn is methodological. There is a whole body of very good scholarship
that has concentrated on developing a variety of statistical methods to analyze panel data with
a focus on how individual responses vary from panel to panel (Morgan and Winship 2014;
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012), all the while assuming that responses within each panel are
constant. The results of this paper show that this assumption is not warranted. It tells us that
we need to pay much more attention to the role of the temporal (unobserved) heterogeneity
in the identification of causal effects and estimation of population parameters, whether or not
one has a representative sample. Other work has contributed to this demonstration as well. For
example, terrorist attacks that happened during survey fieldwork shape survey respondents’
attitudes toward immigrants (Legewie 2013) and fans of winning basketball teams in the 2009
NCAA men’s college basketball tournament rated President Obama’s job performance more
positively after they won than before (Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010). Temporal context gets
under the skin of surveys. In our case, temporal context shapes the ways in which people
interpret questions they are asked (Jerolmack and Khan 2014). This changes, necessarily, the
answers that they give.
We live in the world of replication crisis. It is easy to find some statistical significant effects
just by chance, though it is hard to replicate the same effects (Lee and Conley 2016; Open
Science Collaboration 2015). The solution to this problem is to secure more precision in the
identification of causal mechanisms in addition to the identification of causal estimates. In this
article we believe we have identified the precise mechanism that led to decreased network size
in 2004. That we see the trace of the same process in our data from 2016 is both reassuring with
respect to our argument and deeply distressing with respect to the prospects for meaningful
conversation about important political matters and the rise of political isolation.
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Chapter 3
The Contextual Activation of Political Belief System
The second chapter shows that the smaller network size reported by the 2004 General So-
cial Survey arises due to political priming mechanism (i.e., people frame “important matters”
as political matters due to political events around the election). I further identify the pre-
cise mechanism by using both individual variations of political engagement and geographic
variations of political polarization. Also, I show how political polarization induces smaller net-
works in the 2004 GSS compared to other periods (i.e., the significant difference of network
size between non-partisans and partisans becomes larger in the 2004 GSS than those in other
GSSs). One implicit assumption in my second chapter is that people “frame” important mat-
ters in response to the salient events. Does the first presidential debate actually make people
think in ideological ways? The third chapter elaborates on this assumption based on two na-
tionally representative surveys (i.e., ANES and GSS) that had been collected in the same five
years since 2000. Specifically, I employ the recent development in cultural network analysis
to test whether survey context activates political belief system, which is to provide a cognitive
mechanism for my findings in the second chapter.
3.1 Introduction
People have a set of inter-related political beliefs about societies or other objects. For example,
a liberal who supports gay marriage may also support gender equality, whereas a conserva-
tive who supports economic individualism may also support the limited role of government
in free markets. It follows that it is not always easy to have a coherent worldview due to the
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complexity of ideological reasoning, lack of political information, and ill-defined policy posi-
tions (Converse 1964, 2000). The idea that the public do not have logical coherence across
diverse issues, and that their policy positions are not temporally reliable even over the short-
run pose significant challenges to the theory of political representation and democratic society
(Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008; Downs 1957).
Two broad claims provide competing solutions to the puzzle of how people organize their
belief system. The one is to focus on partisanship as a cognitive heuristic that enables party
supporters to learn and follow the belief system designed by political party elites (Campbell
et al. 1960; Converse 1964). In this view, people’s party identification is stable, and party
identification shows the strongest impact on their voting behavior and drives their opinion
on politicized matters once measurement error is accounted for. In contrast, the revisionist
perspective focusing on issue voting shows that people can actually think of various issues
clearly, and in isolation, that issue-positions have a significant influence on voting behavior
after partisanship is taken into account (Feldman 1988; Fiorina 1981). In this view, people
do not need to be ideologues in order to evaluate politics on the basis of beliefs and values.
(Feldman 1988: 418). A common frame across both perspectives is that partisanship or a set of
core values serve as logical devices that organizes diverse political beliefs. The disagreement
remains with respect to what constitutes core values, how many they are, and how many
different logics exist in the society.
Against this background, recently two sociological studies that conceptualize a political
belief system as a network of interrelated political beliefs show contradictory findings, both
using the same American National Election Study (ANES) data. Based on relational class anal-
ysis, Baldassarri and Goldberg (2014) discover the presence of alternative voters’ belief system
among a subset of the population, which deviates from a center-periphery network structure.
In contrast, Boutyline and Vaisey (2017) argue that belief systems of different groups vary
in the amount of organization but not in the logic that organizes them, showing that politi-
cal ideology occupies the center of political belief networks based on belief network analysis.
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Despite their disagreement on structural form of political belief networks, their network per-
spective on political belief system beyond a dyadic view on ideological constraints provides
new opportunities to study the organization of political belief systems.
In this chapter, I reconcile these contradictory accounts for political belief networks by
focusing on the role of social context in belief activation. Building on literature on cultural
network analysis, I propose a theory of contextual activation of political belief system to explain
how social context changes the way in which individuals activate the political belief system. I
test this idea by using two national surveys that collect a similar list of political issue items in
the same presidential election years in the United States since 2000.
For a brief overview, I first successfully reproduce Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)’s results
in other ANES data, finding that political ideology occupies the center of political belief net-
works. However, in the GSS, surprisingly, an attitude about gay rights lies at the core of belief
networks. One exception occurs in the 2004 GSS, which was peculiar in that it launched its
surveys during the election season like other ANES data, while for all other years the GSS is
collected in the spring and the summer. Then, I focus on survey timing to identify the impact
of exogenous events on the activation of political thinking. Specifically, I discover that the
centrality of the gay rights issue peaked around the mass shooting in the Pulse gay nightclub
in the 2016 GSS, whereas the centrality of political ideology arose around the first presidential
debate in the 2004 GSS. These findings together suggest that belief systems, often considered
to be relatively stable, need to be “activated” by certain social cues.
Then, I turn to two potential explanations for the discrepancy between ANES and GSS.
With regard to the heterogeneous logic of political belief system across different social groups,
I check how subgroups’ belief networks differ in their direction of pair-wise correlations. I find
that the proportion of different signs of correlations is bigger in the GSS than in the ANES.
With regard to the amount of political belief organization, I check extent to which belief or-
ganizations follow the center-periphery account, finding that political belief networks in the
ANES exhibit higher levels of network centralization and stronger mean constraint than in the
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GSS. Researchers who look at the GSS may conclude that Americans may seem “innocent of
ideology” with low ideological constraints (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). Conversely, Americans
should be “ideologues” who organize their beliefs in the single liberal-conservative dimension
if they look at the ANES. This chapter suggests that the same people activate different political
belief systems, thereby invoking different identity, in different social contexts.
Roadmap
I first introduce the theory of political belief system with focus on Converse (1964)’s seminal
study. After briefly summarizing decades of methodological and theoretical debate on “the
capability of mass electorates” (Converse 2000), I explain competing theories of core values
in belief systems. I then describe how cultural network analysis can provide useful insights for
studies on the organization of political belief system that has been dominated by dyadic-level
analysis. Not considering the social contexts may mislead the debate on the structure and
centrality of political belief networks. After introducing the data and variables, I first replicate
Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)’s findings, and apply the method to other ANES and GSS data
sets. Then, I use several strategies to show potential explanation of the discrepancy between
the ANES and the GSS. In the end, I discuss the implication of my findings to political sociology
and cultural sociology.
3.2 A Theory of Political Belief Systems
It is a basic premise for theories of democracy and political representation that “rational” voters
can assess politicians on the basis of their positions on pivotal issues (Downs 1957). Based on
their assessment of issue positions of political candidates and parties, voters decide to cast
their vote for candidates whose political agenda best represents their political interests. The
idea that voters can assess politicians, who in turn seek to represent their constituency, relies
on the assumption that most citizens hold meaningful stances that are coherent across diverse
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issues and that are relatively stable over time. A theory of political belief systems is to explain
how people organize their diverse political beliefs despite cognitive limits and the unlimited
amount of political information.
In his seminal work, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”, Converse defined
a belief system as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound
together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse 1964:3). He
specifically uses the term constraint “to mean the success we would have in predicting, given
initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further
ideas and attitudes,” and further propose that “constraint must be treated, of course, as a mat-
ter of degree, and this degree can be measured quite readily, at least as an average among
individuals.” (ibid) One of his provocative theses is that the majority of the mass public ex-
hibit little consistency in their attitudes over time, and little ideological constraint from one
issue to the other. He shows that the former is supported by the low reliability of individual
issue positions after two and four years following the initial survey, and the latter is supported
by the low level of average pair-wise correlations across different issues among the public, re-
spectively. In contrast, political elites such as elected officials and party activists (referred to
as “ideologues”) exhibit high constraint and less measurement error by successfully organizing
their policy issue stances along the line of liberal and conservative dimensions.
Since the publication of Converse’s essay, mixed results have been reported with regard to
the ideological capability of the public. Some scholars argue that correcting the measurement
error can account for why Converse’s analysis resulted in low between-issue correlations as
well as low over-time correlations. They found, once measurement error is accounted for, high
constraints across issues as well as high stability of individual issue positions over time (Achen
1975; Ansolabehere et al. 2008). However, the explanation of measurement error cannot
explain sharp differences in response stability and constraint that vary with the different level
of political sophistication (Zaller 1992). For example, Freeder, Lenz and Turney (2018) show
that the knowledge of “what goes with what” in the US predicts the stability of political issue
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positions, though only a quarter of people has this sophisticated political knowledge.
In contrast, another group of scholars argues that the 15 percent of population who sat-
isfied the criteria for being “ideologues” in Converse’ study is too low (Stimson 1975), which
may arise from the fact that Converse’s survey data was collected during one of the least po-
litically charged periods in the recent American history (Jost 2006). This is what Freeze and
Montgomery (2016) recently showed; even after correcting for measurement error using a
multi-trait multi-method (MTMM) confirmatory factor analysis; the mean level of constraints
has increased from 0.1~0.3 in the 1970s to 0.5~0.7 in the 2010s. Nevertheless, it remains
the case that in both absolute terms and in comparison to elites, ordinary voters hold opinions
that are weakly correlated across different policy domains (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014;
Freeder et al. 2018)
If most citizens do not organize their political belief system in logically coherent ways, what
can explain the formation of their political beliefs? The immediate scholarly consensus is to find
a “yardstick” (Converse 1964:12), a logical device that ordinary citizens can use to evaluate
events and associated issues, thereby determining which issue positions they should take. The
scholarly disagreement lies on what constitutes a core value in political belief systems.
Converse initially proposed that “the sources of constraint are much less logical in the
classical sense than they are psychological – and less psychological than social.” (1964: 5)
Namely, people use their party identification1 as a cognitive heuristic to learn and adopt an
existing belief system held by the social groups that they are attached to. In his later essay,
Converse re-emphasized that “the mental shortcuts by which modestly informed voters can
bootstrap their contribution to democratic decision making” originate from five sources; (a)
partisan cues, (b) liberal-conservative dimension, (c) social influence from opinion leaders,
(d) group identification other than political party, (e) the economies of restricted attention in
the issue-public space. In this view, political ideology or party identification lie at the center
1The Michigan school defined party identification as “an individual’s affective orientation to an important group-
object in his environment” (Campbell et al. 1960:121), and consider it as an “unmoved mover” which drives the
formation of diverse public opinion (Johnston 2006).
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of the political belief system (2000: 346)2.
Alternatively, other groups of scholars dispute the unidimensional liberal-conservative di-
chotomy, proposing that the mass public develops and uses multiple core values in each domain
other than “ideology.” For example, according to Lakoff (2002)’s theory of moral politics, how
people think about their family and parenting is deeply rooted in the center of liberals and
conservatives’ mind. It is because liberals and conservatives think differently about family, and
these differences contribute to ideological differences that arise since people often use family
metaphors to develop their policy stances. For example, conservatives have a “strict father”
model, while liberals adopt a “nurturant parent” model. Feldman (1988), on the other hand,
proposes that three beliefs -- support for equality of opportunity, economic individualism, and
free enterprise system -- constitute the core values as the Lockean liberal basis of American
public opinions. Additionally, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) propose morality of warfare and
ethnocentrism as the core values in their hierarchical model of constraint for foreign-policy
attitudes.
Either one or more of these accounts cannot be correct, or it can be that core values are
multiple so that there is heterogeneity on the population as to which values lie at the core,
unlike the conventional image of the single core value organizing everyone’s beliefs into a
political belief system. To identify which item or set of items lie at the center of the political
belief systems of liberals and conservatives in the United States is not only necessary to test
these competing theories, but also useful to understand which core values are held by people
at different times and in different situations.
2Yet, one can find the irony in this conclusion because he also claimed that only a small fraction of the public
comprehend the abstract terms, “liberal” or “conservative”, and the majority of the public have some difficulty
in mapping their hodgepodge opinions into one single liberal-conservative dimension. It suggests the possibility
that party identification plays more central role in organizing political belief systems than left-right ideology
scale especially among the public.
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3.3 Network perspectives
Network conception of political belief system can be found in Converse (1964)’s following def-
inition of belief centrality: “the idea-elements within a belief system vary in a property we
shall call centrality, according to the role that they play in the belief system as a whole.” (p.4)
However, this notion of centrality in belief systems has not been well recognized and studied
by Converse himself and his successors. Instead, in the study of issue constraints, existing
scholarship used aggregate measures of constraints by taking the average of dyadic issue cor-
relations, and compared the magnitude and sign of correlations between or within domains
(Achen 1975; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Converse 1964; Craig et al. 2005; Hurwitz and
Peffley 1987; Zaller 1992).
The emerging sociological literature on cultural network analysis directly conceptualizes
political belief systems as networks of issue correlations (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014;
Boutyline and Vaisey 2017). In particular, Boutyline and Vaisey (2017) propose a method,
which they refer to as belief network analysis, to identify the centrality of items in belief net-
works. Under the assumption that any specific belief is derived from other beliefs with some
noise, they argue that the iteration of such a belief formation process creates a belief network,
in which two beliefs are more closely linked if fewer steps are involved in the generation of one
belief from another. Specifically, at the first stage, individuals have one single central belief,
which in turn at the second stage generates another belief with certain random noise. Newly
added beliefs then form the basis for newer beliefs that are peripheral by nature of the built-in
process. The sequence of dyadic belief generation processes induces the emergence of span-
ning tree networks with a center-periphery structure. The core value is a belief that organizes
otherwise disjointed and distant set of beliefs in the network.
The formal model is useful only if the underlying assumption for the belief generation
process makes sense. This is unlikely the case, however. The following assumptions play
critical roles in Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)’s model for the belief generation process. First,
the generation process of each belief is “independent” of that of another belief (i.e., the noises
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to each belief are independent amongst pairs). Second, the majority of node pairs in the
network are “strangers,” which they refer to a situation when two nodes only share the initial
core belief as a common ancestor. Third, there is no reciprocal influence between the parent
node and its child node (i.e., non-reciprocity).
Aside from the issue with the origin of this initial value, I argue that all three assumptions
are unwarranted. The “independent noise” assumption is sensitive to the common temporal
shocks (i.e., multiple issues that are jointly discussed, and emerge in the public’s imagination)
so that it will become problematic especially when the time gap between one belief’s gener-
ation and another is short. Terrorist events, for example, shifted a group of beliefs related
to immigrants altogether (Legewie 2013). Second, anyone who observes the densely related
belief items in actual survey data can easily see why the “stranger” assumption does not make
sense. Furthermore, this assumption only allows the existence of one initial core belief. The
third “non-reciprocity” assumption posits that the belief generation process takes the form of a
“sequence” (i.e., a temporally ordered set of beliefs). Party identification, for example, which
has long been considered as a “right-hand side” (i.e., causal and stable) variable, is subject
to the influence of other attitudinal changes depending on the political context (Highton and
Kam 2011).
Despite these problems, Figure 3.1 illustrates the benefit of having considered all pair-wise
correlations as a whole network. In Figure 3.1, a set of nine belief items (A1 to A4, C, B1 to B4)
and their hypothetical pair-wise relationships with varying degree of strength are plotted. Let’s
assume that researchers rely on the average strength of all dyadic correlations to measure the
centrality of each belief item. Then, A3 and B3 will be similarly ranked at the top because they
have strong connection with other nodes within the same domain of issues. Namely, A3 and
B3 play the central role in shaping other interconnected beliefs. However, if one looks at the
political belief system as a whole, the centrality of belief C should be highest, though C is only
linked to two belief nodes A1 and B1. The efficient organization of this political belief system
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Figure 3.1: Network perspective on a hypothetical political belief system.
NOTE: This figure shows that local measures cannot accurately capture the importance
of belief items in political belief networks. Here, A3 and B3 show the high local (degree)
centrality, whereas C shows the high global (betweenness) centrality. Each node represents
the belief item, and the thickness of ties represents the tie strength which can be captured
by the absolute correlation between items. Since all belief items are connected to each
other in theory, the absence of ties between two belief items does mean that the weak and
insignificant association.
is possible due to the C’s mediating role of two domains of beliefs A1-A4 and B1-B4. One can
use “betweenness centrality” for correct measurement (Freeman 1977). This is consistent with
Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)’s intuitive account for the motivation of measuring betweenness
centrality3.
However, one shared assumption across diverse theories of the core value in political belief
systems is that a political belief system largely follows the center-periphery structure. Again,
according to Converse’s theory of political belief system (1964), the amount of political in-
formation and political sophistication determines the extent to which political belief systems
are organized along ideological dimensions, leading to the heightened level of constraint. He
asserts that only a handful of political elites would follow the center-periphery structure.
If the aforementioned statement holds true, three alternative options are ready for most
ordinary voters to overcome the issue of their low constraint. First, as Converse (1964) argued,
the mass public may use their party identification as a heuristic instead of left-right ideology
3“Many center-periphery accounts of ideology describe the central belief as being the “glue” (Converse 1964) that
holds together the disparate parts of the belief system. That is, the central belief is what enables coherent stances
to exist across the relatively disconnected domains like environmental protection and gay rights (Converse 1964;
Lakoff 2002). By this logic, the center may not be the most constrained belief, but it should be the “broker” (Burt
2004) possessing the most unique and valuable pattern of constraint.” (Boutyline and Vaisey 2017: 1381)
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because it is their social identity. In this case, the logic of organizations should be the same
across different levels of political sophistication, while the amount of organization for the
mass public might depend on the extent to which they follow elites’ partisan cues in a “strinct”
manner (i.e., the high/low significant pair-wise correlations). Second, instead of using partisan
cues, the sub-population of citizens may have an alternative belief system that does not follow
the same logic with elite populations (i.e., the different signs of pair-wise correlations). Third,
the ordinary citizens would think as if they do not have any coherent and stable structure
(i.e., the most pair-wise correlations are insignificant), exhibiting the unpredictable nature of
political belief system.
I use nationally representative sample surveys such as the American National Election Stud-
ies and General Social Surveys to explore these possibilities. I explain how I use betweenness
centrality measures and sign tests of correlation matrices across subgroups after presenting
a new perspective on the activation of political belief system with a focus on eventful survey
context in next session. Before turning to these points, it is important to emphasize that these
data were collected from the mass public and not political elites.
3.4 A theory of contextual activation of political belief
system
The theory of a political belief system hinges on the assumption that beliefs remain stable.
People may change their opinion on a particular issue at a time, but core values with high cen-
trality in the belief system should be stable so that they can function as “switchmen,” driving
the change of attitudes on the periphery. For example, Converse noted: “definitions of belief
systems frequently require that configurations of ideas be stable for individuals over long pe-
riods of time. . . . it follows that central elements are indeed likely to be highly stable.” (1964:
66) The instability of intra-person correlations across time, often considered as a “measure-
ment error,” has been cited as supportive evidence for ordinary citizens’ weak organization of
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political belief system. At the same time, the high stability of party identification was presented
as evidence that lay people use this as a central element in their organization of belief systems.
Both socialization theory and the social identity perspective may account for the origin
of these core values. According to the Michigan school’s perspective, party identification is
an affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment that formed young,
persists throughout the life course, and is relatively invariant to external shocks (Campbell et
al. 1960; Johnston 2006). Likewise, according to Lakoff’s theory of moral politics, parenting
and family values were developed through social interaction within family early in life (Barker
and Tinnick 2006; Lakoff 2002). These perspectives are largely consistent with the recent
finding of the strong cultural stability, defined by the odds of cohort effects relative to period
effects, based on 164 attitudinal items in the 1974-2014 General Social Surveys (Vaisey and
Lizardo 2016).
However, this notion of stable core values has repeatedly been challenged. For example, the
“revisionist perspective” considers party identification as a “running tally” of citizen evaluations
of others’ political attitudes and events, and provide evidence for the significant instability of
party identification (Achen 2002; Fiorina 2002). In another vein, against the value-centered
model that emphasizes the information efficiency of core-values, Alvarez and Brehm (2002)
show that survey respondents in the US are sometimes ambivalent and equivocal, but most
often they are uncertain about how to use those values in political choices. Lastly, another
source of instability is group pressure and social influence. For example, geographic migrants
change their party identifications toward the majority party of their new states (MacDonald
and Franko 2008) and young teenagers change their moral schemes when their friendship
networks are closed and confined by their parents (Vaisey and Lizardo 2010).
I provide an alternative perspective to these disparate findings on the stability and instabil-
ity of core values. This puzzle may disappear if one differentiates core values’ formation and
function. It is possible that core values exist and rarely change over time, but simultaneously
different core values can be activated at different moments in time depending on social cues.
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Namely, the puzzle can be resolved by thinking of how and when people use their core values
instead of thinking how and when people form them (DiMaggio 1997; Swidler 1986)4.
The idea that people may activate different core values depending on social context is dif-
ferent from the idea of a dual-process model of culture in action, which argues that individual
actions are strongly guided by their (unknown) core values, and culture is merely used to
justify their action after the fact (Lizardo et al. 2016; Vaisey 2009). For example, a person
may form a new opinion on gay rights issues based on her core ideological value (i.e., being a
liberal) and express it during the survey, but at the same time she may justify the expression
of already formed opinion using her core ideological value.
Social cues make people link certain core values to other (peripheral) attitudes in different
situations, regardless of whether it is an expression or a post-doc justification, not to mention
justification itself provides a strong mechanism for attitudinal changes (Cooper and Croyle
1984; Olson and Zanna 1993). I propose that the issue salience plays the central role in
this process. Consistently with this view, for example, Dancey and Goren (2010) show that
partisanship affects — and is affected by — issue attitudes only when partisan debate on an
important issue receives extensive media coverage.
The idea of contextual activation I propose is consistent with literature on the role of sit-
uational cues in political priming (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009; Hart and Middleton
2014; Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Mondak 1993). Instead of using hy-
pothetical vignettes in priming experiments, I suggest that real-world contexts in which survey
are taken, induced by both issue salience due to public attention to specific events and ques-
tion order effects, play a significant role as intensified source cues. Although “talk is cheap”
(Jerolmack and Khan 2014), what people do when they take a survey is to “talk about their
4Moreover, we can also find some hints in Converse’s essay that are consistent with this perspective (1964): ”We
are capable of recognizing many more objects (or concepts) if they are directly presented to us than we could
readily recall on the basis of more indirect cues; and we are capable of recalling on the basis of such hints many
more objects (or concepts) that might be active or salient for us in a given context without special prompting.
[. . . ] It had been our assumption that such activation would be apparent in the responses of any person with a
belief system in which these organizing dimensions had high centrality.” (emphasis added: 18-19)
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opinions” to interviewers. The external events such as political debates, elections, or a tragic
mass shooting can frame what people think of “important matters” (Lee and Bearman 2017).
This contextually-sensitive framing activates different core values in people’s mind.
3.5 Data and Methods
To identify the role of social contexts in activating core values, I exploit the opportunity pro-
vided by the fact that two nationally representative sample surveys in the US have been con-
ducted in the same years since 2000 but at different times in those years. The American Na-
tional Election Study (ANES) is an interview of a representative sample of US citizens before
and after the presidential elections, since the goal of surveys is to investigate how people think
of presidential elections. In contrast, the General Social Survey (GSS) typically field their sur-
vey in the spring and summer biannually given that the goal of surveys is to track “general”
social trends without paying particular attention to the election context. One exception is the
2004 GSS. Unlike other GSSs, the 2004 GSS was fielded from September to December during
the presidential election period, which overlaps with the fieldwork period of ANES.
I use time-series repeated cross-section data files in both data sets.5 The GSS and ANES
share many aspects of survey designs including the sampling design (i.e., stratified random
sample), have similar response rates (60-70%), the length of interviews are also the same (80-
90 minutes), the mode of interview (face-to-face interviews in the Computer Assisted Personal
Interviewing format) is identicial, and fortunately many survey items are asked in similar ways.
However, obviously, two data sets are not collected in the exact same ways. First and foremost,
the substantive content of the surveys differs; the GSS includes a wide variety of measures
for “social” attitudes and behaviors to track general trends of social changes, whereas the
questionnaire of the ANES is political in focus. Another critical difference is, as I already said,
5Both data sets are publicly available. The GSS can be accessed at http://gss.norc.org/get-the-data. With
regard to the ANES (http://www.electionstudies.org), I combine time-series cross section data set from
2000 to 2012 and the 2016 time-series cross-section data set. But, since three parenting items are not available
in the time-series cross-section data, I merge those items in each year’s cross-section file to my data set.
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timing of the survey. Although the different results between the ANES and GSS can arise
either due to different interview timings or different focus in survey contents, the resulting
consequence is the same; namely, the respondents in the ANES data may activate “political”
beliefs in their belief networks more strongly than those in the GSS.
To maximize the comparability across different surveys over time, I select about thirty-five
survey items that simultaneously appear in two recent studies about belief networks in the
ANES (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Boutyline and Vaisey 2017), excluding items that are
not collected by the GSS. My goal is not to assess a comprehensive set of items organizing the
political belief system but to have a comparable set of political beliefs between the two data
sets in the same year. It is important to note that the potential selection bias can arise due
to the unbalanced representation of different areas in belief systems – for instance gay rights
issues were not asked in the GSS before 2004. The issue is related to the general boundary
specification problem in network research, which could become more problematic for this type
of analysis using survey items “predetermined” by survey administrators and researchers. This
is because of the open nature of political belief system unlike the closed nature of social net-
works that are strongly constrained by structural opportunity such as geographic and temporal
boundaries. Given that I use a slightly different list of political beliefs, the replication of their
findings using other ANES data is useful to assess whether this is the case for Boutyline and
Vaisey (2017)’s findings6.
Variables
Table 3.1 describes the variables used in the analysis with the specific details of measuring
each of 35 variables in the GSS and ANES. The common strategy that I employ across these
6Boutyline and Vaisey (2017) address this potential selection bias by showing their results are robust against
random selection among set of items that are already included in the pool of forty belief items that they arbitrarily
select. However, their strategy makes sense only if the original pool is already balanced, and does not leave out
for instance, beliefs that are central. In their terminology, this addition and deletion of beliefs in and out of the
political belief system can affect the tie length of particular set of trees in belief generation processes, but not
the structure of the network and its centralization.
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variables is following; I treat a binary variable (yes or no response) as ordinal. I also treat
“both” response as a mid-point instead of dropping respondents all together, following Bouty-
line and Vaisey (2017). I treat “don’t know” or “missing/refuse to answer” category as missing
and drop the observation when I calculate pair-wise correlations. Table 3.2 shows the number
of non-missing observations for each belief across time in the ANES and GSS data.
Table 3.1: Description of 35 belief items’ wording and coding scheme in the ANES and GSS
data.




Opinion on affirmative action (1 - sup-
port, 4 - oppose) [*2016; "in the univer-
sity"]
preferential hiring and promotion of bal-
cks (1-strongly support, 4 - strongly op-
pose)
2 Aid : Black Should the government help blacks (1 -
help, 7 - not help)
same (1 - help, 5 - no special treatment)
3 Racism 2 It’s really a matter of some people not try-
ing hard enough; if blackswould only try
harder they could be just as well off as
whites (1 - disagree, 5 - agree)
Three-item scale: Do people in these
groups [=Blacks] tend to be (a)
intelligent-unintelligent, (b) rich-poor,
(c) hardworking-lazy (1-7)
4 No Favor :
Black
Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other mi-
norities overcame prejudice and worked
their way up. Blacks should to the same
without any special favors (1 - disagree,
5 - agree)




If people were treated more equally in
this country we would havemany fewer
problems (1 - agree, 5 - disagree)
The government should concern itself
with reducing income differences. (1-
reduce diff, 7-no government action)
6 Equal Oppor-
tunity
Society should ensure equal opportunity
(1 - agree, 5 - disagree)
Should be the government’s responsibil-
ity to reduce income difference between
rich and poor (1-defnitely should be, 4-
defnitely should not be)
7 Gender
Equality
Should women have an equal role with
men in running business, industry and
government (1 - equal, 7 - women in the)
Four-item scale; (a) Family life often
suffers because men concentrate too
much on their work, (b) Mother working
doesn’t hurt children, (c) Preschool kids
suffer if mother works, (d) Better for man




Should be increased or decreased the
number of immigrants to U.S. (1 - in-
creased, 3 - same as now, 5 - decreased)
same (1-increased a lot, 5-reduced a lot)
9 Buying Guns Should fed govt make it more difficult to
buy a gun (1-more difficult, 3-easier)




1 FS : the poor Should federal spending on the poor 3 1
- increase, 3 - decrease
Should be the government’s responsibil-
ity to improve the standard of living of all
poor Americans. (1-government action,
5-people help themselves)
2 FS : blacks Should federal spending on assistance to
blacks (1 - increase, 3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too little
(=1) , or about Improving the conditions
of blacks
3 FS : childcare Should federal spending on childcare (1
- increase, 3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too little
(=1) , or about Assistance for childcare
4 FS : crime Should federal spending on crime (1 - in-
crease, 3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too little
(=1) , or about Halting rising crime rate
5 FS : environ-
ment
Should federal spending on the environ-
ment (1 - increase, 3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too little
(=1) , or about Improving & protecting
environment
6 FS : public
schools
Should federal spending on public
schools (1 - increase, 3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too lit-
tle (=1) , or about Improving the nation’s
education system
7 FS : social se-
curity
Should federal spending on social secu-
rity (1 - increase, 3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too little
(=1) , or about Social Security
8 FS : welfare Should federal spending on welfare 3 1 -
increase, 3 - decrease
Are we spending too much (=3), too little
(=1) , or about Welfare
9 Health Insur-
ance
Support for government or private health
insurance (1 - government, 7 - private)
Are we spending too much (=3), too little




Three-item scale: Should government re-
duce or increase spending (1 - increase,
7 - reduce), Should government handle
economy (=1) or free market can han-
dle (=2), The less government the better
(=1) or more things government should
be doing (=2)
Are you in favor of cuts in government
spending (1-strongly in favor, 5-strongly
against) [* but in 2016, also combined
with government should do even more to
solve our country’s problems (1-govt do
more, 5-govt does too much)]
11 Job Security Support for government guarantee jobs
and income (1 - guarantee, 7 - not guar.)
[*only exist in 2016]
Should be the government’s responsibil-
ity to provide a job for everyone who
wants (1-definitely should be, 4- defi-
nitely should not be) [* but in 2016, also
combined with Government financing of
projects to create new jobs (1-strongly in
favor, 5-strongly against)]
Morality
1 Abortion When should abortion be permitted (1 -
always, 4 - never)
Three-item Scale : Should it be possible
to obtain a legal abortion if (a) strong
chance of serious defect, (b) woman’s
health seriously endangered, (c) preg-
nant as result of rape (1-yes, 2-no)
2 Tolerance We should be more tolerant of people
who choose to live according to their own
moral standards, even if they are very dif-
ferent from our own (1 - agree, 5 - dis-
agree)
Fifteen-item scale: Allow [atheists,
racists, communists, militarists, homo-
sexuals] (a) to speak, (b) to teach, (c)
books in library (1-yes, 0-no)
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3 Gay Rights Two-item scale: (1) Should gays be al-
lowed to serve in the military (1 - al-
lowed, 5 - disallowed), (2) Do you favor
or oppose laws to protect homosexuals
against job discrimination (1 - favor, 5 -
oppose)
Homosexual couples should have the
right to marry one another (1-strongly
agree, 5-strongly disagree)
4 Religiosity
Do you consider religion to be an impor-
tant
Do you consider yourself a religious per-
son (1-very religious, 4-not religious)
part of your life or not? (1-yes, 2-no)
5 Biblical Liter-
alism
Is the bible the word of god? (1 - Yes,
literally, 2 - Yes, but not literally, 3 - No,
not the word of god)
Is the bible is the word of god (1), in-
spired word (2), or book of fables (3)?
6 Individualism
Should be “cooperative person who
works well
These days people need to look after
themselves and not overly worry about
others (1-strongly agree, 5-strongly dis-
agree)
with others” or “a self-reliant person able
to




Favor or oppose death penalty for murder
(1-favor strongly, 4-oppose strongly)
same (1-favor, 0-oppose)
8 Parenting 1 which one you think is more important
for a child to have: Independence or re-
spect for elders (1-independence, 2-both,
3-respect for elders)
the most important for a child to learn to
prepare him or her for life ... To think for
ones self (1-most important, 5-least im-
portant)
9 Parenting 2 which one you think is more impor-
tant for a child to have: Curiosity or
good manners (1-curiosity, 2-both, 3-
good manners)
the most important for a child to learn to
prepare him or her for life ... To think for
ones self (1-most important, 5-least im-
portant)
10 Parenting 3 which one you think is more important
for a child to have: Being considerate
or well behaved (1-being considerate, 2-
both, 3-well behaved)
the most important for a child to learn to
prepare him or her for life ... To help oth-
ers (1-most important, 5-least important)
Foreign Policy
1 FS : defense Should we spend more or less on de-
fense? (1 - less, 7 - more)
Are we spending too much (=3), too lit-
tle (=1) , or about the right amount on
Military, armaments, and defense
2 FS : foreign
aid
Should federal spending on foreign aid (1
- increase, 3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too little
(=1) , or about Foreign Aid
3 FS : science Should federal spending on
space/science/technology (1 - increase,
3 - decrease)
Are we spending too much (=3), too lit-




Self-placement on party-identification (1-
strong democrat, 7 - strong
same
republican)
2 Ideology Self-placement on liberal-conservative




Table 3.2: The number of non-missing observations for each belief across time in the ANES
and GSS data.
ANES GSS
Year= 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Civil Rights
Affirmative Action 1624 996 1912 5291 4222 1744 864 1255 1221 1777
Aid : Black 924 1073 1923 5188 3754 1800 859 1308 1282 1875
Buying Guns 0 0 0 0 4247 1811 891 1333 1283 1858
Equal Opportunity 1549 1064 2101 5499 3632 0 0 0 0 1338
Equal Treatment 1547 1064 2097 5491 3629 1849 865 1349 1324 1936
Gender Equality 978 1157 1116 0 3639 1704 872 1282 1259 1843
Immigration 1 1742 1047 2061 5390 3622 0 1983 1294 1262 1845
No Favor : Black 1541 1061 2077 5485 3630 1825 896 1310 1277 1865
Racism 2 1532 1058 2079 5484 3627 2157 868 1254 1238 1828
Economics
FS : blacks 1718 0 0 0 3754 1236 1276 881 877 1294
FS : childcare 1767 1188 2251 5851 4222 2577 2631 1871 1818 2700
FS : crime 1790 1198 2290 5861 4248 1357 1358 965 960 1389
FS : environment 1773 0 2289 5882 4240 1355 1362 976 971 1401
FS : public schools 1798 1201 2295 5881 4248 1381 1383 993 985 1421
FS : social security 1769 1191 2280 5850 4240 2654 2702 1926 1877 2756
FS : the poor 1772 1192 2274 5858 4228 1822 865 1333 1294 1887
FS : welfare 1775 1190 2275 5848 4229 1331 1360 955 957 1385
Health Insurance 935 1112 1044 5471 3766 1379 1382 973 969 1405
Job Security 909 1103 1024 5476 3774 0 0 0 0 1359
Limited Government 727 916 846 4806 3586 1792 853 1308 1289 1858
Foreign Policy
FS : defense 836 1061 963 5187 3683 1307 1367 965 965 1398
FS : foreign aid 1763 1195 2246 0 0 1311 1348 934 930 1345
FS : science 0 1199 2256 5852 4242 0 1325 1875 1824 2687
Morality
Abortion 1758 1047 1031 5855 4208 1679 819 1207 1152 1728
Gay Rights 1393 990 2191 2882 4122 0 1184 1336 1287 1862
Biblical Literalism 1716 1179 2264 5824 4198 2228 1296 1955 1903 2788
Death Penalty 0 0 0 0 4180 2565 1257 1902 1824 2695
Individualism 1514 0 0 0 0 0 1334 0 1291 0
Parenting 1 1548 1064 2096 5497 3630 1863 868 1351 1323 1934
Parenting 2 1550 1063 2100 5498 3636 1863 868 1351 1323 1934
Parenting 3 1550 1063 2100 5499 3633 1863 868 1351 1323 1934
Religiosity 1799 1203 2309 5882 4244 0 0 2000 1952 2833
Tolerance 1545 1062 2090 5495 3632 1495 789 1146 1105 1635
Political Identity
Ideology 673 920 1626 5300 4208 2644 1309 1933 1874 2756
Party Identity 1792 1195 2282 5890 4248 2805 2800 2010 1960 2835
The wording of questions and their response options are not completely identical. One
concern would be the difference of response options and wording of questions in some variables
64
between the GSS and the ANES. I first check whether the general direction of these variables
is consistent in both data sets by checking the signs of correlations of each variable with the
left-right ideology score. I find that all remaining 34 variables are related to ideology scores in
the same direction. Although the mean and standard deviation of variables in both data sets
differ as shown in Table 3.3, the ideological direction of all variables is consistent across data
sets, which reduces the comparability concern.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for 35 belief items in the ANES and the GSS sample.
ANES (N=15,526) GSS (N=12,493)
No Name N Mean SD N Mean SD
Civil Rights
1 Affirmative Action 14045 3.66 1.53 6861 3.2 1.02
2 Aid : Black 12862 4.63 1.86 7124 3.47 1.27
3 Buying Guns 4247 1.53 0.62 7176 0.23 0.42
4 Equal Opportunity 13845 1.76 1.03 1338 2.36 1.07
5 Equal Treatment 13828 2.33 1.17 7323 3.65 2
6 Gender Equality 6890 6.23 1.4 6960 0 0.86
7 Immigration 1 13862 2.61 0.98 6384 3.56 1.09
8 No Favor : Black 13794 2.33 1.29 7173 2.14 1.26
9 Racism 2 13780 3.27 1.32 7345 0 0.86
Economics
1 FS : blacks 5472 3.71 1.96 5564 1.73 0.69
2 FS : childcare 15279 1.71 0.78 11597 1.49 0.62
3 FS : crime 15387 1.52 0.71 6029 1.44 0.61
4 FS : environment 14184 1.67 0.77 6065 1.45 0.64
5 FS : public schools 15423 1.41 0.69 6163 1.33 0.58
6 FS : social security 15330 1.55 0.72 11915 1.44 0.6
7 FS : the poor 15324 1.73 0.78 7201 2.91 1.19
8 FS : welfare 15317 2.18 0.73 5988 2.18 0.78
9 Health Insurance 12328 3.93 2 6108 1.35 0.6
10 Job Security 12286 4.23 1.84 1359 0 0.64
11 Limited Government 10881 0 0.84 7100 2.95 1.24
Foreign Policy
1 FS : defense 11730 4.31 1.57 6002 2 0.78
2 FS : foreign aid 5204 2.34 0.67 5868 2.51 0.67
3 FS : science 13549 1.63 0.76 7711 1.72 0.67
Mortality
1 Abortion 13899 2.08 1.1 6585 0 0.9
2 Gay Right 11578 0 0.77 5669 2.97 1.53
3 Biblical Literalism 15181 1.86 0.72 10170 1.86 0.72
4 Death Penalty 4180 1.31 0.46 10243 0.35 0.48
5 Individualism 1514 1.44 0.5 2625 3.23 1.04
6 Parenting 1 13835 2.55 0.79 7339 2.14 1.27
7 Parenting 2 13847 2.38 0.89 7339 2.71 1.3
8 Parenting 3 13845 1.77 0.92 7339 2.53 0.99
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9 Religiosity 15437 1.29 0.45 6785 2.44 1
10 Tolerance 13824 2.45 1.19 6170 0 0.94
Political Identity
1 Ideology 12727 4.18 1.47 10516 4.1 1.44
2 Party Identity 15407 3.63 2.11 12410 3.72 1.97
NOTE: FS : “Federal Spending”.
Analytical Strategy
How one can identify the importance and location of each belief in a given political belief sys-
tem? As I described earlier, Boutyline and Vaisey (2017) propose a network analytic method,
which they call belief network analysis, to find a core value in a network of interrelated opin-
ions. Despite some problematic assumptions underlying their formal model spelled out above,
the intuition behind employing betweenness centrality echoes recent developments in cultural
network analysis (Bail 2016; Lizardo 2014; Pachucki and Breiger 2010).
I apply belief network analysis to the General Social Survey (GSS) and American National
Election Studies (ANES) across five presidential election years from 2000 to 2016. The first
goal of this analysis is to check whether I can reproduce Boutyline and Vaisey’s finding that
political ideology occupies the center of belief networks in other ANES data. I cannot use the
same set of political beliefs used in Boutyline and Vaisey (2017), but as they showed in their
analysis of randomly dropping belief items, this should not affect their findings. However, if
social context matters, then the same belief network analysis employing the same set of belief
items using the GSS samples will generate different results.
I follow the procedure proposed by Boutyline and Vaisey (2017) to estimate the centrality
of political belief items in networks. First, I calculate pair-wise correlations across all avail-
able items in each data set. Specifically, I account for the ordinal nature of most variables
by calculating the polychoric correlations between two ordinal variables, and the polyserial
correlations between an ordinal and an interval variable, and finally the Pearson correlations
between interval variables using polycor package in R (Olsson, Drasgow, and Dorans 1982).
To deal with multi-collinearity issues, I estimate factor scoring based on polychoric correla-
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tions to create interval variables for the following beliefs: Abortion, Anti-black Racism, Gay
Rights, Gender Role, Tolerance, Job Security in the GSS, and Gay Rights and Limited Role of
Government in the ANES.
In a second step, I treat the correlation matrix of issue attitudes as a complete (fully in-
terconnected) network. This characterization of belief network analysis assumes a linear re-
lationship between variable-pairs. Then, I generate a valued network in which tie strength
equals to 1/cor
 
x i, x j
2
where cor(x i, x j) is the correlation between survey items x i and x j.
I use a weighted measure of betweenness centrality in igraph emplemented in R by converting
the correlation matrix into network objects. As an extension, Freeman’s index of between-
ness centralization can be used to measure the extent to which the belief network as a whole
possesses a single, well-defined center (1977). The centralization of a network is the sum of
pairwise differences between the centrality of the most central node and the centrality of each
other node, normalized by the maximum possible value. This index achieves its maximum of 1
when one belief in the network has a betweenness of 1, and every other belief has a between-
ness of 0. It achieves its minimum of 0 when every belief has exactly the same betweenness
centrality (see also Boutyline and Vaisey 2017:1383).
This centrality analysis is designed to identify whether the center of political belief network
is dominated by a single core belief. The question is how much more central the core value
is located compared to the rest, and how likely the difference in centrality can arise from
“random” statistical variation that includes measurement and sampling error. Since there is no
statistical theory to account for the distribution of betweenness centrality, Boutyline and Vaisey
(2017) propose a nonparametric bootstrap method to simulate a distribution and generate
corresponding confidence intervals. I follow their resampling strategy by randomly sampling
the same number of individuals with replacement in a given survey data and calculating the
betweenness centrality in a correlation network for each of 1,000 resamples.
The basic intuition behind this bootstrapping strategy is that if a core value is robust to
statistical noise (i.e., sampling variability), then it should be able to consistently occupy the
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center of any “randomly generated” network. This means that the absolute value of each simu-
lated distribution is less useful when the goal is to compare the difference in centrality between
a core value and the rest. Thus, I calculate the relative belief centrality by dividing the raw
standardized betweenness centrality score by the centrality of a core value which is identified
as the node with the highest centrality in the observed distribution. This characterization of
belief network analysis is not only useful when we assume there is one distinctive core value in
belief networks, but also when there are two or more core values, since the goal is to quantify
the relative difference. The relative centrality of a core value to itself is always 1. Therefore,
measuring the relative centrality of each pair, is useful: if the 95% confidence intervals (sim-
ulated by the bootstrap procedure above explained) contain 1, then we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that the centrality of a core value is not distinguishable from the centrality of re-
maining beliefs. This strategy provides a useful test for the amount of organization in political
belief networks.
Moving window approach
The comparison of belief centrality results between the GSS and ANES over time is useful
for understanding the contextual sensitivity induced by a number of political questions that
precede various belief items as well as notable events that happened during the fieldwork. I
use interview timing to isolate the role of exogenous events in activating different core values.
Specifically, I measure issue centrality moving through time during the period I which the
surveys were fielded, and observe the temporal trends around salient events. After running
the moving window test for all belief items across all data sets, I limited the analysis on the
two most central belief items (gay rights and ideology) in analyses of the 2004 and 2016 GSS
data, while I also include the results from ANES in the same year as for comparison. In doing
so, I select the subsample taking the survey 15days before and after each date which yields
a monthly moving window. In each subsample, I recalculate the belief centrality and plot
the resulting moving centrality over time. In order to identify the temporal pattern without
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relying on the parametric assumption, I show a smoothing line by fitting a local regression as
a nonparametric method using loess function in R.
Sign comparison test
Since the existence of alternative political belief system identified by Baldassarri and Goldberg
(2014) undermines the notion of the center-periphery structure, Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)
use a sign comparison test -- i.e., compare the sign of significant correlations across subgroups
-- to show the absence of alternative political belief systems across subgroups7. If attitudes
that are positively correlated in one subgroup are negatively correlated in another, ignoring
the sign of correlations by taking the absolute difference or squared difference of correlations
would be problematic. The underlying logic of sign test is that if two groups share the same
logic, then the correlation of two opinions should point to the same direction. For example, if
one group does not support abortion, but support gay marriage, whereas another group favors
both issues, then the two groups are safely said to have different logic organizing these issues.
However, the absence of alternative belief systems leads to the over-estimation of the
center-pheriphery structure. As Boutyline and Vaiey, “if two such evenly sized populations
are mixed together in a single sample, the two patterns may simply cancel out, yielding two
variables that appear uncorrelated in the full sample” (2017: 1398). The absence of sign
differences across subgroups implies ironically that there are less zero correlations than one
would expect under the presence of sign differences, which would widen the gap between the
centrality of core and the rest.
Table 3.4: Description of demographic characteristics in the ANES and GSS data.
Name ANES GSS
Age group R’s age : [ 39=1, 40 55=2, 56 :3] same
7Since insignificant correlations may provide a weak signal, which could exaggerate the different sign of cor-
relations around zero, only significant correlations shall be considered. The significance of each correlation
is provided by the following approximate t values; t = r/
p
(1− r2)/(N − 2) with d.f. = N-2, where r is a
correlation coefficient and N is the sample size.
69
Church attendance Thinking about your life these days, do
you ever attend religious services, apart
from occasional weddings, baptisms or
funerals? (IF YES:) Do you go to religious
services every week, almost every week,
once or twice a month, a few times a year,
or never? [never/no religious preference
=1, other category=0]
How often do you attend religious ser-
vices? [never=1, other category=0]
Class (self-
identified)
"Most people say they belong either to
the middle class or the working class.
Do you ever think of yourself as belong-
ing in one of these classes? (IF YES:)
Which one? (IF NO:) Well, if you had to
make a choice, would you call yourself
middle class or working class? [working
class=1, middle class=0]
If you were asked to use one of four
names for your social class, which would
you say you belong in: the lower class,
the working class, the middle class, or the
upper class? [lower/working class=1,
middle/upper class=0]
Education R’s highest degree : [high school grad-
uate=1, Associate or some college=2,
Bachelor’s or above=3]
R’s years of education : [0-12 years=1,
13-15 years=2, 16-20 years=3]
Family Income R’s family income [1=0 to 33 per-
centile, 2=34-67 percentile, 3=68-100
percentile]
R’s family income (coninc):
[1= 34,999$, 2=35000 65000$,
3=65001$ ]
Gender R is female (=1) or male (=0) same
Having children R has at least one kid (=1) or none (=0)
in the household
same




occupation] **only available in 2000
and 2004
R’s occupation group (occ10), [1=Man-
ager (10/950), 2=Professional
(1000/3540), 3=sales/office work-
ers (4700/5940), 4=service workers
(3600/4650), 5=others(6000/9830)]
Parents foreign born "Were both of your parents born in the








remember that [X] ran for President on
the Democratic ticket against [Y] for the
Republicans. Do you remember for sure
whether or not you voted in that elec-
tion? [voted=1,otherwise=0] ** presi-
dential candidates’ name appear in X and
Y respectively.
Race R’s race : [White=1, Black=2, His-
panic/other =3]
R’s race : [White=1, Black=2, His-
panic/other =3]
Religion Regardless of whether you now at-
tend any religious services do you ever
think of yourself as part of a particular
church or denomination? (IF YES:) Do
you consider yourself Protestant, Roman
Catholic, Jewish or what?[1=Protestant,
2=Catholic, 3=Jewish, 4=Other and
none (also included DK preference)]
What is your religious preference? Is it
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other
religion, or no religion? [1=Protestant,
2=Catholic, 3=all others, 4=None]
South Interview location in the "South" region
of the U.S. census
same
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Betweenness centrality is less useful when the political belief networks follow the center-
periphery structure than when they follow the modular structure. Although the betweenness
centrality and other centrality measures such as degree or closeness tend to be highly correlated
in most empirical contexts (Valente et al. 2008), betweenness centrality can better differen-
tiate the position of network nodes when a network exhibits high modularity. In the extreme
situation of center-periphery structure where one single node is linked to all remaining nodes
that are otherwise disconnected, degree centrality is enough to identify the true centrality of
the core value as opposed to Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)’s argument. In the less extreme sit-
uation, for example when a belief network follows spanning tree structure, which is a kind of
center-periphery structure, then there is no reason to believe that betweenness centrality can
outperform, for instance, closeness centrality.
Nevertheless, I agree with their basic idea to use the sign comparison test for examining the
heterogeneity of logic in the organization of political belief system in certain conditions, and I
apply Boutyline and Vaisey’s demographic belief heterogeneity analysis to the GSS and ANES
data8. In doing so, I follow their measurement strategy as closely as possible regarding the
classification of demographic subgroups. Table 3.4 shows how I measure each demographic
characteristic in both ANES and GSS data, and Table 3.5 shows the mean and standard devia-
tion of each variable in the dataset.
Table 3.5: The distribution of each demographic group in the ANES and the GSS samples from
2000 to 2016.
ANES GSS
Year = 00 04 08 12 16 00 04 08 12 16
Female 56.3 53.3 57 51.9 52.6 56.4 54.5 54 55.2 55.5
No child in the household 50.7 76.2 61.2 67.7 66.3 61.6 69 66.2 69.5 74.2
US-born parent 85 83.2 86.5 79.3 81.4 82 81.9 79.2 76.5 78.4
Working Class 45.7 45.3 56.4 46.6 43.7 50.7 50.2 53.9 53.8 56.8
Church Attendance 69.1 66.1 65.7 59.6 98.1 78.7 83.2 78.8 74.8 74.6
South 36.4 34.4 47.3 38.6 37.5 35.7 38.5 37.1 37.6 36.7
8Note that this strategy cannot directly test the presence (or absence) of the population who exhibit alternative
belief systems (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014) because a group of “alternatives” can also emerge without any
demographic foundation. However, I cannot conduct relational class analysis (RCA) in the GSS due to the split
ballot design of the GSS implemented since 2006.
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Election Voting 76.4 78.7 76.5 75.5 86.7 61.7 62.6 61.7 66.1 63.1
Age:-40 37.3 36 36.8 30.7 34 40.4 39.2 36.4 36.6 34.6
Age:40-55 32 30.8 31.2 29.3 25.2 32.3 32.1 31 29.4 26.8
Age:56- 30.7 33.3 32 40 40.7 27.2 28.8 32.6 34.1 38.6
Race:white 80 74.6 51.2 63.3 78.2 78.6 79.4 77.1 74.8 73.2
Race:black 11.7 15.5 25.2 18.5 10.2 15.2 13.4 13.9 15.2 17.1
Race:others 8.3 9.9 23.5 18.2 11.6 6.2 7.1 9 9.9 9.7
Relig:protesant 56 56.1 57.6 34.8 27.4 54.1 53 51.6 46.6 48.1
Relig:catholic 25.8 24.4 22.8 23.6 15.2 24.1 23.4 23.3 22.6 22.8
Relig:others 2.4 2.9 1 1.9 36.8 7.6 9.2 8.5 11.2 7.4
Relig:none 15.8 16.5 18.6 39.7 20.7 14.1 14.4 16.5 19.7 21.7
Educ:-hs 38.8 38.4 47.8 35.3 25.8 46.8 40.2 45.6 43.5 42.2
Educ:hs 30.3 31.7 30.8 33.5 35.5 28.2 30 25.3 26.5 25.8
Educ:coll 30.9 29.9 21.4 31.2 38.7 25.1 29.8 29.1 30 32
Occ:manager 13.6 12.6 12.6 14 13.6 13.4 13.6
Occ:professional 24.4 21.2 19.6 23 20.8 22.4 23.4
Occ:sales/office 24.3 26.9 25.6 24.1 22 20.8 21.4
Occ:service 31.2 31.4 17.3 16 17.8 20.5 19.8
Occ:others 6.6 7.8 24.9 22.9 25.7 22.9 21.8
Inc:-35k 39.9 36.7 39.2 36.2 32.2 50 41.1 44.4 55.5 49.6
Inc:35-65k 28.9 30.6 38.4 35.2 27 24.8 33.7 27.6 24 26.2
Inc:65k- 31.2 32.7 22.4 28.6 40.8 25.2 25.2 28.1 20.5 24.2
NOTE: Occupation category is not yet available for the 2008, 2012, and 2016 ANES data.
3.6 Results
Table 3.6 shows the relative centrality of nodes in the belief networks in the whole ANES data
that collapsed all pair-wise correlations from 2000 to 2016. I successfully replicate Boutyline
and Vaisey (2017)’s finding from their own 2000 ANES, that political ideology occupies the
most central position in Americans’ belief networks, despite a different list of political beliefs. I
repeat the same analysis using the GSS data collected during the same five presidential election
years, and show the results in Table 3.7. I find that political ideology no longer occupies the
center of belief networks, but instead an attitude about gay rights shows the highest centrality
which is “statistically significant.”
Table 3.6: Relative Centrality of Nodes in Belief Networks in the whole ANES data that collapse
pair-wise correlations from 2000 to 2016.
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ANES
Mean 95% LCI 95% UCI Empirical Est.
Ideology 100 100 100 100
FS : blacks 53.71 33.89 74.45 55.77
FS : the poor 45.53 33.53 60 48.72
Aid : Black 35.27 23.81 52.67 30.13
Death Penalty 28.35 6.04 53.12 28.21
Buying Guns 21.32 10 34.78 25.64
Parenting 2 22.37 18.62 27.27 22.44
FS : environment 21.3 16.76 27.78 21.15
Biblical Literalism 18.71 11.11 27.33 18.59
Party Identity 18.23 3.85 31.48 18.59
Limited Government 4.45 0 20.42 15.38
FS : public schools 11.5 5.13 18.87 10.9
FS : welfare 5.85 2.04 11.41 9.62
Abortion 5.95 1.48 18.79 5.77
No Favor : Black 6.95 0.53 23.08 5.13
Racism 2 5.78 0 21.84 3.85
Equal Treatment 3.01 0 9.79 2.56
FS : crime 0.79 0 1.52 1.28
Health Insurance 1.41 0 4.32 1.28
Job Security 4.85 0 21.77 1.28
Affirmative Action 0.79 0 10.06 0
Gay Right 0.26 0 2.5 0
Equal Opportunity 0.77 0 8.46 0
FS : childcare 1.87 0 8.93 0
FS : defense 0.14 0 0 0
FS : foreign aid 0.01 0 0 0
FS : science 0 0 0 0
FS : social security 2.56 0 11.03 0
Gender Equality 0 0 0 0
Immigration 1 0.39 0 4.38 0
Individualism 0 0 0 0
Parenting 1 1.96 0 17.93 0
Parenting 3 0 0 0 0
Religiosity 0.07 0 0.58 0
Tolerance 0 0 0 0
NOTE: The relatively centrality is defined by the relative ratio of standardized betweenness centrality to the
item with the highest betweenness centrality (i.e. ideology). The mean and 95% confidence intervals are
produced by a nonparametric bootstrap that resamples the respondents (rows) in the survey data set with
replacement 1000 times.
Table 3.7: Relative Centrality of Nodes in Belief Networks in the whole GSS data that collapse
pair-wise correlations from 2000 to 2016.
GSS
Mean 95% LCI 95% UCI Empirical Est.
Gay Right 100 100 100 100
Ideology 49.21 27.81 76.06 47.03
FS : blacks 33.57 17.86 54.89 37.13
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Aid : Black 39.61 19.4 64.67 34.65
FS : environment 32.6 14.29 50.33 34.16
Equal Opportunity 33.31 11 65.45 33.66
Parenting 2 31.38 16.88 45.67 30.2
Health Insurance 21.57 10.05 34.44 26.24
No Favor : Black 15.49 0 42.23 17.33
Party Identity 10.15 0 24.87 13.86
Biblical Literalism 7.61 2.34 16.23 5.94
Immigration 1 2.08 0 5.92 4.46
FS : welfare 3.26 0 11.9 3.96
Parenting 1 9.37 0 28.95 2.97
FS : the poor 4.4 0 14.74 1.98
Job Security 7.86 0 32.9 1.98
Equal Treatment 3.76 0 11.74 0.5
FS : foreign aid 0.25 0 1 0.5
Limited Government 1.3 0 6.67 0.5
Abortion 0.01 0 0 0
Affirmative Action 0.8 0 8.02 0
Buying Guns 0.02 0 0 0
Death Penalty 2.93 0 16.06 0
FS : childcare 1.56 0 6.99 0
FS : crime 0 0 0 0
FS : defense 0 0 0 0
FS : public schools 4.73 0 18.82 0
FS : science 0.01 0 0 0
FS : social security 0.08 0 1.08 0
Gender Equality 0.27 0 4.22 0
Individualism 0 0 0 0
Parenting 3 0.14 0 1.56 0
Racism 2 0.04 0 0 0
Religiosity 0.22 0 4 0
Tolerance 0.29 0 3.17 0
NOTE: The relatively centrality is defined by the relative ratio of standardized betweenness centrality to the
item with the highest betweenness centrality (i.e. ideology). The mean and 95% confidence intervals are
produced by a nonparametric bootstrap that resamples the respondents (rows) in the survey data set with
replacement 1000 times.
Table 3.8 shows the “top 5” central beliefs in both surveys across five different presiden-
tial election campaigns. Again, in the ANES sample, political ideology has been consistently
located at the center of belief networks across different years. The rankings of other political
beliefs related to civil rights, economics, and morality differ across time, though their central-
ity is weak and indistinguishable from each other in general. However, the results from the
GSS show strikingly different patterns. First, with one exception in 2004, political ideology --
though consistently ranked among the “top 5” beliefs -- does not lie at the center of the polit-
ical belief system. Instead, civil rights issues such as how much government should spend to
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improve blacks’ lives or more recently, gay rights issues occupy the most central position in the
GSS data.
Table 3.8: Top five belief centrality across years in the ANES and the GSS data.
Year ANES GSS
2000
Ideology (0.42) FS : blacks (0.26)
Biblical Literalism (0.16) Aid : Black (0.15)
Limited Government (0.12) Gender Equality (0.15)
FS : blacks (0.11) Parenting 2 (0.11)
FS : the poor (0.1) Ideology (0.1)
2004
Ideology (0.5) Ideology (0.2)
Biblical Literalism (0.21) FS : blacks (0.15)
FS : public schools (0.14) Biblical Literalism (0.12)
No Favor : Black (0.09) Party Identity (0.11)
Parenting 2 (0.07) Parenting 2 (0.11)
2008
Ideology (0.42) Gay Right (0.34)
Abortion (0.29) Ideology (0.22)
Limited Government (0.23) FS : blacks (0.15)
Biblical Literalism (0.16) No Favor : Black (0.11)
FS : the poor (0.12) Health Insurance (0.11)
2012
Ideology (0.31) Gay Right (0.41)
Limited Government (0.18) Ideology (0.37)
Biblical Literalism (0.09) Aid : Black (0.21)
Parenting 2 (0.09) Health Insurance (0.14)
No Favor : Black (0.08) FS : blacks (0.12)
2016
Ideology (0.36) Gay Right (0.26)
FS : the poor (0.09) Ideology (0.2)
Parenting 2 (0.07) Aid : Black (0.19)
Equal Treatment (0.06) FS : environment (0.16)
FS : environment (0.06) Parenting 2 (0.11)
NOTE: The (absolute) standardized betweenness centrality score is in parenthesis. The ideology is colored by
gray, and attitudes toward homosexuality is bolded.
The differences in the political belief networks of Americans arising from the GSS and ANES
-- in the same country in the same years -- provides an interesting puzzle. The 2004 GSS results
suggest some hints for resolving this puzzle. Unlike the “usual” GSS data which are collected
in the spring, summer, and early fall, the 2004 GSS data were collected in the fall and winter
during a period of heated debate over the presidential election. The fact that political ideology
centers the belief system only in the 2004 GSS suggests that survey respondents in the 2004
GSS organized their political beliefs with a focus on political ideology, precisely because the
presidential campaign was underway. In short, fielding the survey in the fall primed Ameri-
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cans to politicize their beliefs. This is always, not surprisingly, the case for the ANES survey
respondents who are contacted right before and after the presidential election. In other words,
political ideology emerges as the core value in our political belief systems when ideology be-
comes central for thinking about and responding to a presidential election. When people do
not have to think in such ideological ways, in non-election contexts, attitudes toward gay rights
are increasingly placed at the center of their mind9.
Resampling Approach
Figure 3.2 shows how much “statistical” variations we can observe in both data sets in different
years by a non-parametric bootstrap resampling method. I resample the respondents (rows) in
the survey dataset with replacement, and recalculate the correlation matrix, and corresponding
belief centrality in each resampled data. I repeat this bootstrap 1000 time and plot the 95%
confidence intervals. One obvious finding is that political ideology in the ANES is quite stable
and is consistently located in the center of networks. In contrast, the GSS results are exhibit
less stability, and multiple beliefs occupying the center are statistically indistinguishable from
one another across all different years.
Figure 3.3 shows how the belief networks differ across GSS and ANES datasets. I display
political belief networks in the 2016 ANES and the 2016 GSS, but other graphs generally follow
the same pattern. In this graph, each color represents four classifications developed by prior
research (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014), and the thickness of
edges represents the strength of ties (see inset).
Two findings are worth mentioning. Given that I use the same cut-off, the 2016 ANES
sample (and other ANES data too) shows stronger constraint than the 2016 GSS sample (as
9Alterative explanation is that the way people define “liberal” and “conservative” is shaped by the extent to which
contexts are political. According to this view, these findings do not suggest that people organize their beliefs
based on for example gay rights issues in the GSS. Instead, while belief system is still organized around the
liberal-conservative ideological dimension, people attach different meanings to ideology based on the salient
issues induced by social events.
76
Figure 3.2: Sampling variability of centrality of nodes in belief network from full ANES and
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NOTE: The y-axis is ordered by the magnitude of the relatively centrality, which is defined
by the relative ratio of standardized betweenness centrality to the item with the highest be-
tweenness centrality in each year in each data set (see Table 3.8). The mean and 95% confi-
dence intervals are produced by a nonparametric bootstrap that resamples the respondents
(rows) in the survey data set with replacement 1000 times. The solid line shows statistically
null effects when the 95% confidence intervals include 100 (the reference point) so that
the effect is not distinguishable from the core belief. All five years as well as all collapsed
sample is distinguished by the different type of dots (see the right bottom corner).
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NOTE: Tie strength |Tij|= cor2(x i, x j)is represented by thickness and boldness (see inset).
Correlations between below |r|=0.15 are not depicted. I use fuchterman reingold algo-
rithm, which places strongly connected nodes closer together and weakly connected and
unconnected nodes further apart. Each color represents four different categories except for
ideology (=red), party ID (=pink), and gay right (=green).
well as compared to any other GSS samples from different time points). Second, in the 2016
GSS, the belief system seems to be divided into two major modules – the one is clustered around
civil rights and economic beliefs, another is clustered around moral values. Political ideology
and gay rights simultaneously occupy the center, and link two disjoint modules as “brokers.”
It is consistent with Park (2018)’s recent finding that the moral dimension of ideology has
become dealigned from the economic and civil rights dimension over the past decade. People
think about their morality independent of other issues more when they are asked in the GSS
compared to being asked in the ANES.
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Moving window approach
Based on the above comparisons, it seems that the temporal context in which surveys are
taken about political beliefs matters in important ways as to which belief emerges as the core,
organizing element of our belief systems. I further interrogate this idea. To do so, I investigate
the potential role of the temporal context in shaping core values. Using a 30-day moving
window, I calculate belief centrality across time during the fieldwork period in the GSS and
ANES in 2004 and 2016 respectively. Figure 3.4, Panel A shows that the centrality of gay rights
peaked around the tragic mass shooting at the Pulse gay nightclub in Orlando in the 2016 GSS,
whereas the centrality of political ideology peaked around the first presidential debate in the
2004 GSS. In contrast, the 2004/2016 ANES data show little volatility. These results imply that
people react to a particularly salient social event by updating their core values, though political
ideology has consistently activated if the survey is asked about the presidential elections during
the election period.
So far, I show that social context matters for the activation of political belief systems using
two different national surveys that collect the similar instruments on political beliefs in the
same year. Next, I use the sign comparison test to show how much of the heterogeneity in the
logic and amount in the organization of political beliefs exist differently in the ANES and GSS
data.
Heterogeneity in the logic and amount of belief organization
Table 3.9 shows the results from the comparison of heterogeneity of logic in belief networks
between the ANES and GSS data across different years. First, the mean constraint is higher
in the ANES than in the GSS, which supports the graphical interpretation of political belief
networks in Figure 3.3. Second, the mean constraints across different years do not show a
dramatic difference in any of the datasets.
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Figure 3.4: Trends of standardized betweenness centrality scores for political ideology and
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NOTE: Each dot represents the standardized belief centrality of 30-day moving-window
sample that includes respondents who took the survey 15 days before and after each date
for ideology (pink) and homosexuality (=blue). Each line shows the locally weighted re-
gression line estimated by the loess function in R package with smoothing parameter (a)
set to 0.5 for ideology (=red), and homosexuality (=blue). The solid vertical lines in the
Panel A show when the first presidential debate happened (09/30/2004) and the Orlando
mass shooting at the Pulse gay night club (06/12/2016), respectively.
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Table 3.9: The comparison of heterogeneity of logic in belief networks across the ANES and
GSS in each year.
ANES GSS Between ANES and GSS



















2000 1807 276 0.226 2817 268 0.194 240 5.8
2004 1212 295 0.237 2812 278 0.175 240 7.5
2008 2322 364 0.21 2023 343 0.191 310 10.6
2012 5914(*) 336 0.275 1974 287 0.205 278 7.9
2016 4271(*) 504 0.272 2867 470 0.211 453 4.9
NOTE: I only use the set of belief items that appear in both data sets per year in calculation of this pair-wise
belief centrality differences. The significant correlation is identified by Fischer’s approximation method. The
proportion of significant correlations with opposite signs is the number of correlations with opposite signs in
both data divided by the number of the total number of “significant” correlations in both data after excluding
the diagonal and the insignificant correlations.
* The large sample size in the 2012 and 2016 ANES sample is due to the introduction of “internet-module”
With regard to the direct comparison between the ANES and GSS data, I find that the
proportion of opposite signs between the two is 5-10%, which shows high discrepancy. This
interpretation may come at a surprise to some, but recall that one restriction in this test is all
other belief items are measured in a way that they show the same sign with the ideology score
in each data. The significant reduction in the degrees of freedom is inevitable due to this con-
straint, for example, if there are K items, then K-1 correlations should be the same across two
correlation matrices by default. According to the logic of sign tests, two representative sam-
ples of Americans in the same year have used different logics to organize their political belief
system. Then, a naturally following question is how much heterogeneity exists in demographic
groups within both surveys.
Figure 3.5 examines the logic heterogeneity across demographic subgroups within the same
category. Namely, I calculate the proportion of significant correlations with opposite signs
between subgroups, such as within gender category (female versus male), or racial categories
(white versus black, black versus other race, white versus other race), and so on. Then, I plot
the estimates of all pair-wise comparisons across data sets with the average values displayed
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of average group-level heterogeneity of logic in belief networks in the
















































all 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Average of % Corr. with Opposite Sign
4.7 6.1 3.6 5.6 2.8 12 5.4 7.6 3.1 6.4 2.2 4.4
ANES
GSS
NOTE: The box plot for the average of the percentage of significant correlations with oppo-
site signs across subgroups from the ANES (pink) and the GSS (blue) sample is displayed
per year. The exact number for the average of the percentage of significant correlations
with opposite signs between subgroups within each data set per year is written at the top.
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at the top using boxplots. In general, the proportion of opposite signs is low in both GSS and
ANES datasets, which is consistent with Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)’s finding. However, the
heterogeneity is generally higher in the GSS than in the ANES in that the average heterogeneity
level of the GSS is twice of the ANES’s. A notable difference is found in 2004 comparison, which
I explore further in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: Each cell represents the proportion of significant correlations with opposite signs
between two subgroups, and the solid rectangular shows the within category variations.
The significant correlation is identified by Fischer’s approximation method.
Figure 3.6 shows the extent to which all 44 different combinations of groups share similar
or different logics in their thinking of political belief items in the 2004 ANES data. In this
matrix, diagonal cells surrounded by the bolded box show “within category” comparison, in
which for example, males are compared with females, and whites versus blacks. In other areas,
I compare males versus other distinctive groups such as churchgoers or high school graduates,
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as a general test. The finding here is consistent with Boutyline and Vaisey (2017), that is, the
majority of correlational differences between groups is minimal. The rare exception is group
that identifies as Black and those who did not identify with any of the given religious categories
and choose “other”, of which patterns were also discovered and explained by Boutyline and
Vaisey (2017)’s analysis of the ANES 2000 data. These results again show that I can successfully
replicate their findings.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: Each cell represents the proportion of significant correlations with opposite signs
between two subgroups, and the solid rectangular shows the within category variations.
The significant correlation is identified by Fischer’s approximation method.
In contrast, Figure 3.7 shows strikingly different patterns. Unlike the results from the
ANES, the 2004 GSS show multiple heterogeneous logics in belief networks across different
subgroups. Subgroup differences are universally present, and as a consequence, almost all
84
subgroups show different signs of significant correlations including race groups, churchgoerr
versus non-churchgoers, and different religious affiliations, voters versus non-voters, and dif-
ferent occupational groups. This variation reveals that each group uses their own distinctive
logics to organize their belief system in the 2004 GSS in the United States. This finding needs
to be understood in the context that unlike other GSSs, the 2004 GSS was conducted in the
fall of presidential election campaign periods, and collected “general” attitudinal belief items
compared to the ANES that directly focuses on “political” belief items about the presidential
election.
Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between mean constraint and the global network central-
ization index, in which each dot represents a subgroup with different markers according to their
core value (i.e., the node with the highest centrality) in the ANES and GSS data across times.
First, if we look at the 2000 ANES case, I can reproduce (a) left-right ideology occupies the cen-
ter of belief networks across almost all groups, and (b) there is a positive correlation between
network centralization (i.e., the extent to which the network follows the center-periphery struc-
ture) and mean constraint (i.e., the amount of political belief organization), and (c) almost all
networks with high constraint or high centralization have ideological identity at their center
(see the upper right corner in the figure). This means that I successfully replicate Boutyline
and Vaisey’s findings in Figure 3 (Boutyline and Vaisey 2007: 1404) as well.
The positive correlation between the two implies that if the network follows the center-
periphery structure, then they tend to exhibit a higher amount of organization and vice versa.
All other ANES follow the same pattern. However, it is no longer the case for the GSS data.
First, there are negative correlations between the two in the 2004 and 2016 GSS, which sug-
gests that higher mean constraint does not always lead to the hierarchical structure of political
belief networks. At the same time, ideology occupies the center of few subgroups over time in
the entire GSS data, whereas a fair amount of subgroups have gay rights at the center. Finally,
neither mean constraints nor network centralization predict what occupies the center of belief
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Figure 3.8: The relationship between mean constraint and network centralization in each sub-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: The mean constraint takes the average of all dyadic correlations of political belief
system in each subgroup, and network centralization indicates the standardized between-
ness centralization at the network graph level. Each dot represents a particular subgroup
with different core beliefs displayed by X (=ideology), square (=homosexuality), and circle
(=all other beliefs). The blue line shows the linear regression line with R2.
networks, and vice versa.
In their paper, Boutyline and Vaisey (2017) concluded that: “Taken together, the results
reported in this section show that although demographic groups vary in the degree to which
they are organized, they do not vary in the way in which they are organized. (P.1405)” I
successfully replicate their findings using the ANES data, but all other analyses using the GSS
data refute this conclusion. In sum, I show that the social context shapes how people activate
their core values by changing what occupies the center of belief networks as well as the logic and
amount of organization in political belief system.
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3.7 Discussion
For a long time, the left-right ideology scale has been used to explain how people organize their
political thinking, and how the ideological thinking affects political behaviors such as voting,
social distance, and social relationships across diverse social settings (Jost et al. 2009; Martin
and Desmond 2010). Its strong reliability and predictive power is part of the practical reasons
why it has played such a central role in the field of political behaviors. Another theoretical
reason for its historical popularity is associated with the assumption that political ideology
has been considered as a cognitive heuristic to organize people’s belief systems despite their
limited cognitive capacity. The recent development of belief network analysis that considers a
set of inter-related items as a political belief network shows supportive evidence for this claim
(Boutyline and Vaisey 2017).
Employing the same methods, I reaffirm the pivotal role of political ideology in organizing
various political beliefs using the American National Election studies. The fact that left-right
ideology rather than party identification appears as a core value seems somewhat contradictory
to the original account of Converse (1964) that the mass public does not well comprehend
the abstract and symbolic “liberal-conservative” dimension, and his emphasis on partisanship.
This may be related to the fact that Converse (1964)’s study was conducted during the least
charged presidential election (Jost 2006). Since then, however, there has been an increase
of party sorting and especially the relationship between ideology and party identification has
increased significantly over recent decades (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Baldassarri and
Gelman 2008; Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro 2017; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Park 2018).
In 2016, the correlation between the seven-scale party identification and political ideology is
0.48 in the GSS and 0.65 in the ANES. This suggests “the end of the end of ideology” (Jost
2006).
At the same time, I also show that the influence of ideology is exaggerated using the same
set of belief items with different samples from the General Social Surveys in the same year in the
same country. Thinking of gay rights instead of the symbolic left-right ideology scale is placed
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at the center of political belief networks, which acts like a “glue” by connecting two divergent
clusters of issue elements in the GSS since 2008. The fact that I could recover the centrality of
left-right ideology in the 2004 GSS suggests why ideology has consistently occupied the center
of political belief networks in the ANES data. If the situation becomes political, because of
political events like the presidential elections, then people begin organizing their belief in such
ideological ways.
The finding that how one thinks about gay rights constitutes a core value of Americans in
the non-election months since 2008 has an implication to the claim of “culture wars” being
on the rise, as characteristic of American social and political life (Baldassarri and Gelman
2008; DellaPosta, Macy, and Shi 2015).10 By culture war, we tend to think of individuals
disagreeing on cultural issues. The two module structure of the GSS data suggests that moral
issues are less correlated with the rest, implying that moral issues are unaligned with other
issue. The high betweenness centrality of gay rights does not mean that the disagreement on
gay rights issues is the most intense, rather suggesting the opposite of a culture war. At the same
time, it suggests that these moral concerns become the deep structures underlying liberal and
conservative political worldviews. While an increasing number of Americans support same-sex
marriage, ultimately leading to its legalization, it appears as if the culture war is still ongoing
with different forms in the organization of core American political beliefs.
The idea that social context matters for the activation of core values in a political belief sys-
tem is also supported by the analysis of moving centrality. I first discovered that the centrality
10Park (2018) recently found that the public has become less polarized on moral issues in terms of the bimodality
of its distribution. Importantly, the overlap of agreements on moral issues between Republicans and Democrats
has been increased since 2004, which suggests that both partisans have increasingly agreed upon the moral
concerns than they have disagreed. How less variation of gay rights arising from more agreement across parti-
san lines can play a central role as a core value in shaping other attitudes? As an extreme case, if all American
support the gay marriage, then ones’ position on this particular issue cannot tell anything about other issues.
However, in his analysis, the ideological distribution of the moral dimension of Democrats and Republicans
overlaps about 70 percent (i.e., 30 percent of disagreement remains), and the correlation between the moral
dimension and other dimensions remains near 0.5 in recent years which is significantly lower than the correla-
tion between economic and civil rights (0.7). Combined, these suggest the possibility that the moral dimension
actually mediates the disagreement on the other dimensions in their “network” structure, though the “dyadic”
correlation with other dimensions is low.
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of gay rights peaked around June 12, 2016, when 49 people were killed and 58 were wounded
inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, which was the deadliest incident of violence against
the LGBT people in the US history. At the same time, the centrality of political ideology is
enacted around the first presidential debate in the 2004 GSS. These results resonate with one
of the results in my second chapter that shows the sharp decrease in the size of “important
matters” discussion networks around the first presidential debate (Lee and Bearman 2017).
Presumably, survey respondents frame important matters as political matters when the first
presidential debate forced them to think about the presidential election. The sudden activa-
tion of ideological thinking provides more direct evidence to this political priming mechanism.
Unlike the GSS results, for ANES respondents, political ideology emerged consistently at the
core of the belief network, suggesting that it has the potential to serve as a heuristic to intercon-
nect otherwise only weakly correlated issue positions with one another during the presidential
elections.
With regard to debates on alternative belief systems in the US (Boutyline and Vaisey 2017;
Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014), I show that both accounts are right, but for the wrong reasons.
I successfully replicated Boutyline and Vaisey (2017)’s finding that there is less heterogeneity
in the logic than the amount of belief organization in the ANES data, and that this amount
of organization across subgroups, measured by mean constraint, is positively associated with
the extent to which network follows the center-periphery structure. However, this result does
not hold in the GSS data. I found that there is more heterogeneity in logic in the GSS than
in the ANES across demographic subgroups, and that the amount of belief organization is
not always positively correlated with the centralization of belief networks. These significant
discrepancies in the GSS largely support the existence of “alternative political belief system”
in the voters’ minds. We cannot find it due to resolution limits of modularity-based group
detection algorithms, not because it does not exist.
The discovery that core values that we think are quite durable are strongly influenced by
temporal context should lead us always to try to collect data over longer periods of time than
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single surveys and to be more cautious in our interpretation of results arising from single snap-
shots of the American population. Moreover, this further provides an important implication to
the recent debates in cultural sociology. Ann Swidler (1986) argues that culture is like a toolkit
as people know about the culture more than they use. The implication of toolkit theory is that
people may activate different values in different situations. In contrast, Steven Vaisey (2009)
argues that a value is a predisposition. It is fixed and stable. Since people are likely blinded to
how they organize their values, we need a creative method to identify it. I use Boutyline and
Vaisey’s tool to uncover the core value, replicate their findings, and provide evidence to reject
their theory of value, but in support of Swidler’s tool-kit theory.
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Chapter 4
The Rise of Political Homophily in The Battleground States
The fourth chapter shows the implication of the previous chapter -- that the organization of
political belief system is significantly constrained by presidential election contexts, providing a
social-psychological mechanism for the smaller network size reported in the 2004 GSS – with
respect to the way in which we discuss specific issues with a certain type of people. Political
priming shapes network sizes in two ways. One is to change the interpretation of “important
matters” switching core discussion ties to others such as political discussion ties. Another is
to activate or deactivate certain types of ties depending on the context. The fourth chapter
focuses on the latter, elaborating on how politicized contexts shape the activation of political
diversity in political discussion networks; whether political activation encourages people to
talk to politically diverse people to persuade each other or it constrains people to talk to like-
minded people to avoid potential conflicts.
Unlike previous chapters focusing on survey timing to study the role of political situation,
this chapter focuses on where politics become a central part of social life during election cam-
paigns. Specifically, I focus on battleground states to investigate the mutually conducive mech-
anism of political discussion partners and topics -- with whom people discuss politics depends
on which issues they discuss and vice versa. I argue that the increasing political salience and
exposure to opposing views contribute to the creation of interpersonal political echo cham-
bers. I present evidence to support this claim based statistical analysis of the 1992, 2000,
2008 National Election Studies.
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4.1 Introduction
For several decades, it has been repeatedly shown that political discussion networks matter for
various dimensions of political behaviors1. Among other network characteristics, network size
and political heterogeneity appear as critical factors for better political participation and politi-
cal deliberation, consequently providing the foundation for deliberative democracy (Huckfeldt,
Johnson, et al. 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2002a). The importance of large
and politically diverse networks becomes salient when their stakes are high, such as when and
where an election outcome is expected and turns out to be close. Public and scientific discourse
has focused on these moments most intensely in so called battleground states. This chapter
examines the impact of living in battleground states on the formation of political discussion
networks.
One of the challenges in studying the formation of discussion networks comes from alter-
topic dependency, namely, what people talk to (i.e., discussion topic) and whom they talk to
(i.e., alter) are mutually conducive (Bearman and Parigi 2004; Brashears 2014; Small 2013).
Political discussion networks are not an exception. The potential risk of relationship disrup-
tion makes people avoid talking about certain issues when they anticipate disagreement, and
instead selectively disclose their opinion on sensitive issues only to the trustworthy (Cowan
2014; Cowan and Baldassarri 2018; Gerber et al. 2012). Cowan and Baldassarri (2018) find
that Americans are more likely to share their opinions with whom they agree more, and less
likely when they do not know their discussion partner’s opinions on a given issue. These find-
ings on alter-driven bias in ego-centric networks suggest that it is plausible for an ego to report
the strong political homophily simply because only like-minded alters may disclose their opin-
1Political behaviors influenced by political discussion networks includes but not limited to political information
acquisition (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Huckfeldt 2007; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Huckfeldt, Mendez,
and Osborn 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987), vote choice (Berelson et al. 1954; Huckfeldt and Sprague
1987; Ryan 2011), partisan defection (Beck 2002) political participation (Jang 2009; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998;
Leighley 1990; McClurg 2003, 2006b; Mutz 2002b; Nickerson 2008; Pattie and Johnston 2009), and levels of
political awareness and tolerance (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Jang 2009; Mutz 2002a; Mutz and
Mondak 2006).
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ion to her. If people select only agreeable issues to discuss regardless of the actual level of
political heterogeneity in their interpersonal networks, this will inevitably induce the creation
of political silos, and limit the influence of political diversity in discussion networks.
The implication of selective disclosure is not only limited to explaining the perceptional
scarcity of political disagreement. It also threatens research designs to study how exposure
to diverse opinions affects political polarization and the formation of political discussion net-
works. In the recent field experiment, Bail and his colleagues (2018) document the “backfire”
effect of exposure to opposing views; namely, Republicans who followed a liberal Twitter bot
became more conservative, and so did Democrats. Although this finding based on social media
sites may be limited to the odd population of specific2 Twitter users, it provides useful insights
on the unintended consequences of political diversity. We do not yet understand the “back-
fire” effect in the general population. In this regard, an interesting opportunity arises in the
battleground states with regard to studying how sharp increases in public and media attention
to presidential elections shape political diversity in interpersonal networks by making people
exposed to diverse political issues.
If an election is not contested in a state so that it is obvious who will win, nation-wide
attention to the state election result is limited. Likewise, political campaign efforts to increase
voter turnout are discouraged, and the amount of political advertisement is minimal, and con-
sequently, people discuss safe issues on which they mostly agree with their close confidants
without increasing risk of ruining their relationship. This scene changes dramatically in the
battleground states. The rise of public and media attention to the election outcome, as well
as the increase of negative political campaigns, force people to be exposed to issues they dis-
agree and be aware of differences in their political beliefs on various issues that they have
with their confidence. As a result, it is much harder to avoid talking about unsafe issues, and
2The initial target population comes from the internet panel who visit Twitter at least three times each week. The
extraordinary feature of this population is that about two thirds of the study sample answered all substantive
questions about the content of message retweeted each week and a half further identified the animal picture
re-tweeted each day. It is certainly impressive, but also limits the generalizability of the study’s findings.
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it is inevitable to discuss some salient issues which are externally given depending on how a
particular issue matters in the battleground states because people are more likely to disclose
their opinion on an issue if the issue is salient (Cowan and Baldassarri 2018). Using the bat-
tleground states can therefore help us identify the change of network composition when the
disagreement is revealed.
I combine three nationally representative ego-centric political discussion network data in
the US to examine the impact of battleground states on how many and with whom people talk
about politics during the presidential elections. I show that network size is increased in the
battleground states, but the increase is small and insignificant. In contrast, network homophily
is significantly increased in the battleground states, which is strongly driven by the political
minority.
4.2 Political disagreement in discussion networks
Prior literature has repeatedly documented the positive effect of political disagreement on
personal tolerance for dissent and thus on facilitating the process of political deliberation and
having a meaningful discussion (Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Huckfeldt, Johnson, et al. 2004; Mutz
2002a, 2002b; Pattie and Johnston 2008). Given that the capacity of citizens to disagree but
to communicate with each other provides a foundation for deliberative democracy, it is crucial
to ask how much political disagreement can sustain in discussion networks, and further to
examine potential factors that help to maintain democratic dissent in the society.
With regard to the origin of political discussion networks in the general population, most
scholarly attention has been on the identification of factors at the individual and dyadic level
including but not limited to personality, political expertise, political engagement, discussion
topic, and relationship type (Cowan and Baldassarri 2018; Gerber et al. 2012, 2013; Huckfeldt,
Johnson, et al. 2004). Some people may discuss politics more than others, and some people
disagree more than others. Likewise, some pairs of relationships may allow disagreement in
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their discussion, but some may not. However, we still do not know much about contextual
factors at community or state levels.
We can get some preliminary insights from a series of studies conducted by Huckfeldt and
his colleagues (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2002; Huckfeldt, Johnson, et al. 2004; Huck-
feldt and Sprague 1987, 1988, 1995). Using data from the 1984 South-Bend study, Huckfeldt
and Sprague (1987, 1988) show that neighborhood contexts have significant influences on
the choice of discussion partners. Namely, individuals report the higher similarity of voting
behaviors with their discussants if the higher proportion of like-minded voters occupies their
neighborhood. Further, they show that the political minority perceived more accurately politi-
cal disagreement with the majority who are ignorant of such disagreement. At the same time,
the minority in local contexts who resists talking with the majority is nonetheless exposed to
talking to the majority because of lack of other minorities in the neighborhood.
In addition to the focus on neighborhood contexts, Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2002)
consider political campaigns as another type of local context with high social pressures for po-
litical conformity. Using data from the 1995 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study, they compared the
change of political homogeneity within discussion networks before and after the presidential
election. They find that political homogeneity within discussion networks is reduced signif-
icantly by about 20 percentage points after the election which contradicts their theoretical
expectation. Yet, they discover the decrease of network size and political discussion frequency
after the election, which suggests the significant and positive role of a political campaign in
making voters engage in politics and elections despite the negative role of reducing political
diversity.
Despite theoretical insights arising from their seminal works, there exists significant selec-
tion bias in that they can only observe those respondents who choose to move and live in that
particular neighborhood. If certain unobserved characteristics such as tolerance for conflicting
views affect both choosing the neighborhood and discussion partner, then estimates for the re-
lationship between neighborhood characteristics and network characteristics would be biased.
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Another issue is that their county-level analysis assumes individuals can get some senses of the
distribution of political preferences in their neighborhoods at a county level. Although it may
be of true for residents in the South Bend in 1984, the political importance of neighborhoods
has repeatedly been challenged in the contemporary American society.3 In this regard, their
reliance on small community samples limits the generalizability of their findings.
One of the key lessons from these studies is that voters’ perception about the election con-
text and their surroundings affect how they activate their ties to discuss politics. It does not
reject the role of the structural opportunity that is given by election contexts. For example,
the population size of like-minded people in the neighborhood at the given moment in time
structures the potential pool of interlocutors (Rytina and Morgan 1982). However, except for
the extreme condition in which everyone would disagree in one’s immediate surrounding, it
might not be that difficult to find a person with similar political ideology in various places.
Although people discuss politics more with their co-workers and neighbors than they discuss
their important personal matters, still more than a half discuss politics with their close relatives
(Mutz and Mondak 2006). In this regard, the mechanism of structural constraint is relatively
weak in the neighborhood contexts, especially at the large geographic unit.
Rather, it is more likely the case that local contexts, such as the exposure one receives
when living in a battleground state, change the way in which people perceive the issue salience
and the corresponding ideological distribution of their immediate surroundings on the salient
issue. The finding that people are less like to disclose their opinions on sensitive issues to
their neighbors compared to their friends and families (Cowan and Baldassarri 2018) suggests
that the selective disclosure is a safeguard that permits to get along each other in politically
diverse neighborhoods. However, the heightened level of political salience due to negative
political campaigns and focused media attention pushes people to be open to opposing political
3For example, Abrams and Fiorina (2012) dispute Bishop (2009)’s popular idea of “The Big Sort” that individuals
mostly live in the “land-slide” county, concluding that “neighborhoods are not important centers of contemporary
American life. American today ... do not talk to their neighbors very much and talk to their neighbors about
politics even less. . . . Even if geographic sorting were ongoing, its effects would be limited by the preceding
facts about contemporary neighborhood life.” (p.208)
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views. This, in turn, has them discern and perceive disagreement and conflicting views in their
surroundings otherwise unnoticed. Now, people know that they disagree. I will discuss the
implication of issue salience and perceived disagreement in models for political discussion
networks after I describe network models for political polarization.
4.3 Models for political disagreement and issue selection
The presence of political disagreement raises significant challenges to the theoretical literature
on cognitive dissonance and conformity model of social influence (Asch 1956; Axelrod 1997;
Downs 1957; Festinger 1962) that predict its absence in discussion networks. Namely, politi-
cal disagreement is unlikely to survive because people avoid psychic discomfort and/or due to
interpersonal feedback processes among inter-dependent individuals. Further, severe disagree-
ment often leads to the breaking of social ties between those who hold opposing views. Yet,
empirical research has repeatedly observed the significant presence of political disagreement
in interpersonal networks (Bello and Rolfe 2014; Huckfeldt, Johnson, et al. 2004; Klofstad,
Sokhey, and McClurg 2013; Parker-Stephen 2013). Although political disagreement is rarer
than agreement in discussion networks, the existence of the small amount of political disagree-
ment plays a significant role in changing people’s attitudes and behaviors.
Two different network-based explanations have been proposed as distinctive solutions to
the puzzle of the theoretical absence and empirical presence of political disagreement. Based
on Axerlod (1997)’s culture model, Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) show that dyadic
influence models (i.e., two individuals persuade and are persuaded each other) always pro-
duce the eradication of disagreement in the long run. As an alternative, they propose an
autoregressive network model that considers the process of network influence beyond dyadic
level (i.e., an individual is persuaded only by the surrounding network members instead of the
single partner). They show that political disagreement can sustain because “agents are able
to resist divergent viewpoints within their networks because every opinion is filtered through
97
every other opinion” (178). However, this autoregressive model only works when networks
densities are low. It critically limits the implication of their formal models; namely, political
disagreement would disappear more when more people enter the political debate.
Baldassarri and Bearman (2007) take a different approach to tackle the issue. Instead
of finding a condition in which political disagreement can always survive, they seek to find
when political disagreement can and cannot sustain. They propose an issue take-off model
that considers the selection of issues (“what people talk”) as an important engine that drives
simultaneous processes of social influence and network selection given the dyadic level pro-
cess. The simulation results show two dramatically divergent patterns; when people discuss
one issue heavily, referred to as issue take-off, the unequal distribution of topic selection leads
to the rise of network segregation as well as the stronger polarization of the most popular issue
than other issues. In contrast, when people’s attention to various issues is evenly distributed,
referred to as issue non-take-off, their discussion networks are characterized by attitude het-
erogeneity and the distribution of issue positions are less polarized. Exposing their results to
further scrutiny reveals, however, that the issue polarization and the network segregation are
monotonically increasing over time. It is in some sense anticipated. In the long run equilib-
rium, the absence of political disagreement and network integration is inevitable. In the long
run, we are all dead.
Both formal models are comparable in many different aspects, but the goal of formal mod-
eling is quite different. Huckfeldt et al. (2004)’s autoregressive model is to develop a model
to show how to prevent the absence of political disagreement at equilibrium in the long run,
whereas Baldassarri and Bearman (2007)’s issue take-off model is to develop a model to pro-
duce the relative presence and absence of political heterogeneity and network integration in
the short run. Among some different details of their models, it is worth noting how both model
treats the way in which people select issues to discuss. In autoregressive models, people select
issues randomly among the issues that people disagree, but in issue take-off models, people
select issues on which both take the extreme positions regardless of the direction of their opin-
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ions.
Against this background, how the issue choice affects the choice of discussants is rarely
theorized in both perspectives. While Baldassarri and Bearman (2007) provide a compelling
reason why agents select issues in which both pairs are most interested4, this idea may not
apply to all other settings due to the dyadic and triadic structure of conversation (Gibson
2005). Sometimes Republicans and Democrats might talk about the recent event of a tragic
mass shooting in the US, though one of them wants to avoid talking about it. Sometimes
they might want to avoid potential conflicts so that they discuss uncontroversail issues, for
example, how to cook organic foods and where to go for vacation, and sometimes people want
to persuade others who disagree so that they have to discuss issues such as gun regulation, on
which they disagree.
I propose that this selection of issues for interaction is key to understanding of political po-
larization in discussion networks. If people discuss only one issue at a long time, implying the
issue takes-off in public attention space, two groups of people who hold two extreme opinions
arise from the positive feedback process in that social influence and network homophily rein-
force the similarity of opinions within groups and the difference between groups. In contrast,
if people discuss one issue at a time randomly -- for example, they talk about politics one day,
but they also talk about weather, TV shows, their children playing football the other day-- then
group polarization does not emerge because some issues such as weather (but not global warm-
ing) that people all feel safe to talk and agree on can moderate other issues people disagree.
Talking about an issue people agree on further integrate people who otherwise disconnected.
The discussion frequency of specific issues controls the attention space, through which issue
selection shapes the overall speed of ideological polarization and network segregation.
Yet, the rise of political polarization is anticipated for different reasons according to the
4Specifically, Baldassarri and Bearman (2007) wrote: “Actors might discuss a certain topic because they have
either strongly complementary or strongly competing views on the same issue. Baseball fans, if they sit at the
same dinner table, will talk about baseball whatever team they root for. Those who care deeply about an issue –
the death penalty, global warming, threats to world peace – will also talk about those issues among friends and
kin, certainly when they share the same opinion, but also when they disagree (792).”
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theory of political echo chambers (Bail et al. 2018; Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015; Bouty-
line and Willer 2016; Colleoni, Rozza, and Arvidsson 2014; Iyengar et al. 2008; Prior 2013).
The basic idea is that individuals’ prior political views are reinforced due to selective exposure
to political content that they agree, albeit vis-and-via different sources across offline media,
online social media, and interpersonal networks. It is consistent with a mechanism of “net-
work externality” in that network influence leads to the increase of intergroup inequality and
within-group homogeneity (DiMaggio and Garip 2012). Social contact hypothesis also sug-
gests that a social exposure to different groups help us to be more sympathetic and favorable
to values and norms of the contacted groups (Blau 1977; Broockman and Kalla 2016; Lee
and Conley 2016). The implication of this perspective is, conversely, being exposed to differ-
ent ideas and news stories is essential for enhancement of democratic discussion and accurate
judgment, supporting the formation of a public sphere (Calhoun 1992; Habermas, Lennox, and
Lennox 1974). Accordingly, exposure to diverse opinions will precipitate political diversity in
our interpersonal networks.
The theoretical complication, however, arises from the presence of “backfire” effects – i.e.,
exposure to different ideas make us reinforce our previously held belief and bias (Bail et al.
2018; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Taber and Lodge 2006). When people are surrounded by
ideas and stories that are attitudinally incongruent to their prior beliefs, they use motivated
reasoning to justify and further strengthen their existing stance rather than to correct their
misperception. Indeed, in the large-scale field experiment on social media sites, Bail and his
colleagues (2018) show that receiving tweets with ideologically opposing views make Republi-
cans and Democrats twitter followers more conservative and more liberal respectively instead
of reducing the ideological gap between them. It suggests that attitudinal polarization in dis-
cussion networks becomes stronger when people discuss controversial issues that they disagree
with others than they discuss noncontroversial issues they agree.
Alternatively, individuals may simply deactivate their social ties and media when they are
exposed to opposing views because people do not prefer conflicts (Baldassarri and Bearman
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2007; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; McPherson et al. 2001). If people are able to discuss only
safe issues that they agree on, they can maintain their views on other issues that they disagree
without turning their relationships off. The mechanism of selective disclosure facilitates the
perceived political homogeneity while ignoring opposing views, as well as enhances social
integration (Cowan and Baldassarri 2018). In the same vein, if people happen to discuss
controversial issues, they may simply cut off conflictual ties. The relational consequence of
being exposed to disagreement is the same with that of being exposed to agreement, that
is, people discuss politics with the same like-minded people. However, the consequence on
ideological polarization is different. The mechanism of dropping a tie will not lead to the
increase of political polarization due to the limited amount of social influence with the same
partisans, whereas the mechanism of “backfire” effects will lead to the increase of political
polarization as suggested.
In sum, we propose that not only the discussion frequency of certain issues but also the
mechanism for issue selection for interaction shape the simultaneous absence and presence of
ideological polarization and network integration in social networks. Against this background,
the issue selection in attention space is strongly shaped by local contexts (Iyengar et al. 2008;
Lee and Bearman 2017). Salient events attract public attention and shape the interpretative
context for short periods of time (Downs 1972). Agenda-setting theory puts the role of mass
media and elite politicians in setting what is the most important issue in the society in a given
time (McCombs and Shaw 1972), whereas social movement framing theory emphasizes the
bottom-up process of organizational actors securing the public attention (Bail 2012; Chong and
Druckman 2007). Although sometimes sudden, unanticipated events such as 9/11 terrorist
attacks occupy the attention space, most of the time the public arena is dominated by the
notable event that involves a significant amount of resources and a large number of actors
and audiences (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). Then, how this unequal distribution of attention
space is related to testing the role of issue selection mechanism in political polarization? I will
address this issue with a focus on “battleground states.”
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4.4 Theoretical predictions for the battleground states
Given the unique structure of US presidential election systems with the Electoral College, the
presidential campaign and mass media heavily focus on battleground states, where an election
is expected to be close. The battleground states are the focal point of the political campaign in
presidential elections, where party leaders compete for securing additional votes from unde-
cided “independent” voters and hidden supporters. Election closeness provides voters reasons
why they should vote in an election (Downs 1957; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). Due to the
increased amount of political information and media/campaign attention, citizens should ex-
hibit greater familiarity with the candidates and salient issues in battleground states than they
would if they remained less exposed through residence in a safe state (Gimpel, Kaufmann, and
Pearson-Merkowitz 2007; Lipsitz 2009).
Prior studies show that living in “battleground states” leads to increases in political engage-
ment including voter turnout (Gerber et al. 2009), attending a candidate’s meeting (Lipsitz
2009), posting a political status update in the Facebook (Settle et al. 2016). In this view,
the electoral competition is necessary for the success of democracy and even encouraged with
a hope that it facilitates cross-party communication. However, a recent study discovers that
there is an increase of biased perception and animosity against the opposing party (i.e., af-
fective polarization) in battleground states (Iyengar et al. 2012). The negative feeling and
evaluation toward other party members arise due to the negative advertisement campaign
and the increase of party sorting and partisan intensity (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason
2015). However, we do not yet understand the implication of these various changes occurred
in the battleground states on political diversity in discussion networks.
I hypothesize that effects of living in a battleground state on the formation of political dis-
cussion networks can be present in both directions. Increasing attention and political interests
due to political campaign efforts and corresponding increase of voters’ perception of “piv-
otalness” in battleground states will facilitate the amount of political conversation in general,
which will result in the increase of network size. Party supporters actively seek to persuade in-
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dependent voters and even opposing party supporters using their multiplex and under-utilized
social ties. In such case, extensive exposure to diverse opinions and the increasing political
salience will increase the political diversity in discussion networks. These predictions are con-
sistent with predictions form Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2002)’s study on the role of a
political campaign in the 1992 elections.
However, the issue diversity may have some backfire effects, as discussed. The sharp in-
crease of state-wide attention to a particular issue associated with presidential elections ex-
poses ordinary citizens to diverse and opposing views that they could not identify in the usual
setting thanks to selective disclosure. The fact that people know they disagree on diverse is-
sues activate with whom people discuss politics. People who now better identify the line that
crosses the friend and enemy may avoid talking about politics in general, or selectively talk
to like-minded people whose political views are certain, safe, and similar to them. There will
be an increasing partisan gap between Democrats and Republicans because the repeated in-
teraction with opponents reinforces their own standpoints, or careful selection of discussion
partners through dropping the conflicting ties. Either way, it is inevitable that interpersonal
political echo-chambers are activated in the battleground states.
Recall that the majority-minority status is a key factor that drives individuals’ perception
and preference for political homophily (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1988; McClurg 2006a).
According to the social identity theory, “in-group love” and “out-group hate” are contingent
upon the extent to which individuals belong to the majority or minority in local contexts (Abas-
cal and Baldassarri 2015; Smith et al. 2016; Stets and Burke 2000). By nature of the large
group size, the majority by definition can easily maintain the high homophily (Rytina and Mor-
gan 1982). For example, Democrats in New York city safely assume that most other people in
their interpersonal environment are also Democrats and easily have a political conversation.
They do not need to avoid confrontation or even might not perceive disagreement accurately.
In contrast, since the political minority is not able to find enough pool of the same minority
in local contexts, they talk less about politics, or are forced to talk to the political majority
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who have opposing views. Note that the consequence of being in the majority or the minority
depends on the political uncertainty of the situation. When an election outcome is contested,
the minority-majority distinction is blurring. It is not obvious who will win, and who will be
the minority. Thus, the effects of the majority-minority distinction will be weaker. This is a
testable hypothesis.
4.5 Data and Methods
To test these hypotheses, I combine all available national data sets collected during the three
presidential election cycles -- the 2000 and 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES),
and the US data from the 1992 Cross National Election Studies (CNES) -- and merge them
with state-level election results. Given that we use variation at the state level, the data should
be nationally representative to achieve the maximum coverage, which led us to exclude other
potentially interesting data sets (e.g., the 1984 South-Bend study). Although all data sets use
similar network name generators to collect the information about political discussion networks,
the mode of data collection, as well as the details of network information and question word-
ings, are not exactly the same.5 To address this concern, we top-coded network size variable at
four since the theoretical maximum of the 2000 ANES network size is four, and also control for
year dummies that fixed unobserved survey specific heterogeneity in statistical models. The
size of analytic sample excluding observations with missing variables varies across different
surveys (in total, 5.5% missing at individual levels and 9.5% missing at dyadic level), though
the characteristics of the full sample and our analytic sample are not significantly different.
We are mainly interested in two outcomes— network size and political homophily — that
capture different aspects of political discussion networks. The former measures how much
people engage in political discussion, whereas the latter measures with whom people discuss
politics. Specifically, network size is measured by counting the number of alters invoked by net-
5The mode of data collection differs across different surveys; The 1992 CNES study employs telephone survey;
the 2000 ANES study runs through face-to-face interviews; the 2008 ANES use internet-panel surveys.
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work name generators. The questions about name generators used in each survey are similar
but not precisely the same.
The 1992 CNES asked:
“Now let’s shift our attention to another area. From time to time, most people
discuss important matters with other people. Looking back over the last six months,
I’d like to know the people you talked with about matters that are important to
you. Can you think of anyone?” IF LESS THAN 4 NAMES MENTIONED, PROBE: “Is
there anyone else you talk with about matters that are important to you? [AFTER
THE SECOND NAME: “Anyone else (you can think of)?”] AFTER THEN, ASKING:
“Aside from[n] anyone you have already mentioned, who is the person you talked
with most about the events of the recent presidential election campaign?”
The 2000 ANES asked:
“From time to time, people discuss government, elections and politics with other
people. I’d like to ask you about the people with whom you discuss these matters.
These people might or might not be relatives. Can you think of anyone?” IF LESS
THAN 4 NAMES MENTIONED, PROBE: “Is there anyone else you talk with about
these matters?”
The 2008 ANES asked:
“During the last six months, did you talk with anyone face-to-face, on the phone,
by email, or in any other way about government or elections, or did you not do this
with anyone during the last six months? What are the first names of the people
who you talked with about government or elections during the past six months?”
IF NO TEXT ENTERED, PROMPT: “We noticed that you did not type any names.
We would be very grateful if you would be willing to type the first names of people
you talked with. We will ask you a few questions about each person, and we need
to be able to tell them apart to ask those questions.”
The notable difference is in the 1992 CNES data that collect the network information using
the “important matters” name generator while simultaneously asking how much they discuss
politics with their core discussion partners. As shown in Lee and Bearman (2017), it is highly
likely that survey respondents would frame “important matters” as political matters in the 1992
CNES data because the survey was asked about election campaign and presidential candidates
right after the presidential election. We further consider the subset of this core discussion net-
works by following Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe (2009)’s strategy that defines the “talk politics
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subnetwork” by leaving out all discussants with whom a respondent reported no political dis-
cussion. I also include additional “political” discussion partners elicited by respondents in the
1992 CNES data after providing names up to four in the important matters name generators.
I estimate poisson regression models for network size.
Political homophily is measured by matching an ego’s own presidential candidate voting
and her reports on her discussion partners’ voting. In the 1992 CNES and 2000 ANES survey
fielded right after the presidential election, respondents were asked to report to whom their
discussion partner vote in the presidential election6. After classifying the response into four
categories, (1) do not vote / ineligible to vote, (2) Republican candidates (e.g. Bush), (3) Third
party candidates (e.g., Perot), (4) Democratic candidates (e.g., Clinton, Gore), we identify
the presence of political homophily if a respondent’s self-reported voting is consistent with
her discussant’s voting in each discussion dyad. Since the 2008 ANES data were collected
“before” the presidential election in September, it is not possible to use presidential voting
behaviors. I instead use party identification that is asked about both respondents and their
discussion partners. In line with the previous classification in the 1992 and 2000 data, we
classify seven-scale party identification into four categories; (a) something else, (2) Republican
(strong/weak), (3) independent (including leaning toward), (4) Democrat (strong/weak). To
address the potential concern with regard to the discrepancy between party identification and
voting, and also survey timing, I will also present results after excluding the 2008 ANES sample.
I use logistic regression for modeling political homophily.
A key independent variable is a status of “battleground states” in each presidential election.
Following the literature, I measure the battleground states directly based on the state-level
voter turnout (Fraga and Hersh 2011, 2016; Geys 2006; Hillygus and Shields 2005; Iyengar
6In the 1992 CNES, respondents were asked: “Which candidate do you think [NAME] supported in the presidential
election this year?” RESPONSE: <1> Bush <2> Clinton <3> Perot <4> other (specify) <5> Bush & Clinton
<6> Bush & Perot <7> Clinton & Perot <0> none. In the 2000 ANES asked: “How do you think [NAME] voted
in the 11/4 election? Do you think he/she voted for Al Gore, George Bush, some other candidate, or do you think
[NAME] didn’t vote?” RESPONSE: <1> AL GORE, <3> GEORGE W BUSH <5> SOME OTHER CANDIDATE
(SPECIFY) <7> DIDN’T VOTE <8> INELIGIBLE TO VOTE.
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et al. 2012). I obtain state-level election results from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presiden-
tial Elections database7 and define the battleground state as a state of which winning margin
(=
Ndem − Nrep/|Ndem + Nrep|, where Ndem, Nrep are the total vote counts for Democratic and
Republican candidates respectively) is less than five percentage points.
With regard to the political majority and minority distinction, I employ respondents’ self-
reported party identification measures. I define the political majority if respondents identify
themselves strongly in the same direction with the party of the presidential candidate who
won the state, and the political minority if respondents identify themselves strongly in the
opposite direction with the winning party. Both groups are strong partisans, but they become
the minority or the majority depending on the election outcomes of their residing states.
Analytic strategy
This study focuses on close elections across 50 states across different presidential elections in
the United States. Our analytic focus at the state level variation better captures how political
leaders, political pundits as well as lay people perceive and evaluate political landscape and
campaign dynamics compared to the neighborhood level such as county or zip code (Huber
and Arceneaux 2007; Krasno and Green 2008; Shor and McCarty 2011). Ideally, we would
like to compare a resident living in a battleground state in a presidential election (e.g., 1992)
with the same resident living in a non-battleground state at the same time. This counterfactual
is not observable. Instead, by employing state and year fixed effect models, we can compare
average residents living in a state which was a battleground state in 1992 with those who lived
in the same state which was not a battleground state in 2000. This identification strategy has
been used as a natural experiment to instrument political campaign effects on voter turnout
(Gerber et al. 2009; Krasno and Green 2008).
However, the state-level election results are predictable, and far from random (Campbell
1992; Gelman and King 1993). For example, the successful political campaign may increase the
7https://uselectionatlas.org/. Last assessed on the 30th of May, 2017.
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voter turnout by shaping political communication and issue salience in a state. To account for
state-level turnout, we measured the total number of votes including third-party candidates
and control for it after taking the log. I further control for lagged election closeness in the
previous presidential election (e.g., 1988, 1996, and 2004 election results respectively). If the
winning margin at the current election can be predicted by the winning margin at the prior
presidential election due to path dependency, and political segregation among residents in a
state occurs precisely due to the fact that they lived a battleground state, it suggests that the
proposed battleground effects are artifacts of some underlying processes that are not directly
related to the current election.
To account for potential imbalance with regard to the heterogeneous treatment effects for
the minority-majority status in the state of residence, we include several pre-treatment co-
variates known for affecting the respondent’s political identity as well as the choice of po-
litical discussion partners: respondents’ gender, age, race, years of education, marital sta-
tus, and working status. In addition, we also show results after controlling for some po-
tentially post-treatment covariates such as the overall level of political interests and parti-
san strength that may affect political network size and political disagreement as well as the
identification of political minority status. We measure partisan strength using the seven-scale
party identification (0 = independent, 1 = leaning toward Democrats/Republicans, 2= Weak
Democrats/Republicans, 3 = Strong Democrats/Republicans). Our measure of political inter-
est comes from the following questions:
4.6 Results
Table 4.1: The distribution of sample size battleground states across surveys.
Sample Size Identification of Battleground States
1992 2000 2008 Total 1992 2000 2008 Total
Battle ground States: 656 665 1119 2440 7 12 6 25
Florida 64 78 112 254 1 1 1 3
Ohio 101 62 103 266 1 1 1 3
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Missouri 29 18 69 116 1 1 2
North Carolina 31 17 59 107 1 1 2
Georgia 34 29 74 137 1 1
Iowa 0 24 34 58 1 1
Indiana 62 31 53 146 1 1
Minnesota 34 53 70 157 1 1
Montana 0 1 9 10 1 1
New Hampshire 0 17 12 29 1 1
New Jersey 33 37 60 130 1 1
New Mexico 32 3 23 58 1 1
Nevada 0 4 16 20 1 1
Oregon 0 34 31 65 1 1
Pennsylvania 106 44 116 266 1 1
South Dakota 33 4 12 49 1 1
Tennessee 0 38 61 99 1 1
Texas 63 109 142 314 1 1
Wisconsin 34 62 63 159 1 1
Non-battle ground States: 420 570 869 1859
Alaska 0 0 5 5 0
Alabama 0 53 29 82 0
Arkansas 0 29 12 41 0
Arizona 0 12 45 57 0
California 199 157 258 614 0
Colorado 0 32 59 91 0
Connecticut 28 15 30 73 0
Washington DC 0 0 8 8 0
Delaware 0 2 4 6 0
Hawaii 0 0 9 9 0
Idaho 0 5 13 18 0
Illinois 0 52 100 152 0
Kansas 31 12 24 67 0
Kentucky 0 11 35 46 0
Louisiana 0 47 31 78 0
Massachusetts 33 51 54 138 0
Maryland 67 29 36 132 0
Maine 0 4 14 18 0
Michigan 62 59 103 224 0
Mississippi 32 3 21 56 0
North Dakota 0 7 7 14 0
Nebraska 0 2 25 27 0
New York 64 94 115 273 0
Oklahoma 0 10 22 32 0
Rhode Island 0 2 6 8 0
South Carolina 32 12 33 77 0
Utah 0 35 23 58 0
Virginia 36 77 43 156 0
Vermont 34 1 3 38 0
Washington 32 46 58 136 0
West Virginia 0 4 10 14 0
Wyoming 0 5 5 10 0
NOTE: Battleground states are identified if winning vote margin of presidential election in a given state is less
than five percent.
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Table 4.1 shows the sample size across battleground and non-battleground states across
years. Among 51 US states, 19 states are classified at least once as battleground states dur-
ing the sample period, though the remaining 32 states had never experienced close election
outcomes. The total sample size of 19 battleground states is bigger than remaining non-
battleground states. These non-battleground states are excluded when we employ state-fixed
effects models due to no temporal state-level variation, as well as Florida and Ohio those elec-
tion outcomes are all-time close.
Figure 4.1: State-level Presidential Election Outcomes across fifty states in the United States
from 1988 to 2008.
Year = 1988 Year = 1992
Year = 1996 Year = 2000
Year = 2004 Year = 2008
NOTE: Battleground states are identified if the state-level popular vote margin is less than
five percentage. Blue regions represent states where Democrat candidates win and red
regions represent sates where Republican candidates win, whereas gray regions represent
non-battle ground states.
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Figure 4.1 shows historical patterns of the status of battleground states for the US presi-
dential elections from 1988 to 2008 during the sample period. Battleground states defined by
the close state-level winning margin (<5%) are displayed in red and blue depending on who
won in each state. There are dramatic within-state election-to-election variations with regard
to the status of battleground states at different moments in time.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of analytic samples.
1992 (N=1287) 2000 (N=1506) 2008 (N=2420)
Variable Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD
Outcomes:
Network Size 2.65 1.37 1.88 1.48 2.95 1.61
Political Homophily 0.544 0.617 0.563
(# of dyads) -3,234 -2,606 -5,395
Pre-treatment covariations:
Female 0.56 0.57 0.58
Age 45.14 17.23 47.99 17.06 51.21 14.71
Years of education 13.99 2.79 13.71 2.37 14.69 2.46
Rate : White 0.85 0.46 0.84
Race : Black 0.08 0.07 0.08
Race : others 0.07 0.47(*) 0.08
Currently married 0.55 0.53 0.65
Currently working 0.59 0.63 0.65
Treatment related variables:
Living in BG States 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.38
Lagged (BG) 0.43 0.5 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.44
log (Total Votes) 15 0.9 14.95 0.78 15.14 0.84
Political Majority 0.23 0.18 0.24
Majority-minority baseline 0.57 0.67 0.6
Political Minority 0.2 0.15 0.16
Political Interest 2.94 1.33 2.28 0.69 2.69 0.99
Partisan Strength 1.98 1.02 1.83 1.01 1.95 1.04
NOTE: The large proportion of “other” race category in the 2000 ANES comes from the fact that a question
about respondents’ race is not asked in the telephone interview.
Table 4.2 shows that summary statistics for network characteristics and other variables
across three presidential elections in the United States. First, the number and the proportion
of respondents who live in battleground states (i.e., winning margin < 5%) are about 29%
in the 2000 and 2008 samples. The lower probability (17%) in the 2008 ANES data reflect
that Obama would go on to win a decisive victory over McCain, winning both the popular vote
and the electoral college. We find that the distribution of political majority-minority status
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is relatively stable across three different election cycles. We also find that distribution of the
majority-minority status is not associated with battleground states in each year based on the
chi-square tests (χ2 (d f = 2) = 0.51, 1.68, 1.75 respectively). With regard to network char-
acteristics, we find that network size is smaller and political homophily is higher in 2000 than
other periods. This may reflect the lower level of political interests and partisan strength in
the 2000 ANES data. However, we should carefully interpret this difference between surveys
since this could also arise due to differences in survey mode or question wordings.
Table 4.3 shows the main results from estimating Poisson regression models on network
size. Across different model specifications, we find that living in the battleground states in-
creases respondents’ political discussion network size, though the effect size is small and statis-
tically insignificant. In contrast to other groups, the political majority group consistently talks
about politics more than other groups. The significant difference of network size between the
political minority and the majority is quite surprising given that both groups fall into the same
partisan group, strong Republicans and Democrats. Those who identify themselves as strong
Republicans living in the Democrat winning state talk significantly less about political matters
than those whose party identification is aligned with residing state’s election outcomes. Note
the positive and significant effects of partisan strength and political interest on network size.
After accounting for the level of political engagement, the political majority whose identify
themselves strongly to the state winning party have significantly smaller network size com-
pared to the remaining groups. This suggests that the effects of being part of the majority
group are associated with the level of political engagement. However, the political minority
group consistently exhibit the smaller network size.
Table 4.3: Poisson regression models for network size.
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
State-Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Battleground States (t) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Political majority (=ref)
Majority-minority: Other -0.15** -0.14** 0.07* 0.07* 0.08*
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(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Political minority -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log(total # of voters) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.26+ 0.28+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.15)
year=1992 (=ref)
year=2000 -0.33** -0.25** -0.22** -0.21** -0.20**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
year=2008 0.11** 0.08** 0.13** 0.08+ 0.08*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
R: female - 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R: age - - - -
- - - -
R: education 0.04** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
- - - -
White (=ref) - - - -
Black (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Others -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** -0.16**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
R: married 0.06** 0.05* 0.06** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R: has a job 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R: partisan strength 0.08** 0.09** 0.09**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R: political interest 0.26** 0.26** 0.26**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Battleground States (t-4) 0.03
(0.02)
Constant 0.89** 0.20 -0.48* -3.52+ -3.75*
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (1.83) (1.83)
Observations 5,151 5,151 5,151 5,151 5,151
NOTE: Clustered standard errors by state are in parentheses ( + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01).
Table 4.4 shows the main results from estimating dyadic logistic regression models on po-
litical homophily. First, we find the strong effects of living in a battleground state; note that the
size of battleground effects on political homophily is roughly 2-3 percentage point increase.
One may find that this effect size is small. However, the magnitude of the effect is roughly
similar to the effect of gender (women discuss politics with the like-minded people more than
men), and four times of the effects of one-year increase in education. Model 4 shows that
this effect becomes even bigger in results from estimating state-fixed effects models. Model
5 shows that controlling for the lagged battleground state variable does not alter our main
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findings.
Table 4.4: Dyadic logistic regression models for political homophily.
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
State-Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Battleground States (t) 0.11** 0.10* 0.09* 0.17** 0.17**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Political majority (=ref)
Majority-minority: Other -0.99** -0.96** -0.28** -0.26** -0.26**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Political minority -0.19* -0.21** -0.21** -0.21** -0.21**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Year=1992 (=ref)
year=2000 0.40** 0.42** 0.43** 0.41** 0.41**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
year=2008 0.12* 0.02 0.03 (0.06) (0.06)
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12)
log(total # of voters) -0.04+ (0.03) (0.04) 0.46 0.45
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.38) (0.38)
R: female 0.11* 0.11* 0.12* 0.12*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R: age 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
- - - -
R: education 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White (=ref)
Black 0.52** 0.51** 0.50** 0.50**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Others (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
R: married 0.27** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R: has a job (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Order in network roster -0.03+ -0.03* -0.03* -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
R: political interest 0.17** 0.17** 0.17**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
R: partisan strength 0.39** 0.40** 0.40**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Battleground States (t-4) -
(0.06)
Constant 1.31** 0.52 -0.81+ -8.27+ -8.23+
(0.35) (0.43) (0.44) (4.71) (4.73)
Observations 11,235 11,235 11,235 11,235 11,235
NOTE: Clustered standard errors by state are in parentheses ( + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01).
With regard to effects of the minority-majority status, one consistent finding is that the
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political majority groups have more homogenous networks than all remaining groups. The
significant difference between political majority and other groups is robust against the inclu-
sion of political interests and partisan strength. Note the effect of the order of names that
respondents provide on political homophily is negative and significant. This negative associa-
tion implies that political disagreement can be sustained in larger networks.
Table 4.5: Interaction effects of the majority-minority status with battleground states on net-
work size and political homophily
Outcome Network Size Political Homophily
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6
Sample : Battle-Ground state non BG BG All non BG BG All
Battleground States (t) 0.02 (0.19)
(0.03) (0.13)
Political majority (=ref)
Majority-minority: Other 0.06 0.12* 0.07+ -0.33** (0.12) -0.36**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.18) (0.09)
Political minority -0.06* (0.06) -0.05* -0.27** 0.04 -0.27**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08)
Other # Battleground States (t) 0.01 0.39**
(0.04) (0.15)
minority # Battleground States (t) - 0.29+
(0.04) (0.17)
Observations 8,622 2,613 11,235 8,622 2,613 11,235
NOTE: Clustered standard errors by state are in parentheses ( + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01). A list of
controls (not displayed) includes female, age, education, race dummies, marital status, working status, order
in network roster, political interest, partisan strength, and log (total number of vote counts in each state). We
estimate poisson regression models for network size and logistic regression models for political homophily.
Table 4.5 shows the interaction effects of living in a battleground state with the minority-
majority status on two network outcomes. In terms of the overall engagement in political
discussion, Model 1-3 show that state’s election closeness does not shape the difference of
network size across the majority-minority groups. However, Model 4-6 reveal the strong inter-
action effects between the battleground state and the majority-minority status. The political
homophily is significantly larger among the political majority group than other groups in non-
battleground states, where it is obvious who will win and so who will be the majority. Yet, in
battleground states, the difference of political homophily across the majority-minority groups
becomes small and insignificant. The political minority group now even discuss politics with
more like-minded people in the battleground states, though the effect is not significant. This
is more clearly shown in Figure 2 that plots the predicted probability of talking politics with
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discussion partners whose presidential vote or party identification are the same across battle-
ground states and the political majority-minority status. This finding suggests that the increase
of political homophily is largely driven by the political minority and the other groups rather
than the political majority group.






















NOTE: The predicted values are calculated based on regression estimates of Model 6 in
Table 4.5.
4.7 Discussion
The rise of political polarization is one of the key issues in the contemporary American society.
We observe not only ideological divides between Democrats and Republicans, but also greater
social and emotional distance between them in our everyday interactions. In 1960, fewer than
five percent of Republicans and Democrats felt displeased if their son or daughter married
outside their political party. Fifty years later, in 2008, those who would be upset were 27 and
20 percent, and further, those who would be unhappy in 2010 are 49 and 33 percent among
Republicans and Democrats respectively (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). The magnitude of
political homophily is shown to be comparable to that of educational homophily and half as
116
large as racial homophily when people date online (Huber and Malhotra 2016). Yet, we have
limited understanding of the origin of political polarization in our social networks.
This chapter contributes to political polarization literature by studying contextual factors
for the creation of political echo chamber in political discussion networks. We propose that
the increasing salience of politics and widespread exposure to diverse issues shape the origin
of political homophily. By combining three nationally representative data sets that collect the
political discussion network information around the presidential election cycle, I show that
living in a battleground states significantly increases the likelihood that people discuss politics
with politically similar others. This finding resonates with the finding of the increase in social
distance in the battleground states (Iyengar et al. 2012).
One may argue that the increase of political homophily in the battleground states arises
from the increase of social distance in the battleground states. The fact that we identify the
significant heterogeneity across the political minority-majority distinction suggests that affec-
tive polarization is not enough to explain, for example, why we observe the decrease of political
homophily among the political majority group in the battleground states. In this regard, it is im-
portant to recall that the selective disclosure in conjunction with avoidance of political conflicts
provide an important mechanism to explain the (perceived) absence and (actual) presence of
political diversity in interpersonal networks, which in turn contributes to the misperception
of ideological polarization (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Lyons and Sokhey 2017). This
mechanism works well in non-battleground states where it is clear who is the majority and
the minority. The political minority is less likely to disclose their opinions so that the political
heterogeneity from the minority group is under-represented in the majority’s discussion net-
works. Conversely, the political majority is over-represented in political discussion networks
in the non-battleground states.
In contrast, in the battleground states, the mechanism of selective disclosure does not work.
People selectively disclose their opinions with other people, but they do not hide their opinions
on salient issues (Cowan and Baldassarri 2018). People’s attention to presidential elections
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in the battleground states is higher than in others places. Residents in the battleground see
political messages, news, stories all over the place not only in their workplace and church, but
also on Facebook and on the street that come from the opposing camps. They better identify
their families, friends, neighbors, coworkers’ political opinions. In the end, the deactivation of
politically contentious ties is an inevitable consequence for both the political minority as well
as the majority.
There is one paradoxical implication from the finding on the decreasing gap of political
homophily between the majority and the minority in conjunction with the overall increase of
political homophily in the battleground states. The political competition in the battleground
blurs the line that divides the minority and majority, but simultaneously thickens the dividing
line between friends and enemies.
On election night in 2000, the electoral votes of the state of Florida were still undecided. All
Americans including mass media, political pundits and the mass public would have discussed
who would have the right to be the president of the United States until the recount of votes
reported that Bush won Florida by a margin of 0.009% (537 votes), which eventually make
him won one more vote that was necessary for the majority. It might be a coincidence that the
smallest size and the largest homophily of political discussion networks are reported in 2000
when the presidential election is the closest in the recent US history.
Contrary to beliefs that close elections are rare, Fraga and Hersh (2016) find that in the
four-cycle period between 2006-2012, 90% of Americans had experienced a highly competitive
election for at least one office. The rise of political segregation in battle-ground states suggests
that political division will likely be accelerated in the near future if Americans experience close
elections more and more. Given that the significant association between political homophily
and network size we reported, we can also imagine that political isolation will be unavoidable




“. . . fractures in the ice [. . . ] revealed the structure of the cube in ways hidden
under the sheer gloss of uniformity. In order to see new things, one has to shatter
the old ways of seeing, and for this, one needs a lever of some sort.” (Bearman
2005:17)
In my dissertation, I study the organization of social and political, attitudinal and rela-
tional networks, in the context of political polarization. Do people talk about the important
matters with fewer people than ever before? Do people organize their political belief system
in ideological ways using the single liberal-conservative dimension? Do people discuss politics
with more people who are more politically diverse in contested elections? I answer these and
related questions by revisiting the same survey data that others have found useful, with new
levers. In the end, I discover significant fractures in existing studies. It may be true that people
talk about important matters with fewer people, but I illustrate that in the instances when this
is true, “important matters” are synonymous with political matters. It may be true that people
organize political belief system in ideological ways, but I show that is the case only in the con-
text of elections. It may be true that people discuss politics slightly more throughout heated
political campaigns, but this more likely occurs within their own political echo chamber.
My dissertation shows, throughout three empirical chapters, why we need to seriously
consider temporal contexts in studies of social and political networks. I use survey timing,
exogenous events, and battleground states to show how political situations induced by political
events activate ideological thinking, which in turn deactivates our core discussion networks,
and ultimately activates political echo chambers. In sum, I discover the situational activation
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of network processes.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I show that the finding on the increase of network
size in the 2004 General Social Survey that has been used as evidence to support the decline
of social capital, and the rise of social isolation, is an artifact of interview timing. There is no
problem in the 2004 GSS data, but there is also no evidence for the decline of social capital.
When people discuss “important matters” in political context, not surprisingly the conversa-
tional topic will be political. In addition to political priming effects, I also find political polar-
ization effects; non-partisans who identify themselves as independents talk about important
(political) matters with significantly fewer people than partisans whose party identification is
stronger in 2000 and 2004 than other years. Social isolation is not on the rise. But, political
isolation is. The shrinking size of political networks may reflect the political fragmentation of
contemporary American society.
In the third chapter, by considering a set of interrelated political beliefs as a network of be-
lief systems, I show that political ideology becomes central in our minds when we think about
the presidential elections. This is what happens when people are asked about presidential can-
didates and elections before and after the presidential elections in the American National Elec-
tion Study. In these politically charged periods, political priming activates ideological thinking,
and subsequently, “important matters” for the public are political. In non-politicized periods,
however, important matters can be anything. It can be personal to one person, and it can be
political to another; there are sharp moments in which socially meaningful issues emerge as
the important matters that people share in their minds. This is what I find around the tragic
mass shooting at the Pulse gay nightclub in Orlando during the 2016 GSS fieldwork. The fact
that the gay rights issue occupies the center of belief networks in the GSS since 2008 sug-
gests the possibility that people were surrounded and influenced by many events related to
gay rights issues especially during the spring/summer. Alternatively, it could be because of the
successful “framing” of gay rights issues in the media and society. Either way, it corresponds
with the sharp increase of Americans’ support for same-sex marriages across partisan lines,
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which eventually leads to its legalization in 2015.
In the fourth chapter, I study how election contexts shape social networks with regard to
the discussion about politics, governments, and elections. People’s vote matters when an elec-
tion is close. In a state where an election is close, politics become a salient topic in people’s
discussion, and consequently, selective disclosure of political attitudes is no longer a norm.
The consequence of exposure to opposing political views is not the rise of political diversity in
discussion networks. People discuss politics more with like-minded people, creating political
silos where they can safely reinforce their own political views. The political majority discusses
politics with more people than the political minority although they have the same level of polit-
ical interests and identity. And, the political majority’s network structure is more homogeneous
because their size outnumbers the political minority who are prone to selectively disclose their
identity. Yet, since it is debated who is the majority and minority in the contested election, the
distinction loses its influence.
One consistent perspective across these three different settings is related to how I theorize
the temporality of social structure. Sociological theory explains social and structural changes
around a turning point in a sequence of events associated with stable social structures (Abbott
2001). The objects of my dissertation -- core (political) discussion networks, core values in
a political belief system – are all presumed to be durable and persistent across time to some
extent. Without the temporal stability, we would not call them “core” objects. How should we
understand the temporality of core values and networks? I argue that we need to shift our
attention from the formation of social networks and belief networks to the activation of them
given the presence of multiple identities and multiplex relationships.
The social structure that I revealed in my dissertation is relatively short-lived and context-
dependent. People activate their political ties when they think about important matters around
the presidential debates, though they reactivate their intimate relationships after passing non-
politicized periods. People activate liberal-conservative ideological thinking around the presi-
dential elections, though they activated gay rights issues when there were socially significant
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events associated with gay rights issues such as the mass shooting in the Pulse gay nightclub.
The discovery that core discussion networks and core beliefs that are presumed to be robust are
strongly activated by socio-temporal contexts does not deny the idea of robust social structure.
As Bearman, Faris, and Moody noted: “a popular idiom explains what makes structures robust.
Love, like a tree, can weather storms better if it bends.” (1999:530) The short-lived nature of
the activation and deactivation processes suggests how social integration can be sustained in
non-political periods and ideological thinking can be facilitated in political periods.
The consideration of the situational role of time in tie activation is useful to reconcile two
distinctive and contradictory views that exist in social network analysis – formalism and rela-
tionalism (Erikson 2013). The formalists consider network ties as objective and given, and seek
to identify priori existing categories of relational types that operate independently of cultural
content or historical setting (Burt 1992; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1957; Simmel 1950). In
this view, social networks are monotone conduits that just convey the information flow. The re-
lationalists reject the notion of objectivity of network ties and emphasize the importance of the
content of interactions and their historical setting (Bearman and Parigi 2004; Emirbayer 1997;
Pachucki and Breiger 2010; Stark 2011). In this view, social networks are colorful pipes that
are constructed by the inter-subjectivity of social interaction in particular historical contexts.
The tension between these two dominant views arises when we seek to measure a network
tie and to interpret the findings from it. The formalists tend to measure network ties without
reference to the situation for the sake of generalizability (e.g. “important matters” name gen-
erator in the General Social Survey), whereas the relationalists tend to extract network ties
from interactions encoded in particular situations. Simultaneously, the formalist’s approach is
deprived of consideration of situational contexts where actors are located, whereas the rela-
tionalist’s approach suffers from lack of a well-defined agenda to generalize their findings of
particular situations. I argue that we need to theorize situation with reference to real-world
events to resolve this tension. Individuals do not act in a vacuum nor universally, but situation-
ally, especially for local action (Leifer 1988). The meaning of a situation can be meaningfully
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captured by a set of events shared by individuals who are experiencing it (Bearman et al.
1999). Theorizing the role of dynamic situations is crucial to reconcile the tension between
these two camps.
Sociologists deeply care about data generating processes. Sociologists use surveys, histor-
ical archives, experiments, qualitative observations, “big data” of various sources, and many
others, to collect their own data in order to test social theories of action and interaction. So-
ciologists discover how sampling methods, interviewer effects, and priming effects change the
meaning of actions their “subjects” attach to, thereby introducing bias in the data generating
process (Jerolmack and Khan 2014). My dissertation aims to go beyond detecting bias in the
data generating process. It identifies how the way subjects generate biases provides an impor-
tant opportunity to reveal the structure of bias in ways hidden under the passive use of social
theory. We need to think more about “denying the data” (Bearman 2008; Leifer 1992). As part
of this tradition, my dissertation shows how powerful contextual influences shape the way
people organize their belief systems and social networks. The call for careful consideration of
context in the data generation process will be increasingly pertinent in the era of “big data”
science.
5.1 Coda: What happened during the 2016 Presidential
Election?
One of the great challenges in sociological studies is that it is difficult to replicate sociological
findings from one context to another (Freese and Peterson 2017). It is not simply because
sociologists rely more on the analysis of observational data compared to experiments, but
because in many cases “contexts” are the unit of sociological explanation. In the same vein,
although some scholars argue that predictability should be the gold standard for evaluating
sociological explanation (Watts 2014), I think we will miss many other great opportunities to
learn about social worlds through thick description and analytical explanation of social and
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historical context.
Following on the contextual sensitivity of “important matters” name generators that I show
in the second chapter, I worked with Peter Bearman to design a unique survey experiment
to deal with the interdependency of when and where people talk about what with whom. To
disentangle priming effects arising from events, the content of name generators, and question
order, we designed an experiment to randomly assign about one eighth of subjects to one of
eight conditions, produced by a combination of type of network name generators (important vs.
political matters), external political priming using survey timing (before vs. after the first pres-
idential debate), and internal political priming using question order (before vs. after several
political questions). Fortunately, we were able to conduct a nationally representative survey
experiment of 1,055 American adults during the fall of the 2016 U.S. presidential election with
support from Time Sharing Experiment for Social Sciences (TESS).
The initial results from the analysis of the 2016 TESS data show that average network
size (=1.4) is smaller than reported in any other surveys, which suggests the rise of what we
identify as political isolation. Our experimental design enables us to identify the precise role
of political priming in shaping both political and social networks.
We failed to identify the political priming effects on network size, given the similar size
of core discussion networks and political discussion networks (1.36 versus 1.35). Yet, it ap-
pears that most people thought of “important matters” as political matters during the highly
polarized 2016 election. This interpretation is supported by the analysis of what people talk
about when they report discussing important matters: forty percent of respondents said that
they discuss politics. In contrast, Brashears (2014) reports that only 5% people discussed pol-
itics in the important matters name generator in 2010. We also found weak and insignificant
effects of internal political priming (induced by asking political questions before important
matters name generators) which supports the idea that people interpret “important matters”
as political matters during polarized political moments.
We discovered the larger size of both political and important networks after the presidential
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debate than before the event. Given that people frame “important matters” as political matters
throughout this time period because of the highly politicized 2016 election, people discuss
politics more when the situation is more political. In 2004, people activated political ties when
they are asked to whom they talk about “important matters” only for a short period, whereas
in 2016 people activate their political ties all the time.
Also, we found that the level of political homophily, which is measured by dyadic similarity
scores for seven-scale party identification across ego and alters, is greater than reported in all
other national surveys that measure alters’ party identification. We found that core discussion
networks exhibit significantly stronger political homophily than political discussion networks
do. Further, we showed that political priming reduces the level of political homophily, activat-
ing politically diverse ties in the discussion of important matters (but not in the discussion of
political matters).
These results lead us to reaffirm the main thesis of my dissertation that people activate
different types of social ties in different social contexts. Since politics as a topic of conversation
is fraught with the potential risk of relationship disruption, it is safe to avoid such potential
conflicts within our close and homophilous networks. A consequence is the rise of political
isolation, and the activation of political echo chambers.
125
Bibliography
Abascal, Maria and Delia Baldassarri. 2015. “Love Thy Neighbor? Ethnoracial Diversity and
Trust Reexamined.” American Journal of Sociology 121(3):722–82.
Abbott, Andrew. 2001. Time Matters: On Theory and Method. 1 edition. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Abramowitz, Alan I. and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. “Is Polarization a Myth?” The Journal of
Politics 70(02):542–555.
Achen, Christopher H. 1975. “Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response.” The American
Political Science Review 69(4):1218–31.
Achen, Christopher H. 2002. “Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification.” Politi-
cal Behavior 24(2):151–70.
Ackland, Robert and Jamsheed Shorish. 2009. “Network Formation in the Political Blogo-
sphere: An Application of Agent Based Simulation and e-Research Tools.” Computational
Economics 34(4):383.
Adamic, Lada A. and Natalie Glance. 2005. “The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S.
Election: Divided They Blog.” Pp. 36–43 in Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop
on Link Discovery, LinkKDD ’05. New York, NY, USA: ACM.
Almquist, Zack W. and Carter T. Butts. 2014. “Logistic Network Regression for Scalable Analysis
of Networks with Joint Edge/Vertex Dynamics.” Sociological Methodology 44(1):273–
321.
126
Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 2002. Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information,
and American Public Opinion. Princeton University Press.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder. 2008. “The Strength of
Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint,
and Issue Voting.” The American Political Science Review 102(2):215–32.
Asch, Solomon E. 1956. “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One against
a Unanimous Majority.” Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 70(9):1–70.
Axelrod, Robert. 1997. “The Dissemination of Culture A Model with Local Convergence and
Global Polarization.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(2):203–26.
Bail, Christopher A. et al. 2018. “Exposure to Opposing Views Can Increase Political Polar-
ization: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment on Social Media.” SocArXiv. Re-
trieved March 27, 2018 (https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/4ygux/).
Bail, Christopher A. 2012. “The Fringe Effect Civil Society Organizations and the Evolution of
Media Discourse about Islam since the September 11th Attacks.” American Sociological
Review 77(6):855–79.
Bail, Christopher Andrew. 2016. “Combining Natural Language Processing and Network Anal-
ysis to Examine How Advocacy Organizations Stimulate Conversation on Social Media.”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(42):11823–28.
Bailey, Stefanie and Peter V. Marsden. 1999. “Interpretation and Interview Context: Examining
the General Social Survey Name Generator Using Cognitive Methods.” Social Networks
21(3):287–309.
Bakshy, Eytan, Solomon Messing, and Lada A. Adamic. 2015. “Exposure to Ideologically Di-
verse News and Opinion on Facebook.” Science 348(6239):1130–32.
Baldassarri, Delia and Peter Bearman. 2007. “Dynamics of Political Polarization.” American
Sociological Review 72(5):784–811.
127
Baldassarri, Delia and Andrew Gelman. 2008. “Partisans without Constraint: Political Polariza-
tion and Trends in American Public Opinion.” American Journal of Sociology 114(2):408–
46.
Baldassarri, Delia and Amir Goldberg. 2014. “Neither Ideologues, nor Agnostics: Alterna-
tive Voters’ Belief System in an Age of Partisan Politics.” American Journal of Sociology
120(1):45–95.
Barbera, Pablo. 2015. “Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Esti-
mation Using Twitter Data.” Political Analysis 23(1):76–91.
Barker, David C. and James D. Tinnick. 2006. “Competing Visions of Parental Roles and Ideo-
logical Constraint.” American Political Science Review 100(2):249–63.
Barry, Daniel and J. A. Hartigan. 1993. “A Bayesian Analysis for Change Point Problems.”
Journal of the American Statistical Association 88(421):309–19.
Bearman, Peter. 2005. Doormen. New edition edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bearman, Peter. 1997. “Generalized Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology 102(5):1383–
1415.
Bearman, Peter. 2008. “Robin Williams and the Long Twentieth Century of American Sociol-
ogy... or Back to the Future.” Sociological Forum 23(2):390–96.
Bearman, Peter, Robert Faris, and James Moody. 1999. “Blocking the Future: New Solutions
for Old Problems in Historical Social Science.” Social Science History 23(4):501–33.
Bearman, Peter and Paolo Parigi. 2004. “Cloning Headless Frogs and Other Important Matters:
Conversation Topics and Network Structure.” Social Forces 83(2):535–57.
Beck, Paul Allen. 2002. “Encouraging Political Defection: The Role of Personal Discussion
Networks in Partisan Desertions to the Opposition Party and Perot Votes in 1992.” Political
Behavior 24(4):309–37.
128
Bello, Jason and Meredith Rolfe. 2014. “Is Influence Mightier than Selection? Forging Agree-
ment in Political Discussion Networks during a Campaign.” Social Networks 36:134–46.
Benoit, William L., Glenn J. Hansen, and Rebecca M. Verser. 2003. “A Meta-Analysis of the
Effects of Viewing U.S. Presidential Debates.” Communication Monographs 70(4):335–
50.
Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. Voting: A Study of
Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign. University of Chicago Press.
Berkman, Lisa F. and S. Leonard Syme. 1979. “Social Networks, Host Resistance, and Mor-
tality: A Nine-Year Follow-up Study of Alameda County Residents.” American Journal of
Epidemiology 109(2):186–204.
Blau, Peter M. 1977. “A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure.” American Journal of
Sociology 83(1):26–54.
Boutyline, Andrei and Stephen Vaisey. 2017. “Belief Network Analysis: A Relational Approach
to Understanding the Structure of Attitudes.” American Journal of Sociology 122(5):1371–
1447.
Boutyline, Andrei and Robb Willer. 2016. “The Social Structure of Political Echo Chambers:
Variation in Ideological Homophily in Online Networks.” Political Psychology n/a-n/a.
Boxell, Levi, Matthew Gentzkow, and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2017. Is the Internet Causing Political
Polarization? Evidence from Demographics. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Brashears, Matthew. 2014. “‘Trivial’ Topics and Rich Ties: The Relationship Between Dis-
cussion Topic, Alter Role, and Resource Availability Using the ‘Important Matters’ Name
Generator.” Sociological Science 1:493–511.
Brashears, Matthew E. 2011. “Small Networks and High Isolation? A Reexamination of Amer-
ican Discussion Networks.” Social Networks 33(4):331–41.
Broockman, David and Joshua Kalla. 2016. “Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field Experi-
129
ment on Door-to-Door Canvassing.” Science 352(6282):220–24.
Burt, Ronald. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Harvard University
Press.
Burt, Ronald S. 1984. “Network Items and the General Social Survey.” Social Networks 6(4):293–
339.
Calhoun, Craig J. 1992. Habermas and the Public Sphere. MIT Press.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The
American Voter. University Of Chicago Press.
Campbell, James E. 1992. “Forecasting the Presidential Vote in the States.” American Journal
of Political Science 36(2):386–407.
Centola, Damon. 2015. “The Social Origins of Networks and Diffusion.” American Journal of
Sociology 120(5):1295–1338.
Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman. 2007. “Framing Theory.” Annual Review of Political
Science 10(1):103–26.
Coleman, James, Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel. 1957. “The Diffusion of an Innovation
Among Physicians.” Sociometry 20(4):253–70.
Colleoni, Elanor, Alessandro Rozza, and Adam Arvidsson. 2014. “Echo Chamber or Public
Sphere? Predicting Political Orientation and Measuring Political Homophily in Twitter
Using Big Data.” Journal of Communication 64(2):317–32.
Conti, Gabriella, Andrea Galeotti, Gerrit Muller, and Stephen Pudney. 2013. “Popularity.”
Journal of Human Resources 48(4):1072–94.
Converse, Philip E. 2000. “Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates.” Annual Review of
Political Science 3(1):331–53.
Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” Pp. 206–61 in
130
Ideology and Discontent, edited by D. E. Apter. New York: Free Press.
Cooper, Joel and Robert T. Croyle. 1984. “Attitudes and Attitude Change.” Annual Review of
Psychology 35(1):395–426.
Cornwell, Benjamin, L. Philip Schumm, Edward O. Laumann, and Jessica Graber. 2009. “Social
Networks in the NSHAP Study: Rationale, Measurement, and Preliminary Findings.”
The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 64B(suppl
1):i47–55.
Cornwell, Benjamin and Edward O. Laumann. 2011. “Network Position and Sexual Dys-
function: Implications of Partner Betweenness for Men.” American Journal of Sociology
117(1):172–208.
Coromina, Lluis and Germa Coenders. 2006. “Reliability and Validity of Egocentered Network
Data Collected via Web: A Meta-Analysis of Multilevel Multitrait Multimethod Studies.”
Social Networks 28(3):209–31.
Cowan, Sarah. 2014. “Secrets and Misperceptions: The Creation of Self-Fulfilling Illusions.”
Sociological Science 1:466–92.
Cowan, Sarah K. and Delia Baldassarri. 2018. “‘It Could Turn Ugly’: Selective Disclosure of
Attitudes in Political Discussion Networks.” Social Networks 52:1–17.
Craig, Stephen C., Michael D. Martinez, James G. Kane, and Jason Gainous. 2005. “Core
Values, Value Conflict, and Citizens’ Ambivalence about Gay Rights.” Political Research
Quarterly 58(1):5–17.
Dancey, Logan and Paul Goren. 2010. “Party Identification, Issue Attitudes, and the Dynamics
of Political Debate.” American Journal of Political Science 54(3):686–699.
DellaPosta, Daniel, Michael Macy, and Yongren Shi. 2015. “Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?”
American Journal of Sociology 120(5):1473–1511.
Diehl, David and Daniel McFarland. 2010. “Toward a Historical Sociology of Social Situations.”
131
American Journal of Sociology 115(6):1713–52.
DiMaggio, Paul. 1997. “Culture and Cognition.” Annual Review of Sociology 23(1):263–87.
DiMaggio, Paul and Filiz Garip. 2012. “Network Effects and Social Inequality.” Annual Review
of Sociology 38(1):93–118.
DiPrete, Thomas A., A. Gelman, T. McCormick, J. Teitler, and T. Zheng. 2011. “Segregation in
Social Networks Based on Acquaintanceship and Trust.” American Journal of Sociology
116(4):1234–83.
Downs, A. 1972. “Up and down with Ecology: The Issue-Attention Cycle.” Public Interest
28:50.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of
Political Economy 65(2):135–50.
Eagle, David E. and Rae Jean Proeschold-Bell. 2015. “Methodological Considerations in the
Use of Name Generators and Interpreters.” Social Networks 40:75–83.
Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology.” American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 103(2):281–317.
Erdman, Chandra and John W. Emerson. 2007. “Bcp: An R Package for Performing a Bayesian
Analysis of Change Point Problems.” Journal of Statistical Software 23(3):1–13.
Erikson, Emily. 2013. “Formalist and Relationalist Theory in Social Network Analysis.” Socio-
logical Theory 31(3):219–42.
Erikson, Emily and Peter Bearman. 2006. “Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade:
The Structure of English Trade in the East Indies, 1601–1833.” American Journal of
Sociology 112(1):195–230.
Feldman, Stanley. 1988. “Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core
Beliefs and Values.” American Journal of Political Science 32(2):416–40.
132
Festinger, Leon. 1962. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press.
Fiorina, Morris P. 2002. “Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective.” Political Behavior
24(2):93–115.
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Yale University
Press.
Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. “Political Polarization in the American Public.”
Annual Review of Political Science 11(1):563–88.
Fischer, Claude S. 2009. “The 2004 GSS Finding of Shrunken Social Networks: An Artifact?”
American Sociological Review 74(4):657–69.
Fischer, Claude S. 2012. “The Loneliness Scare Is Back.” Made in America: A Social History of
American Culture and Character Blog.
Fischer, Claude S. 1982. To Dwell Among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City. Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Fischer, Claude S. and Greggor Mattson. 2009. “Is America Fragmenting?” Annual Review of
Sociology 35(1):435–55.
Fowler, James H., Christopher T. Dawes, and Nicholas A. Christakis. 2009. “Model of Genetic
Variation in Human Social Networks.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
106(6):1720–24.
Fraga, Bernard and Eitan Hersh. 2011. “Voting Costs and Voter Turnout in Competitive Elec-
tions.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 5(4):339–56.
Fraga, Bernard L. and Eitan D. Hersh. 2016. Why Is There So Much Competition in US Elections?
Freeder, Sean, Gabriel S. Lenz, and Shad Turney. 2018. “The Importance of Knowing ‘What
Goes With What.”’ Working Paper.
Freeman, Linton C. 1977. “A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness.” Sociometry
133
40(1):35–41.
Freese, Jeremy and David Peterson. 2017. “Replication in Social Science.” Annual Review of
Sociology 43(1):5.1-5.19.
Freeze, Melanie and Jacob M. Montgomery. 2016. “Static Stability and Evolving Constraint:
Preference Stability and Ideological Structure in the Mass Public.” American Politics Re-
search 44(3):415–47.
Gamson, William A., Bruce Fireman, and Steven Rytina. 1982. Encounters with Unjust Author-
ity. Dorsey Press.
Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1993. “Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign
Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?” British Journal of Political Science
23(4):409–51.
Gerber, Alan, Gregory Huber, Conor Dowling, David Doherty, and Nicole Schwartzberg. 2009.
Using Battleground States as a Natural Experiment to Test Theories of Voting. Rochester,
NY: Social Science Research Network.
Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, and Conor M. Dowling. 2012. “Disagree-
ment and the Avoidance of Political Discussion: Aggregate Relationships and Differences
across Personality Traits.” American Journal of Political Science 56(4):849–874.
Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Seth J. Hill. 2013.
“Who Wants to Discuss Vote Choices with Others? Polarization in Preferences for Delib-
eration.” Public Opinion Quarterly 77(2):474–96.
Geys, Benny. 2006. “Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-Level Research.” Elec-
toral Studies 25(4):637–63.
Gibson, David R. 2005. “Taking Turns and Talking Ties: Networks and Conversational Inter-
action1.” American Journal of Sociology 110(6):1561–1597.
Gimpel, James G., Karen M. Kaufmann, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2007. “Battleground
134
States versus Blackout States: The Behavioral Implications of Modern Presidential Cam-
paigns.” Journal of Politics 69(3):786–97.
Goren, Paul, Christopher M. Federico, and Miki Caul Kittilson. 2009. “Source Cues, Par-
tisan Identities, and Political Value Expression.” American Journal of Political Science
53(4):805–20.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology
78(6):1360–80.
Habermas, Jurgen, Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox. 1974. “The Public Sphere: An Encyclo-
pedia Article (1964).” New German Critique (3):49–55.
Hampton, Keith N. and Richard Ling. 2013. “Explaining Communication Displacement and
Large-Scale Social Change in Core Networks.” Information, Communication & Society
16(4):561–89.
Hampton, Keith N., Lauren F. Sessions, and Eun Ja Her. 2011. “Core Networks, Social Isolation,
and New Media.” Information, Communication & Society 14(1):130–55.
Hart, Austin and Joel A. Middleton. 2014. “Priming under Fire: Reverse Causality and the
Classic Media Priming Hypothesis.” The Journal of Politics 76(02):581–592.
Healy, Andrew J., Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2010. “Irrelevant Events Affect
Voters’ Evaluations of Government Performance.” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 107(29):12804–9.
Highton, Benjamin and Cindy D. Kam. 2011. “The Long-Term Dynamics of Partisanship and
Issue Orientations.” The Journal of Politics 73(01):202–215.
Hilgartner, Stephen and Charles L. Bosk. 1988. “The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public
Arenas Model.” American Journal of Sociology 94(1):53–78.
Hillygus, D. Sunshine and Todd G. Shields. 2005. “Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making in
the 2004 Presidential Election.” PS: Political Science &amp; Politics 38(2):201–9.
135
Hoffman, Mark and Peter Bearman. 2015. “Bringing Anomie Back In: Exceptional Events and
Excess Suicide.” Sociological Science 2:186–210.
Huber, Gregory A. and Kevin Arceneaux. 2007. “Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presiden-
tial Advertising.” American Journal of Political Science 51(4):957–77.
Huckfeldt, Robert. 2007. “Unanimity, Discord, and the Communication of Public Opinion.”
American Journal of Political Science 51(4):978–95.
Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, and Jeffrey Levine. 1995. “Political Envi-
ronments, Cohesive Social Groups, and the Communication of Public Opinion.” American
Journal of Political Science 39(4):1025–54.
Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul E. Johnson, and John Sprague. 2004. Political Disagreement: The Sur-
vival of Diverse Opinions Within Communication Networks. Cambridge University Press.
Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul E. Johnson, and John Sprague. 2002. “Political Environments, Political
Dynamics, and the Survival of Disagreement.” Journal of Politics 64(1):1–21.
Huckfeldt, Robert, Jeanette Morehouse Mendez, and Tracy Osborn. 2004. “Disagreement, Am-
bivalence, and Engagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks.”
Political Psychology 25(1):65–95.
Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague. 1988. “Choice, Social Structure, and Political Infor-
mation: The Information Coercion of Minorities.” American Journal of Political Science
32(2):467–82.
Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Infor-
mation and Influence in an Election Campaign. Cambridge University Press.
Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague. 1987. “Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political
Information.” The American Political Science Review 81(4):1197–1216.
Hurwitz, Jon and Mark Peffley. 1987. “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hier-
archical Model.” The American Political Science Review 81(4):1099–1120.
136
Iyengar, Shanto, Kyu S. Hahn, Jon A. Krosnick, and John Walker. 2008. “Selective Exposure to
Campaign Communication: The Role of Anticipated Agreement and Issue Public Mem-
bership.” The Journal of Politics 70(1):186–200.
Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. “Affect, Not Ideology A Social Iden-
tity Perspective on Polarization.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76(3):405–31.
Iyengar, Shanto and Sean J. Westwood. 2015. “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New
Evidence on Group Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59(3):690–707.
Jang, Seung-Jin. 2009. “Are Diverse Political Networks Always Bad for Participatory Democ-
racy? Indifference, Alienation, and Political Disagreement.” American Politics Research.
Jerolmack, Colin and Shamus Khan. 2014. “Talk Is Cheap: Ethnography and the Attitudinal
Fallacy.” Sociological Methods & Research 43(2):178–209.
Johnston, Richard. 2006. “PARTY IDENTIFICATION: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences?”
Annual Review of Political Science 9(1):329–51.
Jost, John T. 2006. “The End of the End of Ideology.” American Psychologist 61(7):651–70.
Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. “Political Ideology: Its
Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities.” Annual Review of Psychology 60(1):307–
37.
Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway. 2003. “Political Conser-
vatism as Motivated Social Cognition.” Psychological Bulletin 129(3):339–75.
Katz, Elihu and Paul Felix Lazarsfeld. 1966. Personal Influence, the Part Played by People in the
Flow of Mass Communications. Transaction Publishers.
Kenski, Kate and Natalie Jomini Stroud. 2005. “Who Watches Presidential Debates? A Com-
parative Analysis of Presidential Debate Viewing in 2000 and 2004.” American Behavioral
Scientist 49(2):213–28.
137
Kinder, Donald R. and Nathan P. Kalmoe. 2017. Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological
Innocence in the American Public. 1 edition. ChicagoâA˘r´; London: University of Chicago
Press.
Klofstad, Casey A., Scott D. McClurg, and Meredith Rolfe. 2009. “Measurement of Political
Discussion Networks A Comparison of Two ‘Name Generator’ Procedures.” Public Opinion
Quarterly 73(3):462–83.
Klofstad, Casey A., Anand Edward Sokhey, and Scott D. McClurg. 2013. “Disagreeing about
Disagreement: How Conflict in Social Networks Affects Political Behavior.” American
Journal of Political Science 57(1):120–34.
Kossinets and Watts. 2009. “Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social Network.” American
Journal of Sociology 115(2):405–50.
Krasno, Jonathan S. and Donald P. Green. 2008. “Do Televised Presidential Ads Increase Voter
Turnout? Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” The Journal of Politics 70(1):245–61.
Krivitsky, Pavel N. and Mark S. Handcock. 2014. “A Separable Model for Dynamic Networks.”
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology) 76(1):29–46.
Lake, Ronald and Robert Huckfeldt. 1998. “Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political
Participation.” Political Psychology 19(3):567–584.
Lakoff, George. 2002. Moral Politics : How Liberals and Conservatives Think. 2 edition.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Layman, Geoffrey C., Thomas M. Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz. 2006. “PARTY PO-
LARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences.” An-
nual Review of Political Science 9(1):83–110.
Lee, Byungkyu and Peter Bearman. 2017. “Important Matters in Political Context.” Sociological
Science 4:1–30.
Lee, Byungkyu and Dalton Conley. 2016. “Does the Gender of Offspring Affect Parental Political
138
Orientation?” Social Forces 94(3):1103–27.
Legewie, Joscha. 2013. “Terrorist Events and Attitudes toward Immigrants: A Natural Experi-
ment.” American Journal of Sociology 118(5):1199–1245.
Leifer, Eric M. 1992. “Denying the Data: Learning from the Accomplished Sciences.” Sociolog-
ical Forum 7(2):283–99.
Leifer, Eric M. 1988. “Interaction Preludes to Role Setting: Exploratory Local Action.” American
Sociological Review 53(6):865–78.
Leighley, Jan E. 1990. “Social Interaction and Contextual Influences On Political Participation.”
American Politics Research 18(4):459–75.
Lipsitz, Keena. 2009. “The Consequences of Battleground and ‘Spectator’ State Residency for
Political Participation.” Political Behavior 31(2):187.
Lizardo, Omar. 2014. “Omnivorousness as the Bridging of Cultural Holes: A Measurement
Strategy.” Theory and Society 43(3–4):395–419.
Lizardo, Omar et al. 2016. “What Are Dual Process Models? Implications for Cultural Analysis
in Sociology.” Sociological Theory 34(4):287–310.
Lyons, Jeffrey and Anand E. Sokhey. 2017. “Discussion Networks, Issues, and Perceptions of
Polarization in the American Electorate.” Political Behavior 1–22.
MacDonald, Jason A. and William W. Franko. 2008. “What Moves Partisanship? Migration,
State Partisan Environment Change, and Party Identification.” American Politics Research
36(6):880–902.
Marin, Alexandra. 2004. “Are Respondents More Likely to List Alters with Certain Character-
istics?: Implications for Name Generator Data.” Social Networks 26(4):289–307.
Marsden, Peter V. 1987. “Core Discussion Networks of Americans.” American Sociological Re-
view 52(1):122–31.
139
Marsden, Peter V. 1990. “Network Data and Measurement.” Annual Review of Sociology 16:435–
63.
Marsden, Peter V. 2002. “Egocentric and Sociocentric Measures of Network Centrality.” Social
Networks 24(4):407–22.
Marsden, Peter V. 2003. “Interviewer Effects in Measuring Network Size Using a Single Name
Generator.” Social Networks 25(1):1–16.
Marsden, Peter V. and Sameer B. Srivastava. 2012. “Trends in Informal Social Participation,
1974-2008.” in Social Trends in American Life: Findings from the General Social Survey
since 1972, edited by P. V. Marsden. Princeton University Press.
Martin, John Levi and Matthew Desmond. 2010. “Political Position and Social Knowledge.”
Sociological Forum 25(1):1–26.
Mason, Lilliana. 2016. “A Cross-Cutting CalmHow Social Sorting Drives Affective Polarization.”
Public Opinion Quarterly 80(S1):351–77.
Mason, Lilliana. 2015. “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting
on Social and Issue Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59(1):128–45.
McClurg, Scott D. 2006a. “Political Disagreement in Context: The Conditional Effect of Neigh-
borhood Context, Disagreement and Political Talk on Electoral Participation.” Political
Behavior 28(4):349–66.
McClurg, Scott D. 2003. “Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Inter-
action in Explaining Political Participation.” Political Research Quarterly 56(4):449–64.
McClurg, Scott D. 2006b. “The Electoral Relevance of Political Talk: Examining Disagreement
and Expertise Effects in Social Networks on Political Participation.” American Journal of
Political Science 50(3):737–54.
McCombs, Maxwell and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.”
Public Opinion Quarterly 36(2):176–87.
140
McPherson, Miller. 2004. “A Blau Space Primer: Prolegomenon to an Ecology of Affiliation.”
Industrial and Corporate Change 13(1):263–80.
McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Matthew E. Brashears. 2009. “Models and Marginals:
Using Survey Evidence to Study Social Networks.” American Sociological Review 74(4):670–
81.
McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Matthew E. Brashears. 2006. “Social Isolation in
America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks over Two Decades.” American Sociologi-
cal Review 71(3):353–75.
McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. “Birds of a Feather: Ho-
mophily in Social Networks.” Annual Review of Sociology 27(1):415–44.
Mollenhorst, Gerald, Beate Volker, and Henk Flap. 2014. “Changes in Personal Relationships:
How Social Contexts Affect the Emergence and Discontinuation of Relationships.” Social
Networks 37:65–80.
Mollenhorst, Gerald, Beate VÃu˝lker, and Henk Flap. 2008. “Social Contexts and Core Discus-
sion Networks: Using a Choice Approach to Study Similarity in Intimate Relationships.”
Social Forces 86(3):937–65.
Mondak, Jeffery J. 1993. “Public Opinion and Heuristic Processing of Source Cues.” Political
Behavior 15(2):167–92.
Moody, James and Peter J. Mucha. 2013. “Portrait of Political Party Polarization.” Network
Science 1(1):119–21.
Morgan, Stephen L. and Christopher Winship. 2014. Counterfactuals and Causal Inference.
Cambridge University Press.
Mouw, Ted. 2006. “Estimating the Causal Effect of Social Capital: A Review of Recent Re-
search.” Annual Review of Sociology 32:79–102.
Mutz, Diana C. 2002a. “Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Prac-
141
tice.” The American Political Science Review 96(1):111–26.
Mutz, Diana C. 2002b. “The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participa-
tion.” American Journal of Political Science 46(4):838–55.
Mutz, Diana C. and Jeffery J. Mondak. 2006. “The Workplace as a Context for Cross-Cutting
Political Discourse.” Journal of Politics 68(1):140–155.
Nickerson, David W. 2008. “Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments.” The
American Political Science Review 102(1):49–57.
Nyhan, Brendan and Jason Reifler. 2010. “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions.” Political Behavior 32(2):303–30.
Olson, James M. and Mark P. Zanna. 1993. “Attitudes and Attitude Change.” Annual Review of
Psychology 44(1):117–54.
Olsson, Ulf, Fritz Drasgow, and Neil J. Dorans. 1982. “The Polyserial Correlation Coefficient.”
Psychometrika 47(3):337–47.
Open Science Collaboration. 2015. “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science.”
Science 349(6251).
Pachucki, Mark A. and Ronald L. Breiger. 2010. “Cultural Holes: Beyond Relationality in Social
Networks and Culture.” Annual Review of Sociology 36(1):205–24.
Paik, Anthony and Kenneth Sanchagrin. 2013. “Social Isolation in America: An Artifact.”
American Sociological Review 78(3):339–60.
Parigi, Paolo and Warner Henson. 2014. “Social Isolation in America.” Annual Review of
Sociology 40(1):153–71.
Park, Barum. 2018. “How Are We Apart? Continuity and Change in the Structure of Ideological
Disagreement in the American Public, 1980–2012.” Social Forces forthcoming.
Parker-Stephen, Evan. 2013. “Tides of Disagreement: How Reality Facilitates (and Inhibits)
142
Partisan Public Opinion.” The Journal of Politics 75(04):1077–1088.
Pattie, C. J. and R. J. Johnston. 2009. “Conversation, Disagreement and Political Participation.”
Political Behavior 31(2):261–85.
Pattie, C. J. and R. J. Johnston. 2008. “It’s Good to Talk: Talk, Disagreement and Tolerance.”
British Journal of Political Science 38(4):677–98.
Paxton, Pamela. 1999. “Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator
Assessment.” American Journal of Sociology 105(1):88–127.
Peel, Leto and Aaron Clauset. 2014. “Detecting Change Points in the Large-Scale Structure of
Evolving Networks.” ArXiv:1403.0989 [Physics, Stat].
Perkins, Jessica M., S. V. Subramanian, and Nicholas A. Christakis. 2015. “Social Networks
and Health: A Systematic Review of Sociocentric Network Studies in Low- and Middle-
Income Countries.” Social Science & Medicine 125:60–78.
Prior, Markus. 2013. “Media and Political Polarization.” Annual Review of Political Science
16(1):101–27.
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
Simon and Schuster.
Pustejovsky, James E. and James P. Spillane. 2009. “Question-Order Effects in Social Network
Name Generators.” Social Networks 31(4):221–29.
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia and Anders Skrondal. 2012. Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using
Stata, Volumes I and II, Third Edition. 3 edition. College Station, Tex: Stata Press.
Rivera, Mark T., Sara B. Soderstrom, and Brian Uzzi. 2010. “Dynamics of Dyads in Social Net-
works: Assortative, Relational, and Proximity Mechanisms.” Annual Review of Sociology
36(1):91–115.
Robins, Garry, Pip Pattison, Yuval Kalish, and Dean Lusher. 2007. “An Introduction to Expo-
143
nential Random Graph (P*) Models for Social Networks.” Social Networks 29(2):173–91.
Robison, Joshua and Kevin J. Mullinix. 2015. “Elite Polarization and Public Opinion: How
Polarization Is Communicated and Its Effects.” Political Communication 0(0):1–22.
Rogers, Everett M. 2003. Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Edition. Simon and Schuster.
Ryan, John Barry. 2011. “Social Networks as a Shortcut to Correct Voting.” American Journal
of Political Science 55(4):753–766.
Rytina, Steve and David L. Morgan. 1982. “The Arithmetic of Social Relations: The Interplay
of Category and Network.” American Journal of Sociology 88(1):88–113.
Schwadel, Philip and Michael Stout. 2012. “Age, Period and Cohort Effects On Social Capital.”
Social Forces 91(1):233–52.
Settle, Jaime E. et al. 2016. “From Posting to Voting: The Effects of Political Competition on
Online Political Engagement.” Political Science Research and Methods 4(02):361–78.
Shachar, Ron and Barry Nalebuff. 1999. “Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political
Participation.” The American Economic Review 89(3):525–47.
Shor, Boris and Nolan McCarty. 2011. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.”
The American Political Science Review; Washington 105(3):530–51.
Sigman, Aric. 2009. “Well Connected?” Biologist 56(1):14–20.
Simmel, Georg. 1950. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Simon and Schuster.
Small, Mario Luis. 2013. “Weak Ties and the Core Discussion Network: Why People Regularly
Discuss Important Matters with Unimportant Alters.” Social Networks 35(3):470–83.
Small, Mario Luis, Vontrese Deeds Pamphile, and Peter McMahan. 2015. “How Stable Is the
Core Discussion Network?” Social Networks 40:90–102.
Smith, Jeffrey A., Miller McPherson, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 2014. “Social Distance in the
United States Sex, Race, Religion, Age, and Education Homophily among Confidants,
144
1985 to 2004.” American Sociological Review 79(3):432–56.
Smith, Kirsten P. and Nicholas A. Christakis. 2008. “Social Networks and Health.” Annual
Review of Sociology 34(1):405–29.
Smith, Sanne, Daniel A. McFarland, Frank Van Tubergen, and Ineke Maas. 2016. “Ethnic
Composition and Friendship Segregation: Differential Effects for Adolescent Natives and
Immigrants.” American Journal of Sociology 121(4):1223–72.
Snijders, Tom A. B., Gerhard G. van de Bunt, and Christian E. G. Steglich. 2010. “Introduction
to Stochastic Actor-Based Models for Network Dynamics.” Social Networks 32(1):44–60.
Snijders, Tom A. B. and Christian E. G. Steglich. 2015. “Representing Micro–Macro Linkages by
Actor-Based Dynamic Network Models.” Sociological Methods & Research 44(2):222–71.
Sokhey, Anand E. and Paul A. Djupe. 2014. “Name Generation in Interpersonal Political Net-
work Data: Results from a Series of Experiments.” Social Networks 36:147–61.
Stark, David. 2011. “What’s Valuable.” Pp. 319–38 in The Worth of Goods: Valuation and
Pricing in Markets, edited by P. Aspers and J. Beckert. Oxford University Press, USA.
Stets, Jan E. and Peter J. Burke. 2000. “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory.” Social
Psychology Quarterly 63(3):224–37.
Stimson, James A. 1975. “Belief Systems: Constraint, Complexity, and the 1972 Election.”
American Journal of Political Science 19(3):393–417.
Straits, Bruce C. 2000. “Ego’s Important Discussants or Significant People: An Experiment in
Varying the Wording of Personal Network Name Generators.” Social Networks 22(2):123–
40.
Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review
51(2):273–86.
Taber, Charles S. and Milton Lodge. 2006. “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political
145
Beliefs.” American Journal of Political Science 50(3):755–69.
Vaisey, Stephen. 2009. “Motivation and Justification: A Dual-Process Model of Culture in
Action.” American Journal of Sociology 114(6):1675–1715.
Vaisey, Stephen and Omar Lizardo. 2010. “Can Cultural Worldviews Influence Network Com-
position?” Social Forces 88(4):1595–1618.
Vaisey, Stephen and Omar Lizardo. 2016. “Cultural Fragmentation or Acquired Dispositions?
A New Approach to Accounting for Patterns of Cultural Change.” Socius 2.
Valente, Thomas W. 2012. “Network Interventions.” Science 337(6090):49–53.
Valente, Thomas W., Kathryn Coronges, Cynthia Lakon, and Elizabeth Costenbader. 2008.
“How Correlated Are Network Centrality Measures?” Connections 28(1):16–26.
Vehovar, Vasja, Katja Lozar Manfreda, Gasper Koren, and Valentina Hlebec. 2008. “Measuring
Ego-Centered Social Networks on the Web: Questionnaire Design Issues.” Social Net-
works 30(3):213–22.
Wang, Hua and Barry Wellman. 2010. “Social Connectivity in America: Changes in Adult
Friendship Network Size From 2002 to 2007.” American Behavioral Scientist 53(8):1148–
69.
Watts, Duncan J. 2014. “Common Sense and Sociological Explanations.” American Journal of
Sociology 120(2):313–51.
Watts, Duncan J. and Peter Sheridan Dodds. 2007. “Influentials, Networks, and Public Opinion
Formation.” Journal of Consumer Research 34(4):441–58.
Waugh, Andrew Scott, Liuyi Pei, James H. Fowler, Peter J. Mucha, and Mason A. Porter. 2009.
“Party Polarization in Congress: A Network Science Approach.” ArXiv:0907.3509 [Physics].
Wellman, Barry. 1979. “The Community Question: The Intimate Networks of East Yorkers.”
American Journal of Sociology 84(5):1201–31.
146
Wimmer, Andreas and Kevin Lewis. 2010. “Beyond and Below Racial Homophily: ERG Mod-
els of a Friendship Network Documented on Facebook.” American Journal of Sociology
116(2):583–642.
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press.
Zeng and Xie. 2008. “A Preference-Opportunity-Choice Framework with Applications to Inter-
group Friendship.” American Journal of Sociology 114(3):615–48.
Zhao, Shanyang. 2006. “Do Internet Users Have More Social Ties? A Call for Differentiated
Analyses of Internet Use.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 11(3):844–62.
Zuckerman, Alan S. 2005. The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political
Behavior. Temple University Press.
147
Appendix A: Interviewer Effects as an Artifact
In this appendix, I show that the foundation for thinking that there may be unique interviewer
effects in the 2004 GSS is not particularly robust. The basic premise of Paik and Sanchagrin
(2013) [hereafter PS] is that there is a largely unexplained interviewer-specific variance in the
2004 GSS, and that there is a significant negative relationship between the intraclass correla-
tion (the ratio of interviewer-level variance over the residual variance) and network size across
five different ego-centric network surveys. If it were true that larger interviewer-specific vari-
ance is linked to smaller network size, then that would help us understand the smaller network
size reported in the 2004 GSS.
To assess this possibility, PS consider the 2005 National Social Life, Health and Aging
Project (NSHAP), 1998 General Social Survey, and 1995 Chicago Health and Social Life Survey
(CHSLS) which all appear comparable to the 2004 and 2010 GSS. Yet, these data sets are not
really comparable with respect to wording, target population, or name generator used. The
1995 CHSLS obtains network size from a combination of the “important matters” name gen-
erator (up to three) and “sharing free time” name generator (up to three). The NSHAP data
are also different from the 2004/2010 GSS. The introduction to the “important matters” name
generator used in NSHAP is of better quality, longer and more detailed than the one used in
GSS (Cornwell et al. 2009)1. Likewise, while the 1998 GSS uses the same “structure” of the
1“Now we are going to ask you some questions about your relationships with other people. We will begin by
identifying some of the people you interact with on a regular basis. You may refer to these people in anyway you
want; for example, you may use just their first names or nicknames. We are not interested in the identities of
these persons, we just need to have some way to refer to them so that when we ask you some follow-up questions
we both know whom we are talking about.
From time to time, most people discuss things that are important to them with others. For example, these may
include good or bad things that happen to you, problems you are having, or important concerns you may have.
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other GSSs, its content is different (i.e., “good friends”) (Marsden 2003).
While it can be a useful strategy to assess the sources of significant interview-specific vari-
ances measured by using intra-class correlation separately in each sample, the differences in
question wording, instruments form, and target population make the comparison deeply prob-
lematic precisely because each of these differences is known to be an important factor influ-
encing network size (Coromina and Coenders 2006; Marsden 1990; Pustejovsky and Spillane
2009; Straits 2000; Vehovar et al. 2008).
Ignoring this issue, the negative correlation identified by PS is not robust. If we include
two studies employing a “political matters” name generator, we observe that the correlation
becomes close to zero.
The fact that network size increases when “outlier interviewers” are
removed is tautological.
PS assert that it is possible to show the impact of “outlier interviewers” who consistently report
more social isolation than expected by chance, by excluding such outliers in estimating average
network size. They show that there are “over-reporting” outlier interviewers in the 2004 GSS
(but not in the 2010 GSS), and eliminating such outliers increases the average network size
and decreases the intra-class correlation in the 2004 GSS. However, this strategy of removing
outlier interviewers who over-report social isolation (i.e., zero network size) is tautological.
To demonstrate this, we repeat their analysis using the primary sampling unit (sampcode)
which doesn’t make any theoretical sense. Namely, rather than considering interviewers as
level-2 unit, we treat PSUs as level-2 unit in random intercept regression models, calculate the
intraclass correlation, and identify outlier PSUs that consistently over-report social isolation.
Looking back over the last 12 months, who are the people with whom you most often discussed things that were
important to you?”
(PROMPT IF DON’T KNOW: This could be a person you tend to talk to about things that are important to you.)”
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including the 2000 and 2006 ANES
NOTE: Given that the 2000 ANES probes the name of alters listed in “political matters”
name generators up to four and the 2006 ANES probes the name of alters listed in “political
matters” or “important matters” name generators up to ten, we top-coded network size in
both ANES data as six (from four to six in the 2000 ANES, from six more to six in the 2006
ANES), though the results do not change even if we use the original scale.
Panel A, Table A1 reports that intra-class correlations of PSUs are quite large in the 2004
GSS data (=0.15), but small in the 2010 GSS data (=0.03). Recall that we identify outlier
PSUs as Paik and Sanchagrin (2013) did using the exact same method. Panel B, Table A1
shows that if those outlier PSUs are removed, mean network size is increased both in the 2004
and 2010 GSS data. As found in Paik and Sanchagrin (2013), we find that removing those
over-reporting PSUs significantly increases average network size in 2004. If one removes lots
of units that consistently report social isolation (i.e. zero network size) either based on “PSU”
or “interviewer”, average network sizes has to be reduced.
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Table A1: Analysis of over-reporting Primary Sampling Units (PSUs).
Panel A. Intra-class correlation and mean network size of PSUs in the 2004 and 2010 GSS
GSS 2004 GSS 2010
Mean Network Size 2.12 2.42
intra-class correlation 0.15 0.03
N 1368 1272
N PSUs 79 79
Panel B. The effects of excluding over-reporting PSUs on network size
Full Sample 23% 12%
In the 2004 GSS
Percent PSUs with Extreme Values 4.50% 34.40%
Mean Network Size 2.12 2.18 2.43
N 1426 1,62 935
In the 2010 GSS
Percent PSUs with Extreme Values 4.64% 31.21%
Mean Network Size 2.42 2.43 2.54
N 1272 1213 875
The training and fatigue mechanisms associated with the long battery of
voluntary association membership are more likely driven by respondent
level factors than interviewer-level factors.
PS argue that a source for interviewer effects is the long battery of voluntary association mem-
bership right before asking “important matters” name generators in 2004. Based on survey
experiment data in the 2010 GSS that randomize the location of important matters name gen-
erator, PS show that the intra-class correlation is bigger and network size is smaller when
interviewers ask the name generator right after the voluntary association membership module
(in the ballot two) compared to the ballot one where the name generator is asked before the
organizational module.
First, the survey experiment in the 2010 GSS clearly shows there is no evidence for the
pattern of the negative correlation between network size and intra-class correlation, which
contradicts their basic premise; for example, the ballot three (i.e., the network name genera-
tor is asked at the end of survey) produced similar network size (=2.53) compared to mean
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network size (=2.56) from the ballot one (i.e., the network name generator is asked earlier).
Second, if the ballot design influences “interviewers” rather than “respondents”, logically, the
behavior of interviewers should be systematically different across different ballots not within
ballots. This is not the case. The vast majority of interviewers who used ballot two and then
reported smaller network size used ballot one and reported larger network sizes. This implies
that over-reporting interviewers report less social isolation because of the ballot they used, not
because of who they are. To further test the idea that over-reporters should be more present
in ballot two than other ballots, we calculate the proportion of over-reporting interviewers in
each ballot, and show the results in Table A1. We find that the relationship is not statistically
significant (p=0.312).





















Mean network size 2.12 2.56 2.15 2.53
intra-class correlation 0.218 0 0.11 0.13
N respondents 1368 402 379 408
N interviewers 131 152 136 142
% interviewers over-reporting “social isolation” (at .12
level)
18.80% 2.31% 4.20% 3.45%
% interviewers over-reporting “social isolation” (at .23
level)
8.80% 0.46% 0.49% 0%
% interviewers over-reporting “no voluntary associa-
tional membership” (at .25 level)
15.29% 6.42% 8.66% 8.53%
Odds-ratio between over-reporting “social isolation”
and “membership isolation” among interviewers
3.12*** 7.81** 2.38 8.34***
Odds-ratio between “social isolation” and “membership
isolation” among respondents
1.96*** N/A 1.72* 1.80*
NOTE: Almost all interviewers except 11% interviewers are assigned to at least two of these ballots. No
respondent reports the social isolation in ballot one. (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001)
If the pattern is indeed related to interviewers’ training/fatigue mechanisms, then it should
152
also be related to their behaviors for the voluntary association membership batteries. If the in-
terviewer effect is driven by ballot two where the voluntary membership organization module
precedes the network name generator, then we would expect to see the larger correlation of
over-reporting both “social isolation” and “membership isolation” in ballot two since interview-
ers should “consistently” report zero network size and zero voluntary membership. As PS iden-
tify the over-reporting “social isolation” interviewers, we can also identify the over-reporting
“no voluntary association membership” interviewers. Using the exact same method based on
the lowest level of no voluntary associational membership reported in 1974 (=25%), we iden-
tify about 15% outlier interviewers who consistently over-report “membership isolation” in
2004. We measure the correlation of two identifications by odds-ratio and find the opposite
result: In ballot two, over-reporting “membership isolation” interviewers are not significantly
likely to be identified as over-reporting “social isolation” interviewers (even smaller level of as-
sociation than other ballots). In contrast, we find a similar level of association between social
isolation and no membership among respondents in ballot two and three. Combined, these are
consistent with the idea that voluntary association membership has an effect on “respondents”,
not on “interviewers”.
The idea that the puzzle proposed by Fischer (2009) would disappear if
one excludes outlier interviewers who consistently over-report social
isolation is not supported.
One of puzzles identified by Fischer (2009) is that the effects of education and face-to-face
contacts on network size are shown to be weak in 2004 compared to other GSS surveys. To
test the idea that this puzzle is driven by sloppy interviewers who misreport network size and
social isolation, PS show that two effects will be stronger and significant after removing the
samples interviewed by over-reporters defined at the 23% expected level of social isolation.
However, these results do not hold against alternative model specification.
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Table A3: Replication and extension of Table 4, Panel A in Paik and Sanchagrin (2013)
Dependent Variable Network Size






Age -0.001 0 0.006 0.002
Female 0.222 0.238** 0.108 0.089*
White 0 0 0 0
Black -0.324** -0.391** -0.707 -0.007
Other 0.438 -0.842*** -0.002 -0.422***
Currently Married 0.322** 0.085 0.393 0.012
Education 0.064 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.062***
Constant -0.599 0.223 -2.286* -0.068
N 163 1257 163 1257
NOTE: This table shows the results from OLS and zero-inflation poisson models for network size after sampling
designs are adjusted. The same set of variables enters into zero-inflation process (which are suppressed). (*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
Table A4: Replication and extension of Table 4, Panel B in Paik and Sanchagrin (2013)
Sub-sample Among over-reporters













Isolation -0.511** -0.133 -0.332* -0.423** -0.472***
N 835 837 838 838 837
Sub-sample Among over-reporters













Isolation -0.165 0.243 -0.087 -0.61 -0.787**
N 94 94 95 95 95
NOTE : This table shows the results from ordered logistic regression models for different types of contacts
after sampling designs are adjusted. Control variables used in Table A3 are included but not shown. (* p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
First, note that there is another idiosyncratic finding that was suppressed in Paik and San-
chagrin (2013)’s presentation of results. Results from OLS model in Table A3 show that married
individuals have significantly larger networks in the over-reporting sample, which contradicts
an element of the puzzle proposed by Fischer (2009) – the observation of a weaker relationship
between marital status and network size. At the same time, as identified by Fischer (2009)
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and McPherson et al (2009), we need to account for the fact that the network size variable is
generated by both zero-inflation process and poisson process. Table A3 shows that the effect
of education becomes stronger and statistically significant among the over reporting sample in
which PS showed that education effect is weaker and insignificant, by estimating zero-inflated
poision regression models.
As for the association between “face-to-face” contacts and network size, it is important to
note that fewer than one hundred respondents are asked the “face-to-face” contacts question
in “outlier” sample. Instead of making claims based on “statistical significance” from small
samples, we present all of the patterns of association across different types of contacts in Table
A4. Among the over-reporting sample, we consistently observe that social isolation decreases
several types of contacts except for “seeing them at meetings/clubs”. In addition, if we focus
on “talking on the phone” and “exchange letters”, isolation effects get stronger among samples
interviewed by over-reporters than non-over-reporters. This suggests that those interviewed
by “over-reporting isolation” interviewers prefer talking on the phone or exchanging letters
rather than seeing others through face-to-face contact or communicating through email.
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